C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000073

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR S. DELISI, L. AROIAN, M. RAYNOR
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, D. TEITELBAUM
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY
PARIS FOR C. NEARY
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2009
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON EFIN ZI ZANU PF
SUBJECT: RULING PARTY TURNS ON ONE OF ITS OWN

REF: 03 HARARE 2364

Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5(b)(d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Flamboyant ZANU-PF MP and prominent
businessman Philip Chiyangwa was arrested January 10 on
charges relating to a GOZ investigation of troubled ENG
Capital Asset Management (ENG). His arrest manifests
divisions within the ruling party that probably are based on
business considerations and personal rivalries, not political
views. Chiyangwa's difficulties may foreshadow additional
intramural combat stemming from failing economic fortunes of
selected principals and machinations among ambitious or
insecure ZANU-PF politicians. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) Chiyangwa, the ZANU-PF MP for Chinhoyi, has remained
in jail since his arrest, emerging only for court hearings
over the weekend and again January 12. The High Court ruled
over the weekend that police had no grounds to hold Chiyangwa
but police refused to release him. According to the
government-controlled Herald newspaper, police claimed that
the High Court order was technically invalid because it had
been addressed to the wrong official. Late January 12 a
magistrate's court heard defense counsel's petition to have
charges dismissed. The magistrate reserved judgment and
remanded Chiyangwa into police custody. The magistrate is
expected to decide this week whether Chiynagwa has a case to
answer and, if so, to consider application for bail. An
attorney with the law firm representing Chiyangwa told the
embassy that police had been unavailable to discuss the
matter with counsel and would not predict when Chiyangwa
might be released.

¶3. (U) Chiyangwa reportedly faces charges of obstructing
justice, perjury, and contempt of court. The first two
charges relate to his alleged lack of cooperation with
authorities in their investigation of ENG during the last two
weeks. Two ENG principals reportedly had enlisted
Chiyangwa's support in protecting them from creditors and in
getting a criminal fraud investigation against them scotched
(Chairman of the Parliamentary Budget, Finance, and Economic
Planning Committee David Chapfika reportedly also was
involved in "facilitating" matters for ENG). Chiyangwa
allegedly had sheltered some of the ENG principals' cars from
creditors and obstructed police efforts to recover them. The
second charge stemmed from Chiyangwa asserting in open court
last week during proceedings on ENG that he "would deal with"
police connected to the case. He refused the sitting
magistrate's instruction to retract the statement.

¶4. (U) Media reports during recent months indicated that
many components of Chiyangwa's diversified business empire
were overleveraged or being sold at distressed prices. The
government-oriented Mirror on January 11 further reported
that Chiyangwa was attempting to extort ZD400 million (USD
60,000) from FSI Agricom Holdings through an illegal lease
arrangement relating to a farm he had seized -- allegedly
outside the terms of the GOZ land reform program. The
article added that Chiyangwa had sent thugs from the
so-called Chinhoyi-based "Top Six" gang to suppress violently
FSI's efforts to remove its equipment from the property.

¶5. (C) Curiously, the law firm retained by the ruling party
stalwart is known best for election petitions and other
actions aligned with the opposition. One lawyer from the
firm noted that the actions supporting the charges against
Chiyangwa -- sheltering the cars and then threatening the
police -- would normally have required arrest on the spot or
no arrest at all. Indeed, the magistrate who heard the
threat to police took no action when Chiyangwa refused his
instruction to retract it. It was only later that he was
arrested, which the lawyer suggested indicated the
intervention of high-level officials.

¶6. (C) In his diatribe against party members who put
personal interests ahead of the party, President Mugabe
singled out Chiyangwa (and only Chiyangwa by name) for
warning during December's national ruling party conference.
Vice-President Joseph Msika was one who had it in for
Chiyangwa; his January 9 warning to unnamed politicians who
abused their position and threatened law enforcement
authorities was widely reported by national media as a stern
warning to Chiyangwa. Perhaps reflecting more than
coincidence, Msika's remarks were made at the opening of a
grocery store owned by ZANU-PF Central Committee member James
Makamba, who reputedly fought Chiyangwa over a farm seized
under land reform. A close relative of Msika confided to
DATT that Msika indeed had played a role in driving
proceedings and had waited to take action against Chiyangwa,
a distant Mugabe relation, until Mugabe was out of the
country and Msika himself would be acting president. A
second source who knows Msika well told us (on what basis we
do not know) that Msika informed Mugabe in advance of his
intention to act against Chiyangwa.

¶7. (C) COMMENT: A cocky favorite with the local media,
Chiyangwa is one of the most prominent of a new breed of
ZANU-PF young turks who have translated their position into
phenomenal business success by hook or by crook. The 44-year
old is a rough cut: during the run-up to the 2002 elections,
he took out ads promising money to supporters and appeared in
video clips encouraging violence against white farmers and
MDC supporters. More recently, his notorious "Top Six" gang
has been implicated in violently preventing MDC political
candidates from filing nomination papers, as well as in the
violent seizure of farm properties. A high profile black
empowerment advocate, Chiyangwa is a lightning rod who
provokes strong reactions among Zimbabweans; dozens of his
supporters (including other politicians) chanted
revolutionary songs (and, curiously, anti-opposition slogans)
in his support at the courtroom during his hearing January 10.

¶8. (C) COMMENT (CONT'D): Notwithstanding his national
prominence and appeal to many, Chiyangwa clearly lost favor
with those who matter. His alleged improprieties generally
conformed to popular practice in Zimbabwe; that they did not
enjoy customary impunity substantiates the political nature
of his prosecution. Although the youthful Chiyangwa's
political career may not be over for good, the rising star's
rather sudden eclipse offers some lessons. First, it
underscores the precariousness of power among those who
jockey for position below the ruling party's pinnacle. We do
not know fully what led to Chiyangwa's apparent demise;
however, the braggadocio and colorful disdain for authority
that contributed to his fast rise to prominence appears also
to have been instrumental in his fall. In a party with but
one leader and voice, individualism and ambition often
provoke suspicion, jealousy and a concerted drawing of
daggers among rivals who view power as a zero sum game. His
plight, prominently chronicled in humiliating detail by the
government media, is a warning to other party mavericks and
rising stars. The turning of the state media, always under
the control of Information Minister Jonathan Moyo, against
Chiyangwa is itself an object lesson on the fickleness of
cronyism.

¶9. (C) COMMENT (CONT'D): The decline of Chiyangwa's business
empire certainly reduced his value to the party and to those
in the party who might have protected him. In that vein,
there are other party business moguls who, like Chiyangwa,
are finding themselves dangerously overextended -- and
increasingly expendable -- as the economy continues its
downward spiral. Those who, like Chiyangwa, have built
economic and political success at the expense of rule of law
may increasingly find themselves hoisted on their own petard
should Zimbabwe continue on its current course. The
situation appears ripe for additional intrigue and
bloodletting within the ruling party but, with depth of
personal loyalty to Mugabe being the principal credential for
career security and advancement, little of this augurs well
for a healthier policy-making environment.

SULLIVAN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 002025

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL CG KBEM
SUBJECT: MINISTER OF INTERIOR ON ELECTIONS, SECURITY


Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d.

¶1. (C) Summary: Minister of Interior, and PPRD co-founder,
Theofile Mbemba expressed concern that the newly launched
pre-election campaigns will further divide the transitional
components and throw up new obstacles to military
integration. He outlined a PPRD strategy to dominate all the
southern provinces except western Kasai, as well as South
Kivu and Katanga in the East, thereby ensuring Joseph
Kabila's victory. The majority of seats in Parliament likely
will go to the MLC, according to the Minister, making Bemba
Prime Minister. Mbemba insisted that Kabila has decided to
be the PPRD candidate but will postpone announcing this until
early December. The PPRD is exploring alliances with the MLC
and Etienne Tshisekedi's UDPS with an eye to improving the
PPRD position in Province Orientale and western Kasai,
respectively. When pressed, he admitted that Katanga could
be not only an electoral battleground but the stumbling block
for the transition as a whole. With face-offs between police
and military on the rise and social tension increasing,
Mbemba said, the country could "implode" before elections in
any event. End Summary.

The PPRD Elections Map -- Color It PPRD

¶2. (C) Over dinner October 29 at PolCoun's house, Minister
of Interior and PPRD co-founder Theofile Mbemba waxed
enthusiastic over his party's likely success in next year's
elections. Simply put, party strategists believe the PPRD
will control Kinshasa (itself a province), Bas-Congo,
Bandundu and East Kasai, as well as South Kivu and Katanga.
West Kasai is solidly with Etienne Tshisekedi's UDPS so
unless PPRD can forge an alliance they will not do well there
-- and do not intend to waste time, money or effort in trying
to do so. The Eastern Province probably will go to
Jean-Pierre Bemba's MLC, according to Mbemba, but
surprisingly, Bemba could lose his home province of Equateur
to either the UDPS (which, according to Mbemba, is well
organized and working hard there) or to the PPRD. The RCD is
too weak to control anything, and therefore the entire East
is up for grabs -- which, he said, explains why everyone has
launched their campaigns in Bukavu (or, in the President's
case, Kisangani). A clearly disgruntled Mbemba acknowledged
that President Kabila will now be the last politician to
visit South Kivu, since Bemba, VP Z'Ahidi Ngoma and now VP
Yarodia have all made initial visits. Nonetheless, Mbemba
was confident that Kabila will capture South Kivu, in part
because of his mother's origins. (Note: Presidential
friends and loyalists say that Kabila's mother is a South
Kivutian -- his enemies say that she is a Rwandan. In any
event, she likely is from South Kivu, at least
geographically. End Note.) North Kivu will be an enigma
until the day after elections, Mbemba predicted, but
acknowledged that Bemba clearly is courting Governor
Serufuli, who is unquestionably well-positioned to "deliver"
his province to the candidate of his choice. (Septel reports
further details of Bemba's visit to the two Kivus.) Even
without North Kivu, however, Mbemba said Kabila will garner
the majority of the popular vote, guaranteeing his election
as president.

Useful But Not Necessary Alliances

¶3. (C) Mbemba said that the PPRD is exploring a possible
alliance with the MLC, primarily with the aim of improving
its effective presence in Parliament, i.e., the MLC likely
will win a majority of Parliamentary seats, putting it in a
position to block key government legislation. Bemba likely
would "settle" for being Prime Minister, a position which
would ensure his continued access to wealth, and he and
Kabila normally have a good working relationship, Mbemba
said, making this a natural partnership. (Note: Mbemba said
that both PPRD and MLC have already decided to support a
President-Prime Minister-Parliament scheme for the future
government, implying there is therefore little left to do but
produce the appropriate paragraphs in the consitution
enshrining this arrangement. End Note.) PPRD also is
talking to Tshisekedi's UDPS but so far the negotiations
haven't advanced much beyond the early stages, in large part
because PPRD has more to offer UDPS than vice versa --
although PPRD would, Mbemba admitted, like to add West Kasai
to its group of "captive" provinces. (Comment: It could be
hard for the elder statesman Tshisekedi to swallow being
second fiddle to a young upstart like Kabila. End Comment.)
Mbemba insisted that UDPS will not renew its old ties to the
RCD (despite recent confident assertions PolCouns heard from
RCD leaders), since the RCD "has nothing to offer anyone."
When PolCouns asked about courting Z'Ahidi Ngoma or Yarodia
(for the support of the unarmed political opposition and
civil society, respectively) Mbemba somewhat contemptuously
dismissed both, noting that neither faction is united nor
does either benefit from strong leadership -- meaning that
all the diverse elements are up for grabs. (Comment: Given
the historical animosity between Yarodia and Kabila it would
be hard in any event to image Yarodia throwing his support
behind Kabila, even were he in a position to do so. End
Comment.) He added, almost in passing, that President Kabila
is currently "on the outs" with Z'Ahidi over the latter's
visit to Bukavu the same weekend as the President's trip to
Kisangani -- a move clearly designed to upstage the President
in one of his "home provinces." After a quick pause, Mbemba
said that of the major religious groups (a key element of
civil society) the Kimbanguists definitely will support
Kabila, and possibly the Catholics as well, but that the
evangalists probably will go for Tshisekedi while the
protestants will throw their support to Bemba.

Katanga The Battleground, Maybe In More Ways Than One

¶4. (C) When pressed, Mbemba reluctantly acknowledged that
PPRD might have trouble in Katanga -- in more ways than one.
From both an electoral and security standpoint, he said, the
province is increasingly problematic and indeed, could be the
trigger which explodes the transition. Pointing to outside
influence, Mbemba said that Congolese security forces have,
in the last several weeks, "escorted" over thirty Zambians to
the border and warned them not to return. These were people,
he said, who have been posing as businessmen but who actually
have been fomenting unrest and political divisiveness;
likewise Tanzania is increasingly active in the province,
particularly in the northern zones, and its influence is
becoming worrisome, while South Africa is a "giant" in the
provincial landscape. All this plus, he noted, a resurgence
of traditional tribal-based tensions between north-south
Katanga and between southern Katanga and West Kasai,
represents a heady and potentially explosive brew. Finally,
he noted cautiously, there are some Presidential advisors,
Katangans, who don't necessarily want elections and who have
been working against the President's interests in the
province. (Comment: Mbemba wouldn't name names, but most
likely he was referring to both Air Force General Numbi and
Augustin Katumba, whose name increasingly is being linked to
a variety of troubling developments. PolCouns also has heard
from various people that Katumba is trying to marginalize
Mbemba or drive him from office, because he, Katumba, would
like Mbemba's job, so there also could be an element of
personal bias involved in Mbemba's hints. End Comment.)

Finger On The Trigger - Social Unrest Rising

¶5. (C) During dinner Mbemba took several calls (including
one from Kabila) about a security incident in the Kinshasa
neighborhood of Binza, where unpaid soldiers had tried to rob
moneychangers, only to be attacked by enraged citizens,
assisted by police. Using this incident as an example,
Mbemba said that he is increasingly concerned that face-offs
between military and police, or between citizens and
army/police, represent a disturbing societal shift. People
are angry and restless, he said, and more and more they are
inclined to fight back, sometimes striking out without
thinking. This "social trigger," he said, could implode the
country before the transition can get to elections. Along
these lines, he added that he regrets the early launch of
pre-campaigning, which he feels will further divide the
transition and virtually eliminate the possibility of
military integration (he predicted that the RCD, especially,
will now dig in its heels on integration since its only
political card is the threat of renewed fighting in the
East). He welcomed the latest EU initiative to provide
police training, hoping that it will augment, in some ways,
the French-trained riot police. (Comment: When Mbemba left
he was on his way to Binza, together with a military
official, to try to calm the situation without utilizing the
riot police against the military, and indeed, the situation
was resolved without recourse to violent means. End Comment.)

Comment

¶6. (C) We agree that social issues and/or the swirling
dynamic of Katanga are two potential flashpoints to future
progress, but it is unclear what the government, or Kabila
specifically, can do to defuse them. The former is difficult
due to lack of means, the latter intransigent because of
Kabila's reliance on Katangans as a key support base.
Mbemba's vision of PPRD dominance and MLC quiessence seems
simplistic and, indeed, cocky, although we could wish it
would indeed be this easy. More troubling are his admissions
-- confirming our suspicions -- of possible external
manipulation in Katanga.
MEECE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANILA 003046

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/PMBS, INR/EAP, EAP/PD, DS/ITA, DS/IP/EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR KPAO ASEC RP
SUBJECT: ARROYO STEADYING THE SHIP

REF: A. OPS CENTER - MANILA 07-01-05 TELECON

¶B. MANILA 2993
¶C. MANILA 2887
¶D. MANILA 2840
¶E. MANILA 2815

Classified By: Political Officer Andrew McClearn for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: The political scene in Manila continues to
be lively but not truly turbulent. During a day trip outside
of Manila, President Arroyo vowed to bring the country out of
"political and economic deterioration." According to her
son, the president's mood was good and she was confident of
weathering the storm. Former president Aquino urged
Filipinos to remain peaceful and loyal to the Constitution.
Hearings in the House and Senate over the tape and illegal
gambling scandals continue. The audiotapes may provide new
revelations not only about the President's conduct during the
May 2004 elections but also about alleged opposition
misdeeds. Although an impeachment motion is moving forward,
no official votes to refer it to the Senate could take place
until the next Congressional session begins on July 25; the
prospect of impeachment remains unlikely. The opposition
continues to hold anti-Arroyo rallies, but turnout remains
relatively small. Arroyo is under pressure, but seems to be
having some success in steadying the ship. End Summary.

-----------------
Arroyo Carries On
-----------------

¶2. (U) President Arroyo visited Iloilo City in the central
Philippines on June 30. She proclaimed that "I am committed
to moving this nation up from political and economic
deterioration to an age of change and renewal." The
president also expressed deep concern over the cost of oil
and its impact on the economy. The trip out of Manila was
the first that Arroyo has taken since she apologized to the
Filipino people in her June 27 address.

¶3. (C) On July 2, Charge will join President Arroyo at
Malacanang Palace to inaugurate the "Filipino People's
Initiatives Against Trafficking Road Show Campaign." USAID,
through its Rule of Law Effectiveness Project, will fund the
initial phase of this effort. The event was originally
slated to take place at a site in Samar Island in the central
Philippines, but, according to the Malacanang handler, the
President preferred to remain in Manila "for obvious reasons."

--------------
Family Bravado
--------------

¶4. (C) In a June 30 meeting with Acting Pol/C met,
presidential son and Congressman Juan Miguel "Mikey" Arroyo
said his mother was "tough," her mood was good, and she was
confident of weathering the storm. Mikey claimed that "once
the tensions subside, you will see that my mother has emerged
stronger than ever." Mikey described the opposition as
"destructive." Mikey insisted that he had no plans to resign
from office, nor did his uncle, Congressman Ignacio "Iggy"
Arroyo, although Mikey remains on an official "leave of
absence." Mikey plans to join his father on a trip to
California on or about July 5. (Comment: While Mikey's
words were cocky, his body language was clearly nervous. He
eschewed his usual expensive wardrobe and trademark
top-of-the-line Rolex for a distinctly inconspicuous look.
End comment)

¶5. (SBU) The First Gentleman departed for Hong Kong with his
other son and family and their nanny on June 30. However,
the Sandiganbayan court has summoned him to appear on July 4
for the trial of former president Joseph Estrada. According
to defense lawyer and former Senator Rene Saguisag, he plans
to prove that Mike Arroyo plotted to overthrow the Estrada
presidency together with his wife, who was then vice
president. It is not clear whether Mike intends to answer
the summons or ask for a postponement.

--------------
Voices of calm
--------------

¶6. (U) Former president Corazon Aquino publicly urged
Filipinos to remain peaceful and loyal to the Constitution.
In a June 30 televised press conference, Aquino said she had
visited Susan Roces, widow of former Arroyo foe Fernando Poe
Jr., on June 29 and made clear that Aquino would not support
any extralegal actions. Aquino encouraged the Filipino
public to find strength in prayer and said that "people power
has succeeded only if it is for others... and not personal
political gain." Aquino added "there is no need to step
outside the Constitution, since doing so would expose us to
greater danger than the injustice we want to correct."
Aquino plans to attend a prayer rally late July 1. (Charge
will meet with Aquino on July 7 for a private lunch.)

¶7. (C) According to Monsignor "Ding" Coronel, the General
Secretary of the Catholic Bishop's Conference of the

SIPDIS
Philippines (CBCP), Aquino remained very close to Manila
Archbishop Gaudencio Rosales, other members of the Catholic
hierarchy, and many rank-and-file priests and nuns. He
remarked that she had become much more active in politics of
late, including the June 26 joint call with Archbishop
Rosales on President Arroyo. Coronel commented that Aquino,
in meetings with Church leaders, had expressed interest in
the formation of a "truth commission" that would look into
the May 2004 election and ways to reform the electoral
system. Coronel added that the CBCP will issued statements
regarding the situation during its annual meeting in Manila,
which will be held July 4-11. The "Social Action" office of
the CBCP issued a statement on June 30 calling for "national
sobriety" and non-violence.

----------------
Hearings Plod On
----------------

¶8. (SBU) Hearings in the House and Senate over the tape and
jueteng scandals continue. The joint committee in the House
investigating President Arroyo's role in post-2004 election
improprieties listened to a shortened version of the tape on
June 30. House Minority Leader Francis Escudero won his
motion to replay a 32-minute version of the audiotape
allegedly containing snippets of conversations between
President Arroyo and then-Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
official Virgilio Garcillano. Pro-Arroyo representatives had
argued in favor of playing the full three hour-long
audiotape, which reportedly also contains improper
conversations between COMELEC officials and members of the
opposition. House Speaker Jose de Venecia commented that in
the end the majority voted to go ahead and play the tapes
"because there is nothing to hide and we want the Filipino
people to know the truth."

¶9. (U) Across town at the Senate, the inquiry into jueteng
and charges that members of President Arroyo's family engaged
in profiteering also continued. Committee co-chairs Manuel
"Manny" Villar and Manuel "Lito" Lapid resisted Malacanang's
efforts to turn the investigation over to the Office of the
Ombudsman. Villar issued a statement that the Senate would
not tolerate intimidation of witnesses, after Archbishop
Oscar Cruz, an anti-jueteng advocate who has called for
Arroyo to resign from office, repeated claims that his life
was under threat.

¶10. (C) An impeachment motion filed on June 28 (ref b) was
modified on June 30 in order to accuse Arroyo of "conduct
unbecoming" a President. Several opposition members claimed
the motion was deliberately vague so that the pro-Arroyo
majority in the House could more easily dismiss the motion on
technical grounds. Lawmakers have moved to include the
motion in the order of business in the House. According to
July 1 comments by House administrator Artemio Adasa, the
complaint is now on track to be referred to the 55-member
House Committee on Justice (dominated by PGMA supporters) no
later than the middle of August, after the next formal
session begins on July 25. After receiving the complaint,
the committee must produce a report within 60 session days
recommending whether or not the complaint has sufficient
substance for further review by the House. A one-third vote
(79 members) is then needed in order to pass the impeachment
motion on to the Senate. Mikey Arroyo and other politicians
have predicted privately that any impeachment motion will
almost certainly not get far in the House given the
pro-Arroyo majority there.

-------
Rallies
-------

¶11. (U) The opposition continues to hold anti-Arroyo
rallies, though turnout remains small by Filipino standards.
Peaceful rallies of between 1,000 to several thousand people
took place in the central business district of Makati on July
1 and June 30. In Cebu City, about 1,000 leftists rallied in
front of the Cebu Presidential office, a.k.a., the
"Malacanang of the South." There were no reports of violence
during the protests. Opposition figures say there will be
additional rallies in days to come.

¶12. (U) The opposition has decried what its members call
the Administration's "clampdown on the freedom of speech,"
claiming that it has been difficult to muster crowds largely
because Metro Manila mayors friendly to Arroyo fail to issue
permits and the Philippine National Police (PNP) is
"uncooperative." Those in the pro-Arroyo camp have asserted
that the opposition's rallies have basically been small
because of a lack of interest among the public. Other
observers have noted that it is now the rainy season, which
dampens participation and makes rallies and marches more
difficult to pull off. There are many allegations that
protesters have received payment for turning out.

-------
Comment
-------

¶13. (C) Arroyo remains under pressure. The opposition
continues its steady drumbeat against her, and she is getting
little sign of strong support from her ostensible supporters
(many of whom have always been lukewarm towards her).
Expected price rises stemming from the onset of the expanded
Value Added Tax on July 1 could also further roil the waters
(septel will describe the limited economic impact so far of
the political drama, along with the resignation of Secretary
of Agriculture Yap due to charges of tax evasion). Arroyo
seems to be having some success in steadying the ship,
largely by insisting that she remains focused on her
substantive agenda. Unless she faces dramatic slippage in
support, perhaps due to new revelations, impeachment appears
unlikely but the saga will continue to unfold.

Visit Embassy Manila's Classified SIPRNET website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/manila/index. cfm

You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/

MUSSOMELI

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000707

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL RS MD UP EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EUR DAS KRAMER DISCUSSES RUSSIA, UKRAINE, MOLDOVA,
AND BELARUS WITH EU OFFICIALS

Classified By: USEU POLCOUNS LEE LITZENBERGER; REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

¶1. (C) Summary: On February 22, EUR DAS David Kramer held
COEST Troika consultations with the EU on Russia, Ukraine,
Moldova, and Belarus. On Russia, the EU agrees that a
combative Russia feels it is in an increasingly strengthened
position. The European Commission viewed the "creeping
reassertiveness" of Russia with concern but focused on
potential areas of cooperation such as deeper economic
engagement - once WTO accession has taken place - and on the
four common spaces agreement the EU has with Russia. On
Belarus, the EU emphasized that Belarus is isolating itself
with its revanchist behavior and, despite
EU/US efforts to engage the Belarusian government, there is
no reciprocal behavior from the authorities in Minsk. Asset
freezes and travel bans, in addition to revoking General
System of Preferences (GSP), were discussed as possible
post-election censures that could be carried out in the event
of problematic presidential elections March 19. On Ukraine,
the Austrians (EU presidency) said they have told Kiev that
standards will be high for upcoming parliamentary elections
and that a government should be formed quickly. There was
broad disappointment at Ukraine's backsliding on its
purported agreements on helping facilitate a settlement for
Transnistria. On Moldova, EU Special Representative (EUSR)
for Moldova
Adrian Jacobovits underlined that the Russian position on
Transnistria is making it significantly harder to move
forward; Moscow is getting "cocky." The EC said it is
looking at expanding the size of its Border Assistance
Mission (BAM) in Moldova. End Summary.

Russia
------

¶2. (C) In EUR/DAS Kramer's February 22 US-EU COEST Troika
discussions with EU officials, there was broad consensus that
dealing with Moscow is becoming increasingly difficult. In a
separate consultation, Fokion Fotiadis, Deputy Director
General for European Neighborhood Policy in the Commission,
told DAS Kramer that the EC sees Russia as "trending in the
wrong direction" and that they would like to send a tough
message to Moscow on energy security in the runup to the G-8
Summit without making it look as if they are declaring war on
Russia. Russia should "get the message" on market-oriented
policies - if Russia wants Europe to have market policies,
then Russia will have to adapt to such principles on Europe's
terms as well. He expressed interest in sitting down with US
officials to try to come to an agreement on how this message
should be conveyed. Expressing a broader concern with
Moscow's
political use of its energy companies, Fotiadis said that
Russian energy companies operating in Europe will come under
closer scrutiny by the European Commission competition
commission. Fotiadis agreed with DAS Kramer that much more
support for Russia's neighbors is needed, particularly
Ukraine, because of Russian behavior.

¶3. (C) EU Council officials shared the belief that a Russian
Presidency of the G-8 is a challenge for everybody as we see
that Russia does not share our view of what its G-8
presidency should look like. It looks as if the Russians see
their G-8 presidency as a "window of opportunity" to assert
more power and be more forceful, according to EU Council
Russia policy official Carl Hallergard. In response to a
question on whether the Kremlin cares what the EU and US
think anymore, Hallergard stated that, "to the extent that
the Russians care, they think they can handle it - but it
looks like they simply
don't care anymore." He went on to say that Foreign Minster
Lavrov's recent message to the EU is that EU/Russia
consultations only occur when there is a crisis and that the
EU should consult with Russia earlier and more frequently.

¶4. (C) While acknowledging the challenges that face the EU in
dealing with Russia, EU officials also looked at areas of
engagement that will be possible over the coming months.
Petteri Vuoromaki of Finland, representing the incoming
Finnish Presidency of the EU, said that Russia would be a
priority of the Finnish tenure. He stated that Finland would
focus on discussing contractual obligations
between the EU and Russia, reinvigorating the energy
dialogue, stressing the importance of regional cooperation
across external borders, developing the EU-Russia
"four-spaces" agreement, and discussing the importance of
human rights in Russia. On human rights consultations,
Vuoromaki and the Austrian Presidency said that they were not
optimistic - but realistic - and nevertheless intended
to bring up human rights during EU/Russia consultations the
week of February 27. The EC stressed that its willingness to
engage Russia on stabilization of the North Caucasus remains
but Russian obstinance is precluding fruitful consultations
in this area. The Commission also said its assistance budget
for Russia is going down.

¶5. (C) The EU took on board DAS Kramer's message that the US
is becoming increasingly pragmatic when it comes to Russia.
However, Kramer noted that Russia is much more cooperative on
Iran than it was a few years ago - "we are now reading from
the same book...perhaps even the same chapter...but we are
not yet on the same page." The Austrian Presidency responded
favorably to this encouraging development.

Belarus
-------

¶6. (C) In wide ranging discussions on Belarus, EU officials
presented a united front on encouraging a
democratic outcome for Belarus in upcoming presidential
elections but differed on possible post-election measures in
the event of a problematic March 19 vote. The Austrians
recognize that the Belarusian government is isolating itself
- it is not the US or the EU that is isolating Belarus.
However, when it came to using targeted asset freezes and
travel restrictions on Lukashenko and his regime after a
possible flawed election, the Austrians were hesitant to make
such a commitment. DAS Kramer conveyed
that it would not necessarily be a bad thing if word got out
to Lukashenko that the EU and US were considering such steps
because it would get Lukashenko, and those around him,
thinking. The Commission reported that the EU may withdraw
GSP from Belarus later in March (as a result of ILO
proceedings that are not linked to the elections). The
action would have an economic impact on Belarus (e.g. textile
producers), and the GOB had already approached the EU on this
issue.

¶7. (C) A Belarus Policy Dinner hosted by the Lithuanian
Mission sharpened the discussion on strategies for Belarus.
DAS Kramer stressed that we need to start acting now on what
kind of messages we want to send to Minsk. We want to get
Lukashenko thinking - in this connection, the EU's possible
withdrawal of GSP seems to have gotten the attention of
Lukashenko - and turn the heat up on the Belarusian regime.
A united EU and US policy would be more effective in forcing
those around Lukashenko to decide on
which side of a tightening "noose" they want to be. The
Lithuanian PSC Ambassador broached the idea of a longer-term
strategy of reaching out to mid-level Belarusian officials
after the election to send the message that certain
Belarusians could still be welcomed in Europe. DAS Kramer
urged restraint in the initial post-election period,
responding that we want mid-level officials to think they may
be on a possible visa ban list which would make them think
twice about continuing to support Lukashenko.

¶8. (C) Comment. Follow-up discussions with EU officials and
the Hungarian and Polish PSC Ambassadors yielded some
reassuring comments that EU member states are likely to
support a targeted expansion of the visa ban following the
elections. It will probably take about two weeks for the EU
decision process to work its way through so we should not
expect an ability to coordinate a response in days. The
Poles, in particular, will "insist" on expanding the visa
ban. The Polish PSC Ambassador told USEU on February
24 that he fully expects Lukashenko to really crack down as
the election date gets closer and he is confident member
states will not need much persuading to support action beyond
a statement.

¶9. (C) Comment continued. Gaining EU consensus to go beyond
a limited visa ban extension could be somewhat more
problematic and would depend on continued deterioration, if
not use of violence, by Belarusian forces. There appears to
be strong EU consensus, however, to coordinate
statements and actions on: 1) A possible pre-election
statement urging restraint and cautioning against violence;
2) Coordinating immediate post-election statements; 3) Taking
steps such as extending the visa ban. The Polish Ambassador
noted that EU heads-of-state will be meeting March 23 in
Brussels. If there is significant violence or other
developments warranting discussion at this level, they will
have a perfectly timed public opportunity to comment on the
elections.

Ukraine
-------

¶10. (C) In a limited discussion on Ukraine, all parties
agreed that standards for the upcoming parliamentary
elections will be high but that we expect the elections to go
smoothly. There is the hope and expectation from the EU that
Ukraine will form a government quickly after the elections.
Fokion Fotiadis agreed that support for Ukraine is essential
in the face of Russian pressure but that the
EU's two most promising areas of engagement - visa
facilitation and closer EU economic integration - are not
workable at this time. The EU took on board the message that
we should support Ukraine in the event it decides to revisit
the January 4 gas deal with Russia, specifically the
disturbing role of middleman company RosUkrEnergo.

¶11. (C) There was broader disappointment at Ukraine's
handling of the Transnistrian conflict. After early signals
that it wanted to play a constructive regional mediation
role, Ukraine has not followed through on its commitment to
begin enforcing the use of Moldovan customs seals on cargo
coming from or transiting Transnistria.

Moldova
-------

¶12. (C) Focusing on resolution of the Transnistrian
conflict, EUSR Jacobovits said that Russia's position on
Transnistria is making it harder all the time to move
forward; he commented that Russia was getting "cocky." He
outlined four points: 1) Insist on Ukrainian implementation
of the customs declaration; 2) Democratization of
Transnistria; 3) Change the peace stabilization force into a
multinational force; 4) Insist on Russian withdrawal from
ammunition bases. DAS Kramer conveyed that we need to let
the parties involved in settlement talks know that the status
quo is unacceptable. He noted that the Russian side has
played an unhelpful role in this conflict, while the
Transnistrians have demonstrated no seriousness toward the
negotiations.

¶13. (C) Commenting again on Transnistria, Carl Hallergard
noted that Moldovan President Voronin's intransigence was
creating a lot of enemies in Brussels. Hallergard speculated
that member states may soon run out of patience with Voronin
and defer to Moscow's lead on resolving the issue. On the
issue of a PKO, Hallergard mentioned that Russia
interestingly continues to broach the idea of a joint
EU/Russia PKO to EU officials. The EU would only be
interested in a PKO as part of a settlement process.

¶14. (C) The European Commission said that its Border
Assistance Monitoring (BAM) Mission on the Moldovan-Ukrainian
border is in its third month of implementation, but that it
is increasingly difficult to solicit Ukrainian cooperation.
The EU is looking at increasing the size of the mission from
the 69 that are presently there.

¶15. (U) DAS Kramer has cleared this cable.
McKinley

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SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL APER BM CH
SUBJECT: ANOTHER CHAT WITH BURMA'S DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER

REF: A. A) RANGOON 287
¶B. B) RANGOON 249

Classified By: CDA Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Charge met with Deputy Foreign Minister Kyaw
Thu on April 25 to continue discussions in the hope of
gathering more insights into the opaque regime. He did not
disappoint. We discussed a range issues from his recent trip
to China to obtaining multiple entry visas for regional
officers to the need for peaceful change. He provided some
useful advice to keep in mind as we try to expand our
American Center programs to Mandalay, as well as an update on
life in Pyinmana. End Summary

Lessons for Mandalay
--------------------------
¶2. (C) Charge mentioned that we wanted to make greater use
of our property in Mandalay, for instance by opening a
library since many Burmese expressed such an interest. Kyaw
Thu smiled when told how our recent visit there appeared to
irritate the Mandalay military commander (ref A). He
suggested that we consider donating books instead, and
recounted two stories as lessons. He himself wanted to open
a small bookstall/lending library with donated books from
friends abroad and had asked the Information Minister about
getting this started. Although the Minister seemed to
approve the idea, he told Kyaw Thu that he would have to pay
the customs duties in dollars and they would be considerable
because they are calculated by weight. Kyaw Thu concluded
that he might pursue the idea after he retires.

¶3. (C) Kyaw Thu also recounted the experience of the German
Ambassador trying to open a cultural center here. The German
Ambassador grew impatient at Kyaw Thu's waiting for a
propitious time to raise the subject, so went to the Foreign
Minister directly. Since the Minister rarely offers his own
opinion to higher ups, according to Kyaw Thu unlike himself,
the Minister sought the approval of the senior generals and
did not get it because of concerns that people might be
exposed to "propaganda about Germany." Once the generals say
no, then "nothing can be done," Kyaw Thu said, so now the
idea is dead. Charge suggested we might use the Mandalay
property for computer classes. Kyaw Thu agreed that might be
doable, if the computers were not hooked up to the internet.

Peaceful Transition
-----------------------
¶4. (C) Charge noted how hungry Burmese were for more
information. Kyaw Thu agreed and added that the situation is
more open now, than during the Ne Win period. He noted that
imported magazines, such as Time, with articles critical of
the military can be found now. While bookstores now have
more variety, he continued, they still have a lot of books on
SPDC building projects rather than subjects people want to
read. The Foreign Ministry has greater access than most to
books, but even its libraries are limited. Charge observed
that making more information available to the people could
pave the way for a more peaceful transition. Kyaw Thu nodded
when she added that there were probably many people in the
Foreign Ministry and throughout the government that
recognized the need for a peaceful transition. He continued
to nod in apparent agreement that change was inevitable and
could not be denied. A gradual opening could permit a
peaceful transition, but continued resistance might result in
violence. Kyaw Thu finally spoke, "Like in 88." Charge
reiterated that we wanted to see a peaceful transition and
assumed that most Burmese wanted the same, which Kyaw Thu
acknowledged with more nods.

Negotiating with the Chinese
-----------------------------------
¶5. (C) Kyaw Thu returned April 22 from Kunming where he had
been trying to resolve the cases of 580 Chinese detained in
Burma for illegal logging. He met with Beijing and Yunnan
officials, and was accompanied by GOB Forestry and Mining
officials. He seemed proud that he brought the two sides
together, noting that the Chinese had been trying to meet for
several months directly with the two ministries without ever

RANGOON 00000543 002 OF 003


receiving a response. He also claimed credit for resolving
the dispute with Burma agreeing to free 536 Chinese over
time. The remaining 44 are in Burmese prisons on drug
charges, he said, and the Chinese "do not want them back."
Charge asked if he thought the Chinese were serious about
stopping illegal logging. Kyaw Thu replied that the PRC had
sealed the border to imports; the problem was on the Burmese
side of the border. Charge noted she had seen pictures of
trucks piled with logs headed for the border, so they had to
cross the border somehow.

Pyinmana Update
---------------------
¶6. (C) Kyaw Thu urged the United States to at least reserve
a plot of land in the new capital before all the good parcels
go. Hinting at a willingness to accommodate, he noted that
some Embassies, like the Chinese, might need more than the
allotted 5 acres, so 10 acre plots would also be available,
but nothing in between. Charge asked why the diplomats had
not yet been invited to visit, since most people would not
commit sight unseen. Kyaw Thu said he "could have predicted"
that the visit would not happen as promised in April because
construction is still ongoing. He said that the current
condition would not give a good impression and then the
diplomats would report this back to their capitals. He said
the Thai had agreed to reserve a lot, even though they are
building a new Embassy in Rangoon. It may be a long time
before anyone builds anything, he acknowledged, but only by
reserving a plot now can a country be sure of having a prime
spot.

¶7. (C) Personal life has improved for Kyaw Thu in Pyinmana
since his wife now lives with him in his office. "Can't you
see that I'm getting fatter now that my wife is cooking for
me again." He said they erected a partition in his "very
large" office to make a sleeping area. Housing for deputy
ministers is still under construction, and he does not intend
to move in until all the construction is finished. Asked
about working conditions, he said that he now has plenty of
time to read because there is no one to meet with. Sudden
requests for information can be a problem, because often the
desk officer is in Rangoon and must be called back to the new
capital. He has back-to-back meetings with various
Ambassadors when he comes to Rangoon. He noted that
arranging the above meeting in Kunming had been difficult,
because he could only talk to the Chinese Ambassador by
phone, "which is not a good idea." He said now that hotels
had been built, some diplomats will be invited individually,
citing as an example an upc
oming Russian delegation.

Multiple Entry Visas
-------------------------
¶8. (C) Charge asked Kyaw Thu about the possibility of
obtaining multiple entry visas for regional USG personnel
assigned elsewhere. We noticed that the already prolonged
visa process had become even longer after the GOB move to
Pyinmana. He indicated that he could assist, if not too
many. Charge said 20-30 multiple entry visas would be
helpful. He countered that eight in priority order might be
manageable and that we could submit more names later. He
said that we should send the request to him directly, so he
could "send forward when the mood is right." He cautioned
against involving the consular division directly since then
the request would pass up to the other Deputy Minister, who
he intimated, was much less friendly towards us.

Comment
------------
¶9. (C) Kyaw Thu seemed much more content in comparison to
previous meetings (ref B), which probably is a tribute to his
wife. He also came across as smug, verging on cocky, about
his ability to get things done, yet offered some practical
advice. We had already decided against seeking approval
directly to set up an American Center in Mandalay to avoid a
no. This is a culture where working around obstacles is the
best way to achieve results. Although he talked a lot about
books and his reading, he did not take Charge up on repeated
offers to provide him books, so he has set limits on this

RANGOON 00000543 003 OF 003


relationship. Similarly his bravado in speaking out
disappears when talking about a political transistion. He
does seem genuinely interested in showing what he can do, so
we might as well see whether that can advance our objectives.

VILLAROSA

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FOR EAP PDAS STEPHENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/26/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR BP
SUBJECT: SOLOMONS GETS DICEY - TIME FOR A U.S. STATEMENT

REF: A) PORT MORESBY 185 B) 4/21 STANTON/EAP E-MAIL

CLASSIFIED BY: Robert Fitts, Ambassador, AMB, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)



CLASSIFIED BY: Robert Fitts, Ambassador, AMB, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)



1.(C) SUMMARY: The barely-elected government in Solomon Islands
has collapsed. Though constitutional norms have been held to,
the worrisome outcome could be a government incorporating
figures tempted to undercut RAMSI and thus the restoration of
good governance. The population retains a great deal of respect
for the U.S. We strongly recommend that a senior U.S. official
make a statement encouraging Solomon Islanders to continue
working with RAMSI to rebuild their institutions and ensure
their future. END SUMMARY

15 MINUTES OF FAME
2.(U) On April 26, barely five days after being sworn in,
Solomon Islands Prime Minister Rini resigned on the floor of
Parliament. The day before, his government had barely squeaked
through election of a Deputy Speaker with 25 votes out of 50.
That was only made possible by the incarceration of two
opposition supporters and the walk out of the remaining 23. The
collapse was triggered when four members of his coalition,
including three ministers, crossed to the opposition.

OUT WITH THE OLD
3.(SBU) Rini had served as DPM in the previous government and
headed essentially the same coalition this time around. (The
previous Prime Minister was the one who squeaked into the Deputy
Speakers chair.) The coalition had been backed by local ethnic
Chinese businessmen and dogged by charges of under-the-table
funding from Taiwan. Their initial success (27-23) in the new
Parliament had triggered two days of violence, destroying much
of the local Chinatown and led to quick military reinforcement
of RAMSI by Australian and New Zealand troops.

NEW CROWD A DICEY BUNCH
4.(C) The opposition, now 28 or so, is united only by opposition
to the old crowd. However, it includes figures intimately
involved in the ethnic violence that tore the Solomons apart and
a fair share of corrupt souls. Still, Solomon Islands lacks
cohesive parties and there are prominent figures, Parliamentary
Speaker Keniloria for example, not completely identified with
either side but who may figure in the mix to hash out the new
government. Some fragments of the just dissolved coalition could
figure in the new group as well. For example, the lead defector
(Industry Minister Sogavare) headed a party of six members.
Rumor now has it that he may have been offered the PM's job to
effect his switch.

DON'T LET RAMSI BE MISUNDERSTOOD
5.(SBU) The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
restored order in July, 2003, and has since been working to
rebuild government institutions particularly the police. It is
Australian-led and largely perceived as an Australian entity
though there is a large New Zealand contingent with smaller
contributions from Pacific Island neighbors.

6.(C) RAMSI - and we - were largely caught by surprise with the
sudden outbreak of violence following a peaceful election which
was to have been an important milestone on the road to RAMSI's
success. Clearly, the ethnic tension has remained under the
surface of RAMSI-enforced law and order. Local institutions are
in no sense ready to cope with the forces that would tear the
government apart.

7.(C) RAMSI and the Solomon Island police, which are perceived
as under RAMSI control, acted throughout the past week to
enforce the law and restore order. However, many - and not just
in the now victorious opposition - argue that RAMSI actions
bolstered the previous order. Resident Americans told us that
RAMSI police were guarding assets owned by prominent Chinese
financiers while allowing the crowds to run riot amongst poorer
Chinese shop houses. Others, Speaker Keniloria, for example
argue that inappropriate RAMSI action fed the violence. (NOTE:
we understand, but do not buy either argument.)

8.(C) Therefore, opposition members will find some support for
charges that RAMSI took sides. After all, the initial
government success in naming the deputy speaker only became
possible after RAMSI detained and refused bail to two opposition
MPs. (NOTE: Both of whose actions we understand fully justified

PORT MORES 00000188 002 OF 002


the step.)

DON'T GO OFF HALF-COCKED
9.(C) We therefore are concerned that the new government, when
it emerges will contain many who are cocky with their success
and have a real agenda of trimming RAMSI's authority. Thus
could jeopardize three years of careful work to rebuild Solomon
Islands into a nation with a viable government. We judge that
the Commissioner of Police, an Australian not formally
affiliated with RAMSI, might come under immediate pressure for
police actions during the violence.

U.S.G. CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE
10.(SBU) The Solomons population maintains an abiding respect
for the U.S. dating back to our effort in Guadalcanal in World
War II. Except for missionaries and a very popular Peace Corps
program (suspended since the ethnic violence), we have been
largely absent since. However, we are seen as impartial and
less self-interested than other powers.

11.(SBU) RAMSI marks a major long-term commitment by Australia
toward regional stability. Even before recent events, Prime
Minister Howard spoke of a term of at least ten years.

12.(C) Embassy therefore proposes that a senior U.S. official
make a statement designed to reinforce the population's support
for RAMSI assistance and to urge them to keep their eye on the
ball. The issue is to rebuild government institutions for
long-term stability rather than the politics of the moment. To
have an impact, the statement would have to be prominent enough
to get into the local press. The general population has no
access to the world press. A statement would be most effective
if it became public before new nominations for Prime Minister,
scheduled for May 1.

13.(C) SUGGESTED POINTS:
The U.S. is concerned by the civil disturbances which have
shattered recent harmony and may bring about economic hardship
for Solomon Islands citizens.

However, we are happy to note that, despite deep political
divisions, each step in the past week has been taken according
to the constitution. We congratulate the Solomon Islands people
and leaders for that.

We welcome the assistance to Solomon Islands authorities
provided by her neighbors working through RAMSI.

We reaffirm our support for Solomon Islands to work with RAMSI
to build sustainable peace so as to foster economic growth and
good governance.

Nation building is never an easy process. It takes time and
there will be setbacks. But we have a strong commitment to help
countries in transition, such as Solomon Islands.
FITTS

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 003293

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NSC STAFF FOR SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2026
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KDEM EG
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR URGES INTERIOR MINISTER ACTION ON
DETAINEE ABUSE CASES AND SUPPORT OF NGOS

REF: A. CAIRO 3270

¶B. CAIRO 3161
¶C. CAIRO 3106

Classified by Ambassador Francis Ricciardone for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

¶1. (C) In a May 31 meeting, Ambassador urged Interior
Minister Habib Adly to respond seriously and quickly to
recent allegations of excessive force against demonstrators
and charges that detained demonstrators had been tortured:
The GOE should investigate, announce the results, and, if
there is evidence of violations, punish those responsible.
The GOE should also consider whether training could help
reduce such apparent abuses. The Ambassador urged the GOE to
investigate transparently such charges. The cases of two
detainees, Mohammed Sharkawy and Karim Shaer were of
particular concern. Adly denied that the two had been
tortured but said their claims were being investigated by the
independent Public Prosecutor. Adly stressed that the Muslim
Brotherhood were exploiting issues like the Judges Club
controversy, fomenting protests, and provoking the police to
advance their agenda. The Ambassador urged that the GOE
register and legalize the Cairo offices of IRI and NDI -
stressing that they should be viewed as allies rather than
threats. End summary.

¶2. (C) The Ambassador called on Interior Minister Adly on May
31 to underscore USG concerns about reports of police
brutality and the torture of detainees, widely circulated in
the domestic and international media following a series of
anti-GOE demonstrations in May (reftels). Stories and images
of recent police violence and claims of mistreatment by
detainees were resonating not only abroad, but also, we
believed, among the Egyptian people. These pictures and
reports may not tell the whole story, but they are
nonetheless making a very negative impact, the Ambassador
continued. The cases of Mohammed Sharkawy and Karim Shaer,
activists detained on the fringes of a demonstration May 25,
have attracted particular attention because of their graphic
charges of torture and abuse, the Ambassador noted. The GOE
could not afford to ignore the appearance of legal violations
and should investigate, announce the results, punish anyone
found guilty, and take appropriate actions such as training
to prevent recurrence.

¶3. (C) Adly asserted that charges of police excesses were
greatly exaggerated, and torture charges fabricated, by
leftist and Islamist activists, who have been particularly
focused on attacking and undermining the Ministry of
Interior. Nasserists, leftists, and Islamist sympathizers in
the opposition media readily provided a platform for these
complaints, he added. If so many instances of abuse took
place, victims and groups should come forward with evidence
instead of relying on innuendo, Adly stated. In spite of all
the stories and reports, he continued, only two (Sharkawy and
Shaer) of 400 detainees arrested, have filed complaints.

¶4. (C) Adly adamantly denied that either detainee had been
abused - "If I found any of my men were involved in such
abuse, I would turn them over to the prosecution
immediately," he maintained. "And if I saw one of my officers
abusing someone on the street, I'd slaughter him myself.
That kind of behavior offends police officers more than
anyone else, as they consider themselves protectors of
citizens. Of course, some of these demonstrators
deliberately insult and provoke the police." Adly confirmed
that Sharkawy and Shaer were still in custody and said that
their complaints have been forwarded to the Public
Prosecution for investigation. In investigating the charges,
the Public Prosecution has the discretion to call for
forensic investigation of the prisoners, using their own
doctors, but the matter is entirely out of the Interior
Ministry's hands, he maintained.

¶5. (C) The Ambassador responded that if the GOE is
investigating their charges, they should publicize the fact
and not give the impression that they are stonewalling. In
the absence of transparent investigation, many in Egypt and
abroad will believe the worst of what is being reported.
Adly accepted the idea and instructed an aide to pass it on
to the prosecution. Ambassador recalled our standing offer
to consider expanding police training to new areas - for
example, we could explore programs to train Egyptian trainers
in crowd control techniques to build officers' resistance to
provocations. Adly did not respond.

¶6. (C) Adly told the Ambassador that the Muslim Brotherhood
(MB) had been exploiting the democracy agenda, and the recent
Judges Club controversy in particular, to advance their own
political agenda. The MB provided the core of the
organization and manpower of recent demonstrations, he
asserted. The MB have become particularly cocky and
aggressive since their success in the fall 2005 elections,
Adly opined, adding that their success "proved" that the
parliamentary elections had not been falsified. "If I had
been dictating the results, I certainly would not have given
the MB 88 seats," he stated. The MB are a threat not only in
Egypt but are on the ascent in Jordan, Kuwait, and elsewhere,
their goal is to seize the reins of government across the
region, which would be a calamity for U.S. interests, he
warned. The Ambassador responded that the USG is no fan of
the MB and does not wish to see them succeed. However, he
continued, the GOE should not let its fear of the MB impede
the progress and political development of the country. If
this happens, the MB will win.

¶7. (C) The Ambassador also flagged for Adly's attention the
current applications of IRI and NDI to formalize and legally
establish their offices in Cairo. Noting the recent campaign
against the groups in the pro-government media, the
Ambassador stressed that the two prestigious American private
institutes operate in a completely open and transparent
manner. Their activities will support rather than undermine
President Mubarak's stated goals for political development.
For example, they had trained Egyptians to conduct proper,
lawful monitoring of last year's elections. In reply, Adly
noted that "one of these groups has launched its activities
before it has legal permission to do so," (an apparent
reference to IRI's May 24 "Open House" which included a press
briefing on its engagement with political parties in Egypt).
The Ambassador stressed that both groups wish to legalize
their status here and repeated that all of their activities
are conducted with complete transparency and are fully in
line with President Mubarak's own reform program. We hoped
that the GOE would view them as friends and assets, certainly
not as undermining national security.

RICCIARDONE

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INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4216
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7866
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 6476
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 7756
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001983

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2021
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW
SUBJECT: DIRECTOR'S INTRODUCTORY MEETING WITH FORMER
PRESIDENT LEE TENG-HUI, JUNE 2, 2006


Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young, Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Former President Lee Teng-hui criticized
President Chen and DPP corruption but predicted Chen would
not step down during an introductory meeting June second with
the Director. Lee also criticized KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou
for supporting the ultimate goal of reunification, and he
suggested that the only hope for Taiwan to overcome political
confrontation is for dissatisfied members of the two major
parties to come together to form a new "third force." Lee
faulted Chen and the DPP government for early mishandling of
the arms procurement package. Though still recuperating from
TB, Lee appeared sharp, energetic, and healthy for a man of
¶83. End Summary.

¶2. (C) During an introductory meeting with the Director on
June 2, former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui expressed
concern about corruption in the Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP), but doubted President Chen would step down. He
predicted that the current media focus on scandals will
continue into the fall, when the public will eventually tire
of the story. Lee estimated that only about 30 percent of
the news stories about ruling party corruption were accurate.
Lee suggested that Chen's recent devolution of some powers
to the Executive Yuan and the DPP was "very strange," adding
that passing responsibilities to Premier Su Tseng-chang was
not necessarily a good thing as Su was controlled behind the
scenes by the DPP's New Tide faction, which has close
connections to business.

¶3. (C) Lee said he could not rest easy at the thought of
Kuomintang (KMT) Chairman Ma Ying-jeou becoming president,
since Ma supports the ultimate goal of reunification. Lee
also criticized DPP leaders and potential presidential
candidates. He suggested that the only hope for Taiwan is
for the dissatisfied in the DPP and the KMT to come together
to form a new "third force." Otherwise, the current
political confrontation will continue, he predicted.

¶4. (C) Lee asked the Director about the current state of
Taiwan-U.S. relations. The Director stressed the underlying
strengths of U.S.-Taiwan relations, adding that although the
cross-Strait status quo is not perfect, it has protected the
freedom of the people of Taiwan, allowing them to continue to
develop and prosper in peace. The "one China" policy has
helped to maintain peace and stability and avoid dangerous
situations.

¶5. (C) The Director underscored U.S. concerns about the
failure of Taiwan's political parties to work together in the
legislature to agree on steps to enhance Taiwan's self
defense capability. Lee agreed, emphasizing that Taiwan
should be prepared to take care of itself and that an
adequate defense is key to Taiwan's continued survival. Lee
said he was disappointed with Chen and the DPP government,
who waited until late 2003, just before the 2004 presidential
election, to propose the special budget, and then lumped the
purchases together into one very expensive package, rather
than spreading the cost over a number of years. During his
tenure, Lee noted, Taiwan used installment payments to spread
out the high cost of F-16 aircraft. Noting that when
president he had invited the opposition to explain situations
and forge cross-party consensus, Lee faulted President Chen
for not following his practice.

¶6. (C) Lee praised late President Chiang Ching-kuo's role in
beginning to move Taiwan toward democracy. Chiang Ching-kuo
realized the need for change and began the Taiwanization of
the KMT. Lee emphasized how unusual it was for a dictator
such as Chiang Ching-kuo to willingly give up his powers,
adding that economic progress alone does not necessarily lead
to democratization. Taiwan's democratization has taken place
against the backdrop of special challenges, namely the
influence of Mainland China, which wants to "swallow" Taiwan.
Taiwan's democratization took place peacefully, allowing the
opponents of democracy to remain active participants in
politics, hoping for a comeback. Another special feature in
Taiwan is the corruption of the democratic force (i.e., the
DPP), a situation Harvard scholar Samuel Huntington did not
foresee in his analysis of challenges facing new democracies.

¶7. (C) Asked about his planned sightseeing trip to Japan

TAIPEI 00001983 002 OF 002


later this year, Lee said he was at the mercy of his doctors,
who would decide when he was fit to travel. Lee noted that
his recent bout with TB may have been a recurrence of a lung
problem that he had in 1949-1950 when in the process of
applying for graduate studies in the U.S. Although lamenting
that his recurrent strain of TB may be drug-resistant and
that he was still recuperating, Lee appeared sharp,
energetic, and healthy for a man of his age, and invited the
Director to join him for a round of golf.

Comment
-------

¶8. (C) The self-assured, almost cocky Lee Teng-hui the
Director had known during his last tour here still comes
through today. Asked about his legacy, Lee stressed the
island's democratization, though he could just as easily have
highlighted the growth of a Taiwanese identity and the
emergence of pro-independence sentiments within the ruling
party. Though seen by many here as an eccentric, Lee still
gets significant press coverage for his political views, and
as our meeting made clear, he has plenty of those.
YOUNG

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0009
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRATISLAVA 000521

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR DAMON WILSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2021
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM SOCI LO
SUBJECT: FICO DOESN'T RULE OUT WORKING WITH SLOTA AND MECIAR

REF: A. BRATISLAVA 513
¶B. BRATISLAVA 506
¶C. BRATISLAVA 499
¶D. BRATISLAVA 494
¶E. BRATISLAVA 491

Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D
).

¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Smer's Robert Fico has said that preliminary
coalition talks will end by this Friday, when he will start
official negotiations for the new GOS. Smer is expected to
invite two other parties to be in coalition some time
tomorrow (June 28). SMK, SNS, and HZDS all were invited for
a second round of discussions with Smer today, while KDH has
been given extra time for its own intra-party discussions.
The tide has continued to turn since the June 17 elections:
last week a Smer-KDH-SMK coalition held much potential, but
now it looks that KDH is out of the game. As of today, it
appears that coalitions with SMK-HZDS or SNS-HZDS are Smer's
top choices. END SUMMARY.

KDH NO LONGER CONSIDERED A LIKELY - NOR RELIABLE - PARTNER
--------------------------------------------- -------------

¶2. (C) KDH is holding its own intra-party discussions today
and is expected to meet with Smer tomorrow. Jaro Daniska, an
assistant to KDH Deputy Chairman and MP Vladimir Palko, told
us that he believed the party would stay in opposition rather
than join a coalition with Smer.

¶3. (C) Even if KDH wanted to join a coalition, Smer might not
want it anyway. Smer MP and presidium member Peter Pelegrini
told us that KDH is no longer considered a likely -- nor
reliable -- partner, as a result of divisions within the
party over coalition talks.

ALTHOUGH SMK PREFERS KDH, IT MAY HAVE TO SETTLE FOR HZDS
--------------------------------------------- -----------

¶4. (C) After a second round of negotiations with Smer today,
SMK is still in the running to join the governing coalition.
SMK MP Laszlo Nagy told us that his party had not yet
received any official offers, but he expected Smer to
announce its decision as early as tonight, at which point the
SMK leadership would make its own decision. Although SMK
prefers a coalition that includes KDH, Nagy does not consider
KDH a likely partner anymore. Instead, he expects his party
to join a government that includes HZDS. We asked Nagy if
SMK would ever join a Smer-SNS coalition, to which he
replied, "Probably not." (Comment: Never say never. End
comment.)

SMER WON'T LET SNS OR HZDS "TRAUMATIZE SOCIETY"
--------------------------------------------- --

¶5. (C) Smer's Pelegrini told us that like SMK, his party
would prefer a KDH-SMK coalition; however, a coalition with
SNS and HZDS now appears more likely. Nonetheless, Smer will
do "everything possible" not to "traumatize society." This
includes keeping both Meciar and Slota out of government
positions, not pardoning previous crimes or corrupt
politicians, and not allowing those politicians to return to
political and public life. Smer's main goal is to create a
"stable government with no traumas to entrepreneurs or to
citizens."

SNS AND HZDS GET COCKY
----------------------

¶6. (U) SNS leader Jan Slota told press this morning that he
did not think SMK would be invited into coalition with Smer.
He would not say whether or not he and Fico had reached any
agreements, yet he was confident that some sort of decision
would be made by Friday.

¶7. (C) HZDS emerged seemingly optimistic from talks with Smer
this morning. Deputy Chairman and MP Milan Urbani told us
today that it seemed sure that HZDS would be in government
with Smer, although Meciar would not hold a post in the
cabinet. Meciar himself told press following the meeting
that he would not accept any "constitutional position" in the
government. He also noted that he wanted to keep KDH out of
the government. If included in a coalition, HZDS would want
the ministries of regional development -- which would likely
go to Urbani -- and possibly defense.

SDKU IS OUT OF THE GAME
-----------------------


BRATISLAVA 00000521 002 OF 002


¶8. (C) SDKU appears to be out of the running as a potential
coalition partner for Smer. A Smer MP told us that Dzurinda
had ruined any possibility of a coalition between the two
parties when he had approached Fico in preliminary talks, "as
if he were in charge," and offered Fico inclusion in a
coalition, as if it were his to offer.

¶9. (U) Dzurinda noted in a press conference this afternoon
that a three plus one rightist coalition with HZDS would be
the best solution for Slovakia for three reasons: first, it
would ensure a continuity of reforms; second, three of the
members belong to the European People's Party (EPP) and one
(HZDS) is in waiting for acceptance; and third, this
coalition would be the most stable of all options, as it
would be an equal partnership, unlike in the case of a
leftist coalition. Dzurinda would not reject the possibility
of ever joining in coalition with Fico, but he did tell press
to "look at Germany and Merkel versus Schroeder before
elections, no more comment..." He also rejected the
possibility of his personally resigning in the interest of
bring the "good" coalition together, saying that his party
had done well, and there was no reason for him to quit.

FOREIGN DIPLOMATS WONDER IF THEY SHOULD INTERVENE
--------------------------------------------- ----

¶10. (C) The British Ambassador and DCM mentioned to our
Ambassador and DCM that European embassies in Bratislava have
been discussing whether or not to try to express to Smer
their views of SNS and HZDS in a potential GOS. They said
that no European parties or countries have yet done so. DCM
noted that we had passed informal messages to the parties but
would not formally intervene. The British may advocate doing
so with the other EU embassies. (Comment: It is probably too
late for their comments to have an effect on Smer's decision.
End comment.)
VALLEE

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SIPDIS

EUR FOR DICARLO, EUR/SCE FOR HOH, FOOKS AND STINCHCOMB, NSC
FOR BRAUN, OSD FOR FLORY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: INAUGURAL SESSION OF BIH PARLIAMENT
COLLAPSES UNDER COALITION PRESSURE


Classified By: Political Counselor Michael J. Murphy, reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: At the inaugural session of the BiH House of
Representatives (HoR) held on November 20, delegates failed
to agree on even the most mundane procedural issues,
including the organization of the parliament and the election
of the three co-speakers. What was thought to be a
pre-cooked arrangement for the selection of the co-speakers
unraveled when the largest Serb party, the Alliance of
Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) refused to agree to a
vote, noting that a government coalition should be agreed
prior to the election of the speakers in order to maximize
the effectiveness of the future government and parliament.
The session exposed some of Party for BiH's political
weaknesses, since it had sought to engineer the speakership
deal. The HoR will reconvene on Thursday, November 23,
though it is unclear whether it will settle on new
co-speakers then. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (SBU) At the inagural session of the BiH HoR, Alliance of
Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) MP Nikola Spiric, one of
the co-speakers of the HoR in the previous parliament and a
leading contender to be Prime Minister in the next state
government, announced that his party would not support
selection of the co-speakers of the HoR until a decision had
been made on the formation of a state government coalition.
Prior to the session, the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action
(SDA) and Party for BiH (SBiH) agreed to the election of
Beriz Belkic of the Party for BiH (SBiH) and Martin Raguz of
the Croatian Democratic Union-1990 (HDZ-1990) as Bosniak and
Croat speakers, respectively, and Sulejman Tihic as
co-speaker of the House of Peoples.

¶3. (C) Spiric's move caught SBiH, HDZ-1990, and SDA by
surprise, and their disarray was visible during the session.
Belkic was furious at Spiric, but was unable to garner the
votes needed to stop him. SDA MPs simply sat on their hands
and watched. The public failure made clear SBiH is not as
close to concluding a coalition agreement with any party,
except perhaps HDZ-1990, as the SBiH-leaning daily Dnevni
Avaz claims. SBiH looked more like the other major parties'
coalition partner of last resort rather than the Svengali of
the Bosnian political scene.

¶4. (C) COMMENT: Spiric is often cocky, and he certainly
played to the galleries today, proudly flexing the SNSD's
parliamentary muscle. Undoubtedly, Avaz and others will
portray SNSD's decision to block a deal on the speakership as
"Serb highhandedness," but there is a less sinister political
logic behind SNSD's actions. Spiric, the leading SNSD
candidate for PM, may have been seeking to prevent the
conflicts that could result if the parliamentary leadership
comes from parties not included in the governing coalition, a
sign of SNSD's interest in participating in an effective
state-level government. The episode made several
parliamentarians nervous about their parties' ability to form
a government, however. Several approached us on the margins
of the session and hinted that they hope the U.S. intervenes
to guide coalition talks. END COMMENT.
MCELHANEY

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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0695
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4148
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RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 6142
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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2026
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PTER KTIA MOPS IN CE
SUBJECT: INDIA'S MEA PROVIDES READOUT OF SRI LANKA'S
PRESIDENT'S VISIT

REF: COLOMBO 02014

Classified By: Political Counselor Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ministry of External Affairs' Joint
Secretary responsible for Sri Lanka, Mr. Mohan Kumar,

SIPDIS
provided Polcouns with a readout of Minister of External
Affairs Pranab Mukherjee's meeting with Sri Lankan President
Mahinda Rajapaksa. Kumar said that Mukherjee hammered home
four points and received the following responses:
-No military solution is possible. Kumar reported that
President Rajapaksa agreed.
-Civilian casualties are becoming a grave concern. Rajapaksa
responded that the GOSL was doing its best to limit civilian
casualties.
-A southern consensus on the devolution of power needs to be
developed quickly, LTTE actions/reactions notwithstanding.
Rajapaksa insisted that more time was needed to allow the MOU
signed between the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the
United National Party (UNP) "time to flower."
-The North-East merger is a fundamental part of any peace
process. Rajapaksa retorted that the Supreme Court's
rejection of the merger was based on process, and the
Parliament was free to sign a new bill merging the north and
east at any time.

¶2. (C) Referring to LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakran's
annual Heroes Day address, Kumar asserted that it was notable
as much for what was omitted as its content. Specifically,
he noted that there was, "no reference to the northeast
merger or a political settlement as a viable option to
Eelam." He said he personally believes that the LTTE has
lost faith in a political solution and that the hard-line
tenor of the statement was not a negotiating ploy. Kumar
also stated that the GOI is interested to know if the
Co-Chair members (excluding the U.S.) are truly supportive of
the Norwegians continuing in their role as facilitators in
the peace process and asked if U/S Burns would help clarify
this during his visit to New Delhi next week. Polcouns said
that he will pass the request to Washington. This question
may reflect the GOSL's sentiments toward Norwegian Special
Envoy, Jon Hanssen-Bauer, noted in Reftel A and, perhaps,
expressed by President Rajapaksa during his meetings in New
Delhi. END SUMMARY

----- Mukherjee warns that there is no military solution -----

¶3. (C) On 1 December Polcouns requested a briefing on the 28
November meeting in New Delhi between Minister of External
Affairs Pranab Mukherjee and Sri Lanka's President, Mahinda
Rajapaksa, by the Ministry of External Affairs' Joint
Secretary (JS) for Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Burma and the

SIPDIS
Maldives, Mr. Mohan Kumar. The JS emphasized that the
India-Sri Lanka relationship was based on "constant
interaction" at the highest levels, and India continued to
monitor the situation very closely. He said that Mukherjee
began the meeting by stating flatly that there was no
military solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka. The JS
claimed that President Rajapaksa agreed and stated that the
GOSL is ready for unconditional talks; however, the LTTE's
position is that talks are contingent upon the re-opening of
the Apha 9 Highway, and the GOSL refuses any stipulations.
The JS remarked that he tried to explore the GOSL strategy
behind its military actions in sidebar meetings and, as far
as he could determine, they were not an attempt to weaken the
LTTE before future negotiations. Rather, maneuvers in the

NEW DELHI 00008129 002 OF 003


field were performed out of fear that a dramatic LTTE
offensive was imminent. He reported that the GOSL believed
that the LTTE attack would probably take place in Colombo.
The GOSL's fears were well-founded, Kumar later asserted, as
the Defense Ministry Secretary and brother of the President,
Gotabaye Rajapaksa, was the target of a suicide bomber in
Colombo on 4 December.

----- GOI getting fed up with civilian casualties -----

¶4. (C) Mukherjee also conveyed the GOI's concern with the
rising number of civilian casualties. He reiterated the
GOI's "article of faith" that Tamils are distinguished from
LTTE cadres but recent GOSL military actions were blurring
the distinction. GOSL actions were also driving moderate
Tamils into the arms of the LTTE. The JS said that Mukherjee
warned the Sri Lankan President that the international
community was watching the situation closely. Rajapaksa
responded that the GOSL was doing its best to limit civilian
casualties.

----- "The political process must commence as soon as
possible" -----

¶5. (C) According to Kumar, the Minister stated that the GOSL
needs to show progress on a viable political process that
provided protection for all ethnicities. He contended that
it was the responsibility of the GOSL to continue to advance
the political process even if proposals are rejected by the
LTTE. Referring to the "Southern consensus," Mukherjee said
that Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by the United
People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) and the United National
Party (UNP) on 23 October, 2006, must stay on track, as it
will lead to a southern consensus on a devolution of power
scheme.

----- "Merger of North and East is vital to a permanent
solution" -----

¶6. (C) Kumar reported that Mukherjee emphasized that the
north-east merger was a "fundamental part of the peace
process." President Rajapaksa responded that the de-merger
order by the Supreme Court was a legal maneuver and does not
rule out Parliament's option to introduce another merger
bill. He reminded Mukherjee that he was essentially heading
a "minority government" and noted that there were questions
regarding Ranil Wickremesinghe's leadership in the UNP. He
claimed that Wickremesinghe "does not have the numbers to
push through a consensus within the UNP." The JS also quoted
Rajapaksa as saying that the "MOU must have time to flower."
The JS noted that, unsurprisingly, in a separate meeting with
Wickremesinghe on 30 November, the UNP leader appeared
"cocky" and gave no signal that he was experiencing
leadership problems within the UNP.

¶7. (C) Turning to GOSL responses to LTTE leader Vellupillai
Prabhakran's annual Heroes Day address, the JS said that
President Rajapaksa was "dismissive" and basically told his
interlocutors, "we told you so." When Polcouns asked about
his perception of the Prabhakaran speech, the JS commented
that what was most significant was what was missing from the
speech: specifically, neither mention of a north-east merger
nor mention of the potential for a political settlement. He
asserted that it signals the LTTE has lost faith the
political process and sees no viable option to total
independence. In his view, the hard-line stance taken by

NEW DELHI 00008129 003 OF 003


Prabhakaran is more worrisome than deemed by the GOSL and was
not merely an empty gesture aimed at future negotiations.

¶8. (C) According to JS Kumar, no specific military
assistance was discussed at the Mukherjee-Rajapaksa meeting.
However, increased surveillance of LTTE maritime supply
routes was requested. In addition, the GOI said that it will
listen to subsequent proposals for arms. The JS expressed
the GOI's interest in gauging the degree of support by other
co-chairs for Norway's continued role as the primary
facilitator in the peace process. (NOTE: This may be a
reference to complaints about Norway's perceived bias toward
the LTTE as noted in Reftel A and, most likely, shared with
by Rajapaksa with the GOI. END NOTE.) Polcouns noted the
JS's request for Undersecretary Nicholas Burns' clarification
and told the JS that he would convey it to Washington.

¶9. (C) COMMENT: Kumar's report on the atmospherics of the
Mukherjee-Rajapaksa meeting is in contrast to many media
reports reporting friction in the bilateral relationship.
The 29 November edition of the "Hindustan Times" noted that,
"Indian officials are irked by what they term the Sri Lankan
government's 'intransigent' attitude towards the country's
ethnic problem" under the headline, "Sri Lanka ignoring
India's advice." When Polcouns asked about various press
reports suggesting India's frustration with the Rajapaksa
government, Kumar replied, "the India media is way off base
on this." While this may be true, there is no doubt that
the absence of a joint statement or photo opportunity after
Rajapaksa's meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh sends
a signal to Tamil Nadu that the GOI is not pleased with
rising casualties among the minority Tamils and is voicing
its displeasure quietly. In addition, Mr. Kumar's more than
casual inquiry regarding support for Norway's continued
leading role as mediator in the Sri Lanka conflict lends more
credence to Norwegian Special Envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer's
suspicions that the GOSL perceives him as being biased toward
the LTTE and may be ramping up its effort to discredit
Norway's efforts in the war torn nation (see reftel A). END
COMMENT
MULFORD

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 8334
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 8306
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RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 9821
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 7319
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 0635
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 5565
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
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RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 004114

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2031
TAGS: PGOV PREL TW
SUBJECT: DPP CHAIRMAN YU SHYI-KUN ON DOMESTIC POLITICS,
ARMS PROCUREMENT, AND DIRECT CROSS-STRAIT LINKS


Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young,
Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)

¶1. (C) Summary: DPP Chairman Yu Shyi-kun told the Director
on December 12 that the results of the December 9 Taipei and
Kaohsiung mayoral elections were a "small victory" for the
party, with Chen Chu winning narrowly in Kaohsiung and Frank
Hsieh turning in a good performance in Taipei. The elections
showed that Taiwan voters are able to judge independently,
despite the barrage of negative publicity about President
Chen and the DPP in the pro-Blue media. The people are
giving the DPP a new opportunity, and Yu underscored his
"absolute confidence" in the party's future. The KMT was
making a mistake in blaming its setback on weak campaigning,
Yu argued; the KMT's essential problem is its lack of a clear
Taiwan focus. If Chairman Ma Ying-jeou continues to press
for unification with the Mainland, he will lose the
presidential election in 2008, Yu predicted. Yu asked the
Director if his recent remarks to AmCham encouraging the
opening of direct cross-Strait links were consistent with
President Reagan's 1982 assurances that the U.S. would not
mediate between Taipei and Beijing and would not pressure
Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC. In response,
the Director pointed out that Taiwan has developed a major
economic relationship with China in recent years in ways no
one could have anticipated 24 years ago. The focus back then
was on political negotiations concerning final status and
arms sales. Opening direct links today is important to
further enhancing Taiwan's economic competitiveness in the
region. End Summary.

Mayoral Elections
-----------------

¶2. (C) Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairman Yu
Shyi-kun told the Director on December 12 that the party's
internal polls had predicted Chen Chu would win the December
9 Kaohsiung election by 6300-7800 votes, which was not far
off her actual 1114 vote margin of victory. This contrasted
with highly inaccurate polls in the pan-Blue media, which
showed Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Huang Chun-ying with a
double digit lead over Chen Chu. Pro-Blue media polls had
been inaccurate in the past, Yu added, including in both the
2000 and 2004 presidential elections. Such polls had misled
U.S. observers into concluding that the March 19, 2004
shooting of President Chen and Vice President Lu had swung
the election from Lien Chan to Chen Shui-bian. In fact, Yu
said, DPP internal polling had shown President Chen was
already slightly ahead of KMT candidate Lien Chan even before
the shooting incident.

¶3. (C) The December 9 mayoral elections, though called a
draw by some, actually represented a small victory for the
DPP, Yu maintained, adding that many observers had predicted
a defeat, given the party's difficulties. Yu attributed Chen
Chu's victory to Frank Hsieh's good performance as mayor in
Kaohisung, Chen Chu's qualifications, the DPP's efforts, and
late campaigning by President Chen and former DPP Chairman
Lin I-hsiung, who left the party some months ago. Lin, whom
many respect for his personal integrity, was not recruited by
the DPP but campaigned because of his friendship with Chen
Chu. In addition to Chen Chu's victory in Kaohsiung, Frank
Hsieh turned in a good performance in Taipei, winning nearly
41 percent of the votes, though this was below the
percentages registered by Chen Shui-bian in his successful
and unsuccessful races in Taipei City in 1994 and 1998.

¶4. (C) Yu suggested that the two mayoral elections
demonstrated the Taiwan people's growing ability to think and
judge independently, despite the barrage of criticism
directed at the DPP by the pro-Blue media. The elections
also reinforced the trend toward a two party political
system, highlighting the fact that the space for small
parties is shrinking. In addition, the mayoral elections
showed that the people of Taiwan are giving a second chance
to the DPP, which will need to use this opportunity to carry
out further reflection, review, and reform. Yu stressed his

TAIPEI 00004114 002 OF 003


"absolute confidence" in the future of the DPP.

An End to Pan-Blue Efforts to Remove President Chen?
--------------------------------------------- -------

¶5. (C) Asked whether the pan-Blue campaign to force
President Chen out of office is over, Yu responded that the
upcoming trial of First Lady Wu Shu-chen will be an important
factor, adding that there are many points of controversy
regarding this case. Yu doubted that Shih Ming-te will be
able to revive his "Depose Chen" movement. Shih would first
have to successfully pressure Ma Ying-jeou into remobilizing
the pan-Blue troops that formed the mainstay of the "Depose
Chen" movement before he could try again to "encircle" the
Presidential Office. (Comment: As Yu undoubtedly realizes,
Ma is highly unlikely to allow Shih to damage his leadership
again. End Comment.)

The KMT's Root Problem
----------------------

¶6. (C) According to media reports, Yu noted, the KMT is
blaming 90 percent of its December 9 election setback on
faulty campaign tactics and just 10 percent on problems with
its own values or policies. The KMT will have no hope so
long as it continues to blame faulty campaigning for its
problems, Yu argued. Despite its many advantages, including
financial resources, a friendly media, and a large cadre of
elected local officials, the KMT has shrunk because it does
not have a Taiwan focus (bentu lunshu, literally,
"localization theme"). The DPP, on the other hand, has grown
and won elections because of its Taiwan focus. However,
those who favor unification want to hurt the DPP because they
do not like this policy. If Ma continues to press for
unification, he will lose the presidential election in 2008,
Yu predicted. He cited recent polling indicating that 65
percent of the people identify themselves as Taiwanese and
over 50 percent support Taiwan independence. Yu also noted
that Ma's approval rating, according to DPP internal polls,
is now under 40 percent, down from a high of about 80 percent
following his trip to the U.S. last March.

Candidate Selection for Upcoming Legislative Elections
--------------------------------------------- ---------

¶7. (C) The DPP would like to hold the next legislative and
presidential elections together on January 19, 2008 rather
than having legislative elections in December 2007 followed
by the presidential election in March 2008, Yu said. The DPP
will use a three-step process to select candidates for the LY
elections. The party will seek to recruit candidates in
districts where there are no volunteers. In the other
districts, the DPP will allow party members to register as
possible candidates, working to identify a single consensus
candidate for each district through a consultation process.
In districts where it is impossible to reach consensus on a
single candidate, the party will hold a competitive primary
to determine the candidate, which will be held at the same
time as the presidential primary. Yu said he expects
campaigning to begin around July of next year.

Offensive Missiles are the Best Defense
---------------------------------------

¶8. (S) Yu expressed confidence that the LY will approve the
arms procurement budget either now or by March at the latest.
The Director underscored the U.S. hope that the Taiwan
government will submit a supplementary budget request for
PAC-III missiles after March 20 to strengthen Taiwan's
defenses against PRC missiles. Yu somewhat offhandedly
tossed out the idea that what Taiwan really needs from the
U.S. to prevent PRC invasion or annexation is 10-20
long-range missiles. In the past, the U.S. could not sell
such missiles because of Taiwan's policy to recover the
Mainland. The situation now is different, however, and
Taiwan is in a defensive posture. Yu cited the adage
"offense is the best defense" in support of his view that

TAIPEI 00004114 003 OF 003


Taiwan needs long-range missiles. Yu's idea was completely
impossible, the Director stressed. Defense is more
effective than offense. Taiwan and the U.S. have different
defense roles, and Taiwan does not need long-range missiles.
We want Taiwan to strengthen its missile defense capability
and to play its role as a democratic model, which will help
steer China in the direction of being a responsible
stakeholder rather than a threat to Taiwan and the region.
(Comment: Yu seemed to be playing devil's advocate, but his
remarks recall the momentary fame he achieved in 2004 by
threatening to attack Shanghai with missiles if the PRC
launched missiles against Taipei and Kaohsiung. End Comment.)

Encouraging Direct Cross-Strait Links
-------------------------------------

¶9. (C) Yu asked whether the Director's recent remarks to
AmCham encouraging the opening of direct cross-Strait air
links were consistent with President Reagan's 1982 assurances
that the U.S. would not play any mediation role between
Taipei and Beijing and would not exert pressure on Taiwan to
enter into negotiations with the PRC. Yu explained that some
DPP cadres had requested that he seek clarification from the
Director on this question. The Director pointed out that
DUSTR Bhatia, during his visit to Taiwan last May, had
already underscored that opening direct cross-Strait links
was important for Taiwan, including for the U.S. businesses
operating here. The context was greatly changed from 24
years ago, when the USG intent had been to reassure Taiwan
that we would not negotiate over Taiwan's head with China on
our arms sales or pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations
on final status issues. In recent years, Taiwan has
developed a major economic relationship with the PRC, and
opening direct links is important to further enhance Taiwan's
economic competitiveness in the region. Yu argued that the
PRC uses economics for political purposes, and therefore
Taiwan needs to take account of the security dimension of the
question. The Director responded that strengthening self
defense is the way to address security concerns, and this
will provide the confidence to further develop cross-Strait
economic links.

Comment
-------

¶10. (C) Yu seemed almost cocky in arguing what he saw as the
DPP's advantages over the KMT. Although the DPP won a very
narrow victory in the contest for Kaohsiung mayor, the KMT
won by a much wider margin in Taipei, and it also won more
city council seats in both cities than the DPP. While Ma
Ying-jeou no longer appears to be the shoe-in for president
in 2008 that many local commentators thought him to be
several months ago, he is still quite a formidable candidate.
Because the Taiwan government itself supports opening
direct links with the Mainland, we see no problem in
encouraging this process. Yu's question on cross-Strait
links may stem from the minority view held by some Deep Green
supporters that Taiwan should slow the development of
cross-Strait economic relations to prevent further "tilting"
toward China.

YOUNG

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6154
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 8362
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 8341
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 1618
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 9853
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 7385
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 0671
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 5588
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
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RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000028

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/05/2032
TAGS: PGOV TW PINR
SUBJECT: KMT CHAIRMAN MA SINGS THE BLUES

REF: A. TAIPEI 04096

¶B. TAIPEI 03890

Classified By: AIT Acting Director Robert S. Wang,
Reason 1.4 (b/d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The opposition KMT's poorer than expected
performance in key mayoral elections on December 9 was a
minor setback for KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou, giving critics
an opening to raise doubts about his leadership and ability
to appeal to Taiwan's southern voters. The KMT kept control
of Taipei as expected and strengthened its representation in
the Taipei and Kaohsiung city councils. The party, however,
proved unable to defeat the ruling DPP in its southern base
of Kaohsiung despite Ma's heavy campaigning and a string of
corruption investigations plaguing President Chen, his
family, and advisors. Ma, whose term as Taipei mayor ended
on December 25, will now focus on leading the KMT into the
2007 legislative election and securing his party's nomination
for the 2008 presidential race. End Summary.

Ma's Wake-up Call
-----------------

¶2. (C) The Kuomintang's (KMT) poorer than expected
performance in key mayoral elections on December 9 was a
setback for KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou, giving critics an
opening to raise doubts about his leadership and ability to
attract enough Taiwanese votes from southern Taiwan to win
the presidency in 2008. Ma himself declared shortly after
the election that the KMT had performed adequately and
reached a "draw" with the DPP. KMT Organization Department
Director Liao Feng-te suggested to AIT that the KMT actually
won three of the four races on December 9--it gained a
"technical" victory by winning the Taipei mayoral race and
strengthened its control over both Taipei and Kaohsiung city
councils. The narrow loss in the Kaohsiung mayoral contest,
however, has been widely seen as a personal setback for Ma,
who made himself very visible in campaigning for the KMT
mayoral candidate, acknowledged Liao. Despite a razor-thin
loss in Kaohsiung by KMT candidate Huang Chun-ying, Ma is now
under pressure to review the party's election strategy and
grass roots operations, Liao explained, because of concerns
about the KMT's ability to attract southern votes in the
upcoming 2007 legislative and 2008 presidential elections.

¶3. (C) Analyzing the KMT strategy in Kaohsiung, Liao
suggested that Ma's "direct sales" approach, which bypassed
local KMT grassroots leaders in an effort to appeal directly
to voters, alienated local party bosses and could have cost
the KMT the race. Although Ma's approach is effective in
northern urban areas like Taipei, Liao asserted it has
limited appeal in the south, where personal outreach to local
leaders is a more effective method of mobilizing the party
base and ensuring voter turnout. KMT Legislator Lai
Shih-pao, a strong Ma supporter, acknowledged some problems
with Ma's Kaohsiung strategy and campaigning style, but
pointed to the relative passivity and weakness of KMT
candidate Huang Chun-ying as the major factor in allowing the
DPP to pull out a narrow victory.

¶4. (C) Soochow University Professor Emile Sheng (Chih-jen)
suggested that over the long-term the Kaohsiung loss could
prove a boon to the KMT. The sense of crisis, Sheng
predicted, would prompt Ma and the party leadership from
becoming over-confident and avoid making the same mistakes in
upcoming elections. A victory in Kaohsiung, on the other
hand, might have encouraged the KMT to become "cocky." Ma
can no longer take the party's presidential nomination for
granted, Sheng surmised, even though party rival Wang
Jin-pyng and KMT Honorary Chairman Lien Chan do not pose an
immediate threat to Ma's front-runner status.

Leading the Pan-Blue Camp
-------------------------

¶5. (C) KMT Chairman Ma, whose term as Taipei mayor ended on
December 25, now faces the demanding task of leading the KMT
into the 2007 legislative election. The shift to
single-member districts and halving the legislature in 2007

TAIPEI 00000028 002 OF 003


means that competition among incumbents for a seat in the new
113-member legislature will be fierce. Ma's initial attempt
in December to forge a formal coalition with the smaller
People First Party (PFP) met strong resistance from a vocal
block of KMT legislators in the party's Central Standing
Committee (CSC). Ma's proposal, which aims to minimize
internecine pan-Blue competition, was rejected at two weekly
CSC meetings and then moved to a party sub-committee for
"further deliberation," a face-saving move that called into
question Ma's leadership of the party. Ma, however, gained a
small victory on January 3 when the CSC unanimously passed a
watered-down version that endorsed the concept of KMT-PFP
cooperation but left the more sensitive issue of how to
coordinate candidate nominations between the two parties for
future discussion.

¶6. (C) According to KMT Legislator Ting Shou-Chung,
opponents of Ma's conciliatory approach to the PFP have
argued that any concessions will come largely at the expense
of KMT legislators. KMT Legislator Hsu Chung-hsiung, one of
the most vocal opponents of KMT-PFP cooperation in the CSC,
told AIT that in Taiwan's "electoral jungle" the KMT can no
longer afford to make "compromises" with an increasing
marginalized PFP, weakened by a rash of defections to the KMT
and the abysmal performance of PFP Chairman James Soong in
the Taipei mayoral race. Lai Shih-pao predicted that the
upcoming legislative election will "finish off" Soong and the
PFP, which no longer pose a major threat to the KMT. (Note:
Taoyuan Magistrate Eric Chu told ADIR that Soong is "already
in his political grave." End Note.) Lai explained that Ma,
nevertheless, is making conciliatory overtures to keep Soong
from running in the 2008 presidential election and avoid
reopening the pan-Blue split that gave President Chen a
narrow victory in 2000.

¶7. (C) The PFP, for its part, sees its leverage over the
KMT dwindling and will be facing an uphill battle to survive
as a viable political party after 2007. PFP Legislator
Vincent Chang (Hsien-yao), who is close to Soong, told AIT
that his party has "no choice" but to work with the KMT ahead
of the elections because PFP supporters demand it. The PFP
would risk further alienating those supporters by working
with the DPP to pass legislation on the recovery of the KMT's
party assets, the only major lever the PFP enjoys over the
KMT, added Chang. Despite Soong's declared intention to
"withdraw" from politics on December 9, Chang expects Soong
will continue negotiations with Ma to secure PFP legislative
and future government positions should the KMT regain power
in 2008.

¶8. (C) Given the strong opposition within the KMT and the
increasingly constrained bargaining position of the PFP,
KMT-PFP relations are likely to muddle along barring any
unexpected breakthroughs. KMT Director Liao suggested to AIT
that for the foreseeable future the KMT will continue its
informal cooperation with the PFP on policy and electoral
issues, allowing PFP members to rejoin the KMT ahead of
legislative primaries early next year. Already 3 of the 22
PFP legislators have initiated procedures to regain their KMT
membership and Liao expects that another handful could rejoin
in order to compete in the KMT primaries.

Wang on the Offensive?
----------------------

¶9. (C) In the wake of the loss in Kaohsiung, (KMT)
Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng appears to be laying the
groundwork to challenge Ma for the party's presidential
nomination in the spring. Most party insiders and outside
observers, however, still see a Wang candidacy as only a
remote possibility. Wang's supporters have been pointing to
the Kaohsiung loss as evidence that Ma, who was born in Hong
Kong and is not a native speaker of Taiwanese, lacks
resonance with southern Taiwan's ethnic voters in order to
bolster Wang's nomination prospects, Director Liao told AIT.
Wang himself has also asked James Soong to remain active in
politics and has allied with KMT Honorary Chairman Lien Chan
as a means to maintain pressure from the deep Blues and keep
Ma off balance. Legislator Hsu, a Wang supporter,
nevertheless characterized Wang's maneuvering as "political

TAIPEI 00000028 003 OF 003


ploys" that, in the end, would only be of limited use in
elevating Wang's stature.

¶10. (C) National Taipei University Professor and close Wang
confidant Herman Chiang (Min-chin) told AIT that Wang's
ultimate objective is to force Ma into accepting him as the
KMT Vice Presidential running mate in 2008. Only by
presenting himself as a potential challenger, explained
Chiang, can Wang reach this objective since he holds
relatively limited influence with KMT elites who do not want
to see a Wang-led presidential ticket. KMT Legislator Lai
suggested that despite the ill-will between Ma and Wang
engendered by their competition for KMT chairmanship in 2005,
Ma is now open to the possibility of choosing Wang as a
running-mate. Ma's thinking has changed, explained Lai,
because he is facing potential problems with the mayoral
special budget investigation and is calculating that an
alliance with Wang would help draw more support from ethnic
Taiwanese voters, diminishing the effectiveness of the DPP's
"ethnic card."

Ma's Achilles' Heel
-------------------

¶11. (C) Ma, long known for his squeaky-clean image, found
himself unexpectedly under investigation for the alleged
misuse of a mayoral office expense account last November.
Although Taipei city prosecutors questioned Ma on several
occasions and have indicted a staff assistant responsible for
handling Ma's expense account submissions for the alleged
misuse, no decision on whether or not to indict Ma has yet
been made. KMT Legislator Lai told AIT that he expects an
announcement by the prosecutor's office in the coming weeks
and predicted that Ma will be cleared of any wrongdoing.
Nonetheless, Lai acknowledged that Ma's reputation for
competence and cleanliness has been tarnished by his poor
handling of the crisis, but surmised it would probably not
affect Ma's presidential chances. Lai assessed that in the
unlikely event of an indictment, however, Ma would likely
follow through with his promise to resign from his KMT
chairmanship, leaving the party to struggle with the awkward
issue of whether and how to back Ma for a 2008 presidential
bid.

Comment
-------

¶12. (C) The electoral loss in Kaohsiung and the ensuing
strong criticism and challenges from Ma's detractors appear
unlikely to significantly slow down Ma's momentum toward
winning his party's presidential nomination this spring.
Despite Wang's maneuverings, Ma still remains the KMT's best
hope to retake the Presidential Office in 2008, barring
further revelations or a formal indictment from the ongoing
investigation into Ma's expense account from his tenure as
Taipei mayor. Having now stepped down as Taipei's mayor, Ma
will also most certainly venture more frequently out of the
capital to the south and rural counties to build up his
relationships with local KMT leaders at the grassroots.
WANG

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 001536

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/INS, DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PINR KISL IN
SUBJECT: BJP COCKY ABOUT UTTAR PRADESH AND DELHI POLL
PROSPECTS

REF: A. NEW DELHI 1273

¶B. NEW DELHI 1508
¶C. 06 NEW DELHI 7577
¶D. 06 NEW DELHI 7827

NEW DELHI 00001536 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for reasons 1.4 (B,D)


¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On March 25, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
kicked off its campaign for the upcoming Uttar Pradesh (UP)
State Assembly elections with a bang. The BJP is focusing on
the UP elections, which start on April 7 with results to be
announced May 11, and on April 5 Delhi Municipal elections.
In UP, the overconfident BJP has outlined its issues, named
its Chief Minister (CM) candidate (Kalyan Singh, CM of UP
from 1991-1992 and 1997-1999), and rejected a post-election
coalition, claiming it will sail to victory by consolidating
the divided Hindu vote. Revitalizing the Ayodhya
campaign--to build a temple on the disputed site where Lord
Ram (a Hindu God) was purportedly born -- appears to be the
latest BJP attempt to revive its anti-"minorityism" strategy
(reftel A). The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), however, seems to
have a winning list of candidates including Dalits, Muslims,
and Brahmins --the three largest voting blocs in UP. This
leaves the BJP and SP jostling for second place, with
Congress trailing in fourth place. In Delhi, India's always
powerful anti-incumbency sentiment all but assures the BJP of
victory. After Delhi and UP, the BJP will shift focus to the
next two state elections: Goa and Gujarat, as they traverse
the country, plotting a comeback at the Center in the 2009
Parliamentary polls. END SUMMARY

THE BIG FISH: UTTAR PRADESH
------

¶2. (SBU) On March 25, the BJP made a big splash in UP,
launching its campaign for the upcoming State Assembly
elections. (Note: Polling across the state will start on
April 7th, continuing throughout April, with results
announced on May 11. End Note). In meetings across the
state, an all-star cast of BJP leaders delivered pledges to
rebuild the controversial Ram temple in Ayodhya and attacked
the UPA government for "appeasing minorities" and failing to
address the rising inflation rate (reftel A). BJP President
L.K. Advani is reported as overconfidently stating that "the
party would defy all speculations of a hung Assembly by
getting an absolute majority." However, of all states, UP
--with four major parties and dozens of smaller ones-- is
probably the one least likely to deliver a clear majority for
any party.

KALYAN SINGH TAPPED TO LEAD
-------

¶3. (U) Two time former Chief Minister of UP and current BJP
Vice President Kalyan Singh has been tapped as CM should the
BJP form the next UP government. While attacking the SP and
Congress on issues of inflation and "Muslim appeasement," the
BJP is asking voters to compare the report cards of each
party's proposed leader. The SP's Mulayam and BSP's Mayawati
both face corruption cases, while Kalyan Singh has never been
charged. Singh is promising to restore a corruption free,
efficient government that will address crucial bread and

NEW DELHI 00001536 002.2 OF 004


butter and infrastructure needs of the people and the state.
He is also promising to restore law and order and stop
appeasing minorities (read Muslims). Playing on his name and
the Hindu word for welfare, he is promising to restore
"kalyan" (welfare) to the state.

RAM TEMPLE
------

¶4. (C) Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Kalyan
Singh's campaign is his promise to construct a Ram temple in
Ayodhya. The 1992 demolition of the Babri Mosque, which stood
on the disputed site, caused widespread communal rioting
throughout the country and made it a flashpoint for
Hindu-Muslim tensions. BJP leaders credit the Ayodhya
campaign with the BJP's rise to power at the Center. The
current support for the temple indicates that the BJP has
decided to embrace a Hindutva (Hindu Nationalist) agenda
again to win in UP and return to power eventually in New
Delhi. Singh, however, is hedging his bets by couching the
Ram temple as a cultural issue rather than a political one.

BJP VOTE BANK GETTING PARCELED OUT
------

¶5. (C) The media reports that BJP leaders claim that the
party does not consider the SP, BSP, or Congress as
significant threats. Despite this, to achieve the impossible
and consolidate the Hindu vote, the BJP will have to contend
with the BSP's new strategy of targeting Brahmin and Muslim
voters (refs A & B). BSP leader Mayawati has announced a
list of 403 candidates that includes 89 Brahmins and 61
Muslims. Though she formerly chanted derogatory campaign
slogans against Brahmins, they seem to be forgotten today,
making Mayawati and her party the strongest contender. Now,
Brahmin voters have two strategies: voting for a Brahmin to
ensure greater representation; and not voting for the SP in
races where no Brahmin is a realistic candidate. The BJP has
not yet released its list of candidates, which contacts have
told us includes only 50 Brahmins. The BJP needs to pick up
the pace and release a list with more Brahmin candidates if
it plans to capture one of its largest Hindu vote banks in
the state (10 percent of the population).

¶6. (SBU) Additionally, cutting into the BJP's targeted vote
bank is the recent defection of Gorakhpur MP Yogi Adityanath,
after the BJP leadership rejected his list of 24-30
candidates. Adithyanath has a following among a religious
sect of Hindus, who are upper caste but not Brahmins. His
following, both political and religious are based in Eastern
UP. After negotiations with the BJP failed, Adityanath
decided to split from the party and contest approximately 70
seats independently. In the likely event of a hung assembly,
his support represents a significant chip off the BJP block.
News reports project that Adityanath could take as many as 15
seats away from the BJP.

POST-ELECTION COALITION POSSIBILITIES
------

¶7. (C) On March 21, Sanjaya Baru, Media Advisor to the Prime
Minister spoke candidly with visiting Ambassador Shirin
Tahir-Kheli about UP and potential post election scenarios.

NEW DELHI 00001536 003.2 OF 004


Baru reaffirmed that the BJP intends to stress
"anti-minorityism" to consolidate the anti-Muslim vote
(reftel A). According to Baru, the BJP secretly intends to
form a coalition government with the SP of Chief Minister
Mulayam Singh Yadav after the election. He maintained that
the BJP hopes Muslims will stick with the SP and not switch
to Congress, as this would strengthen a BJP/SP coalition.

¶8. (C) In a March 30 meeting with Poloff, Congress MP Rashid
Alvi echoed Baru's assessment, stating that he suspects that
the SP and BJP have come to an understanding. Alvi, who
knows all the UP players intimately, stated that CM Yadav is
terrified that Mayawati will come to power and "destroy" him.
Alvi claimed that the BJP has offered Mulayam protection
from prosecution and harassment, but only if he agrees to
support a BJP government "from outside." Under such an
arrangement, the SP would not have access to ministries or
public funds. Alvi stressed that Mulayam would have to be
absolutely desperate to accept such a deal, as it would
destroy his political career. The SP's Muslim support base
would disappear overnight, making it all but impossible for
Mulayam ever to become Chief Minister again.

¶9. (C) Alvi revealed that Congress is hoping that the
election outcome will be so indecisive as to prevent any
party from forming the government. In such an event,
Congress is prepared to ask for six months of President's
rule. Alvi has purportedly told Rahul Gandhi that given six
months, Congress can jail all the criminals associated with
the SP and gain the gratitude of the UP voters, reviving
Congress and giving it a clear chance to return to power in
UP.

THE SMALLER FISH: MUNICIPAL DELHI ELECTIONS
------

¶10. (SBU) Complicating the UP scenario, just across the
Yamuna, Delhites will go to municipal polls on April 5, with
results announced on April 7. According to a recent poll
conducted by the BJP's Pioneer newspaper and the Pioneer
Media School, the top three issues voters are concerned about
are: inflation, the recent handling of shops being sealed in
residential zones (reftel C & D), and corruption. The poll
also predictably indicates the BJP will capture control of
the Delhi Municipal government with 62% of the vote. With
inflation impacting peoples' lives daily and the badly
handled sealing drive continuing to impact the lives of
traders, and Sheila Dixit suffering from anti-incumbency, the
BJP is expected to sail to victory in the capitol.

COMMENT: IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE
--------

¶11. (C) We cannot comment on the veracity of the persistent
UP rumors and scenarios, but suspect that negotiations are in
progress between the SP and BJP, as this would explain the
BJP's seemingly irrational confidence that it will form the
next government in Lucknow.

¶12. (C) Should the BJP and SP fail to capture enough seats
to make an SP/BJP arrangement feasible, we believe the BJP
would be more than happy to sit in the opposition in UP,
hoping for Mayawati to self destruct (reftel B). Both Baru

NEW DELHI 00001536 004.2 OF 004


and Alvi agreed that anything can happen in UP. Whereas most
states have just two principal political parties, UP has
four, negating the "anti-incumbency factor" that is usually a
determining factor in election
results.

¶13. (C) While the BJP is perhaps overly confident regarding
its prospects in UP, according to news reports, it is running
a sharp, well organized campaign that could bring some
tangible returns. According to our UP contacts, the BJP
seems to be running a close second place with the SP and
could possibly relegate the once-powerful SP to third
position. The BSP is most likely to capture the first slot,
with Congress coming in at the bottom. Even if the BJP is
not part of the ruling government in UP, it will carry many
advantages while in the opposition, especially if the BSP
wins and cannot keep its house in order (reftel B). The
BJP's real goal is not to capture power in Lucknow, but
rather in New Delhi, and its every move is made with that
goal in mind.

¶14. (C) In Delhi, all arrows point toward a BJP victory.
Should things go the BJP's way in Delhi and UP, the BJP will
direct its attention to upcoming elections in Goa and Gujarat
(scheduled for May and December, respectively). The party
hopes that a string of election victories in state contests
(in addition to Bihar, Punjab, and Uttarakhand) will create
sufficient momentum to propel it to victory in the 2009
national elections. END COMMENT
MULFORD

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM PINR SCUL KDEM KISL IN
SUBJECT: LATEST UTTAR PRADESH POLL CONFIRMS CONTINUED
SAMAJWADI PARTY DECLINE

REF: A. NEW DELHI 1946

¶B. NEW DELHI 1915
¶C. NEW DELHI 1699
¶D. NEW DELHI 1675
¶E. NEW DELHI 1508

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Atul Keshap for reasons 1.4 (
B,D)

¶1. (C) Summary: The fifth phase of seven phases of the
Uttar Pradesh (UP) election concluded on April 28, with a
growing consensus that this election will likely spell the
end of SP rule. An effective Election Commission has
prevented the ruling Samajwadi Party (SP) from using dirty
tricks to rig the polls and things are not going well for
Chief Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav. UP contacts claim he is
increasingly depressed about the election outcome, while a
confident Mayawati has promised to jail Mulayam and his
henchmen if she comes to power. At one point, Mulayam hoped
he could retain power by making an "arrangement" with the
BJP, which is gaining strength in this election. However,
the BJP leadership decided that an alliance with the
repugnant and discredited Mulayam was too high a price to pay
and publicly bowed out. This all but precludes a BJP or SP
government post election and there is growing speculation
regarding a possible relationship between the front-running
BSP of former Chief Minister Mayawati and Congress.
Ironically, Congress, which is so often counted out in UP,
could emerge as the kingmaker. Should Mayawati fall short of
a majority as most expect, she would need Congress support to
get her over the top. Press reports and rumors indicate that
Congress is prepared to impose President's rule on the
troubled state if Mayawati fails to win enough seats to come
within striking distance. End Summary.

Almost Without a Hitch
----------------------

¶2. (C) Uttar Pradesh (UP) held the fifth phase of its seven
phase Legislative Assembly Election on April 28,. The
Election Commission maintained its sterling record, ensuring
a practically trouble-free contest. Polling took place in 57
constituencies in Central and East UP, including the state
capital in Lucknow. Voter turnout of 46 percent was much
lower than the 53.65 percent registered in the 2002 polls.
The low turn-out could have resulted from the heat wave
currently engulfing UP or the absence of "silent rigging."
In the 2002 polls, political parties, especially the
Samajwadi Party (SP), told voters not to come to the polls,
as their "votes were taken care of." Party officials would
then vote on behalf of the electorate, resulting in an
inflated participation rate. Observers agree that "silent
rigging" was absent from this contest.

¶3. (C) The poverty-stricken villages of East UP have long
been home to criminal politicians such as Raghuraj Pratap
Singh (alias Raja Bhaiyya), who was an MLA and Food Minister
in a previous SP government. Singh maintained his own
private army of "gunmen," who terrorized the entire region.
Villagers told Poloff during his recent tour of East UP that
Singh kept a farmhouse where he would torture his victims to
death and feed their bodies to live alligators. When
Mayawati become Chief Minister she immediately sent police to
shut down the "farm," which was purportedly littered with
human bones, and arrest Raja Bhaiyya. Contesting for a seat
under the SP banner in this contest, Raja Bhaiyya repeatedly
complained to the EC that his followers (who did not have
proper identification), were not allowed to vote.
Mayawati on the Warpath
-----------------------

¶4. (C) Addressing a campaign rally in Allahabad on April 29,
Mayawati pledged to "dislodge the mafia raj of Mulayam Singh
and Amar Singh,...order an inquiry into their bunglings and
severely punish the guilty." She told her supporters that

NEW DELHI 00002092 002 OF 003


she had sent Raja Bhaiya and his notorious colleague Atiq
Ahmed to jail before and would put them behind bars again, as
soon as she is sworn in as Chief Minister. After cleansing
the state of its ruling mafias, Mayawati promised to "weed
out corruption and ensure equitable development of all
sections of society." UP informants who attended Mayawati
rallies claim that this simple message was greeted with
rousing applause by voters fed up with the insecurity and
criminality of current UP, and that Mayawati's one-point
election plank could propel her to power in Lucknow. Raja
Bhaiya has publicly conceded that he takes Mayawati's
promises at face value and that he, Mulayam and Amar Singh
will go to jail if she forms the next UP government. Mulayam
has in campaign speeches urged voters to cast their vote for
the SP and "keep me out of prison."

Polling Claims Mayawati on Top
------------------------------

¶5. (U) Four TV newschannels conducted exit polls. NDTV
projected the following result in fifth phase (57 seats):

BJP - 21 seats

BSP - 14 seats

SP - 10 seats

Congress - nine seats

Others - three seats

The BJP has an unusually high seat tally in this phase, as
its principal following is among urbanites, most especially
in Lucknow, which is the home base of former Prime Minister
AB Vajpayee. The BJP does not do as well in the rural areas,
where it has little support.

¶6. (U) As regards the final state-wide outcome, all agreed
that Mayawati's BSP will win the top spot in the four way
contest. Three polls show the BJP surpassing the SP to
occupy the number two position, with SP slipping to third.
NDTV projected the following seat tally as the final
statewide outcome in the 403 member assembly:

BSP - 120-130 seats (a revival)

BJP - 115-125 (quite strong)

SP - 95-105 (damaged goods)

Congress - 35-45 (doldrums)

The Sinking Ship
----------------

¶7. (C) As the polling progresses, Mulayam has become visibly
deflated. Insiders have claimed to Poloff that he has seen
the writing on the wall and has grown increasingly desperate.
At the campaign's outset, Mulayam was confident that he
could use "silent polling," and intimidation by his "army of
goons," to rig the polls and keep him in power. He did not
count on the presence of an effective Election Commission, a
special seven phase poll, and the presence of thousands of
security personnel. As a result, his is the only party to
complain of election irregularities and call the veracity of
the polling into question. All other parties have praised
this contest as among the most free and fair ever.

Grasping At Straws
------------------

¶8. (C) Desperate to retain power, Mulayam opened
negotiations with the BJP to come to an "arrangement" that
would allow a BJP government to come to power with SP

NEW DELHI 00002092 003 OF 003


support. On April 28, Poloff spoke with Lucknow politicians
and journalists who maintained that the negotiations have
been called off without agreement. They reported that the
BJP could not bring itself to ally with the immensely
unpopular and discredited Mulayam, and the BJP has released
an official announcement ruling out formation of a government
with the SP or BSP.

Could Congress Hold the Key?
----------------------------

¶9. (C) With Mulayam out of the picture, speculation has now
turned to Congress and the possibility that it could emerge
as the UP "kingmaker" in a confused four way contest. On
April 28, Congress President Sonia Gandhi, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh and Congress leaders met to discuss their
options in UP. Leaks from the meeting reported in the press
indicate that Congress is seriously considering a plan to
impose President's rule almost immediately after the election
results are declared. This has been buttressed by recent
statements by Union Minister of State for Home Sriprakash
Jaiswal, (himself an influential UP politician), and UPA
Ministers Lalu Prasad Yadav and Ram Vilas Paswan hinting that
President's rule is "a strong possibility."

¶10. (C) Mayawati, who has fielded candidates in all 403
contests, continues to insist that she will be able to form
the government on her own, but practically no one takes her
assertions at face value. Most pundits assess that should
the BSP win 150 seats or above, it will ask for Congress
support to push her over the required 202 seats. A cocky and
confident Jaiswal stated that "the Congress would have the
key to government-formation and it would ensure that any
party other than the BJP and Samajwadi Party forms the next
Government." However, Congress has purportedly not yet
decided whether it should join a BSP government should the
opportunity arise, or support it from "outside." Many within
the Congress leadership are starting to turn their longing
gaze towards President's rule as the best of all possible
worlds.

¶11. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/)
PYATT

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FROM THE AMBASSADOR FOR U/S BURNS, EUR A/S FRIED, EUR PDAS
DICARLO AND FRANK WISNER
NSC FOR ANSLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2017
TAGS: ECON EFIN PREL PGOV SR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S 5/24 MEETING WITH DEPUTY PRIME
MINISTER DJELIC


Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MICHAEL C. POLT FOR REASONS 1.4
(B) AND (D)

¶1. (c)SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR MET WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
DJELIC ON MAY 24 TO REVIEW HIS PLANS FOR CARRYING OUT THE NEW
GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM. UPBEAT AND ENERGETIC - TO THE
POINT OF BEING COCKY - DJELIC EMPHASIZED THAT HE WOULD
INVEST HEAVILY IN BUILDING GOOD RELATIONS WITH DIFFERENT
PARTS OF THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS
FREQUENT RIVAL, ECONOMY MINISTER AND G17 LEADER DINKIC. ON
POLICY ISSUES, HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE GOS WILL SEEK
RESUMPTION OF SAA TALKS WITH THE EU BEFORE PRESENTING ITS
REVISED 2007 BUDGET TO THE PARLIAMENT IN THE SECOND HALF OF
JUNE. AMBASSADOR REMINDED DJELIC THAT THE SECRETARY FACES AN
END-MAY DECISION ON CERTIFYING SERBIA'S ICTY COOPERATION AND
DESCRIBED COOPERATION TO DATE AS INADEQUATE. ON ECONOMIC
POLICY, DJELIC SAID THAT THE GOS WOULD MOVE IMMEDIATELY TO
RESTART PRIVATIZATION OF STATE OIL COMPANY NIS AND INSUROR
DDOR. HE WAS CAUTIOUS ON PROSPECTS FOR AN IMF PRECAUTIONARY
PROGRAM, SAYING THAT THE GOS WOULD CONSULT WITH THE FUND TO
SEE WHETHER ITS REVISED BUDGET WAS CLOSE ENOUGH TO IMF
PARAMETERS TO SUPPORT A NEW PROGRAM. DJELIC IS SMART AND
ENERGETIC, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME TO ABSORB THE REALITIES OF
THIS ODDLY CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENT AND SERBIA'S PRECARIOUS
RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY BEFORE HE CAN
REALISTICALLY HOPE TO ACCOMPLISH HIS ASSIGNED TASKS. END
SUMMARY

¶2. (SBU)Ambassador Polt held a one-hour introductory
meeting with an ebullient Deputy Prime Minister Djelic on May
¶24. Djelic, the top-ranking Democratic Party official in the
new Kostunica government and a former finance minister and
banker, used the meeting to explain how he sees his role in
the new government and set out his key goals. Building a
strong relationship with the Prime Minister to buttress his
role as the "clear no. 2 in the government," without
reference to party distinctions, would be key, he said, and
he already had invested considerable time to working out the
relationship with Kostunica, whom he described as "very
business-minded." The former Credit Agricole banker also
noted that he was working to build a better relationship with
Economy Minister Dinkic. President Tadic also will be
brought into key economic decisions, he added.

¶3. (c)Djelic, whose formal appointment is as deputy prime
minister for EU integration, said lamented the fact that ICTY
Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte would be his charge when she
arrives in Belgrade on June 4 to discuss ICTY cooperation,
but he also said that the exchange of documents with the
Hague tribunal already had been restarted. Djelic said he
had been surprised to learn that this exchange had more or
less ceased in November. "The whole story is absurd," he
said.

¶4. (c)Restarting Stability and Association talks with the EU
before presenting a new budget to Parliament in the second
half of June would be important, Djelic said. This would
permit the new government to show results and armor itself
against Radical charges that Serbia's Western friends would
not support the new government. The deputy prime minister
argued that the entire episode with appointment of Radical
leader Nikolic as Parliament speaker had served a purpose in
demonstrating to all Serbians what a Radical government would
be like, with status as a Russian province. Now the new
government must show Serbia that it will move forward on
integration, he said, so the bar should not be set so high as
to deny Serbia this step forward. U.S. support of the new
coalition would be important, he added.

¶5. (c) The Ambassador agreed on the importance of restarting
SAA talks, stating that both the U.S. and the EU are looking
for reasons to move forward. The U.S. faces a decision on
whether it can certify Serbia's ICTY cooperation and thereby
avoid withholding part of our assistance. Handing Djelic the
USG's 11-point suggestions on active steps for ICTY
cooperation, the Ambassador reminded Djelic that the
so-called action plan of the previous government had yielded
no results. The U.S. would like to lean forward, the
Ambassador said, but we need a visible signal of Serbia's
determination to find Mladic and reinvigorate ICTY
cooperation, not "vague assurances."

¶6. (c) One of the next steps for the Spring Coalition
government would be the decree on National Security Council
operations. Reform of the security services in general would

BELGRADE 00000737 002 OF 003


be a DS priority, Djelic said, He pointed out that Tadic
already had said publicly that Rade Bulatovic was too
identified with partisan politics to remain as the
"professional" head of the BIA intelligence service. The
sentencing on May 23 of the killers of former Prime Minister
Dzinjic had brought home to DS leaders the importance of
reforming the security service: "This cancer has to be put
out." He added that completion of the Stambolic (the murdered
former Communist leader) prosecution is a priority.


¶7. (SBU)Besides EU integration, his portfolio will include
coordination on all economic and financial issues, relations
with the IMF and other international financial institutions,
charting a course on sustainable development, and
coordinating the fight against poverty, Djelic said.
President Tadic had defined his role as "prime minister in
waiting," Djelic optimistically said, and it was important
that he lead by working through and supporting ministers and
not attempt to run individual ministries.

¶8. (SBU) With regard to IFI cooperation, Djelic pledged a
"radical acceleration" of cooperation with the World Bank,
seeking to close five loans based on more favorable IDA terms
before the window closes with the end of the Bank's fiscal
year on July 1. He also said that the GOS would work out a
country economic memorandum with the Bank. With regard to
the IMF, the deputy prime minister was more circumspect,
noting that when a high-ranking IMF delegation official
arrives in June, the GOS will present its budget to see
whether it could provide the basis for an IMF precautionary
agreement. (Note: the April Fund mission targeted a budget
turnaround of 5 percent of GDP, and Djelic has said publicly
that he is skeptical.)

¶9. (SBU) The GOS will move forward with privatization of the
first tranche of Naftna Industrija Srbije, the state oil
company, Djelic said. It also will restart the suspended
tender for DDOR Novi Sad, one of the two state-owned insurors
that dominate the market. The GOS also should move to sell
the other remaining banks and non-financial institutions,
including Dunav insurance. (Note: Dunav is controlled by a
key political associate of Prime Minister Kostunica; the GOS
has yet to announce which party will control which
state-owned companies.) Djelic said he expected the German
G8 presidency to single out Ukraine and Serbia for work on
capital market reforms, he added.

¶10. (SBU) Foreign investors also would be a key constituency
for the new government, Djelic said. The problems of
existing investors would be solved, because he understands
quite well that the most important assessment of Serbia's
business climate is that of established investors, whose
views potential investors usually solicit. The government
would honor its commitments to Philip Morris, he added.
Ambassador Polt interjected that corruption is a key obstacle
for foreign investors, raising the current Ocean Atlantic
issue as one example. The USG had invested USD 12 million in
commercial court reform and was disappointed with the
handling of the bankruptcy sale from which the U.S. investor
sought - unsuccessfuly - to buy development property. Djelic
said that he was aware of this issue and pledged to resolve
it. When looking at the Commercial Court, he added, the glass
is not half full, but rather pretty empty.
.

¶11. (SBU) When the deputy prime minister mentioned that he
looked forward to working again with U.S. assistance
programs, Ambassador Polt ran down USG priorities: job
creation, which absorbs 70 percent of our assistance,
strengthening of democratic institutions, by which we include
civil society, and rule of law. Another priority is
exchanges, especially for youth, to help overcome the
isolation that Serbia has endured over the past 15 years. In
general, the U.S. assistance program has moved away from work
with the central government, the Ambassador added, to focus
more on municipalities and the private sector.

¶12. (SBU) Ambassador Polt also raised the restitution law
that the outgoing government had approved in one of its last
acts. Djelic immediately criticized it as a "crazy law,"
especially in its promise of EUR 4 billion in compensation.
It is time for the GOs to address this issue, he said, but
the draft must be revised. Ambassador Polt noted that the
Embassy would provide comments on the current draft law, and

BELGRADE 00000737 003 OF 003


he urged addressing the issue before it became another major
political liability for Serbia.
POLT

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STATE FOR WHA/CAR, DS/IP/WHA, AND DS/DSS/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC GJ
SUBJECT: NEW SENTENCE FOR GRENADA 13 LEAVES GRENADIAN
POPULATION DIVIDED

Classified By: DCM Mary Ellen T. Gilroy for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: New sentences for the "Grenada
13" were handed down on June 27, 2007, by Justice Francis
Belle, who presided over the June 18-26 hearing. Three of
the defendants convicted in 1986 of the 1983 killing of Prime
Minister Bishop, members of his cabinet, and a number of
civilians, received 30 year sentences, which led to their
immediate release, while the remaining ten were sentenced to
40 years, leaving them in prison for an additional 3 years.
Lead defense attorney, British Queen's Counsel Edward
Fitzgerald announced after the sentences were read that he
plans to ask that Grenada's Governor General request a new
trial for the defendants to prove their innocence. The
Government of Grenada expressed disappointment with the
sentences, but issued a statement calling on all Grenadians
to accept the decision. The judge, whose impartiality was
challenged during the hearing, apparently slipped out of the
country immediately after delivering his verdict. Families
and friends of the victims are variously furious or resigned.
The sentences have only exacerbated the divisions among
Grenadians rather than providing the healing/closure most had
hoped for. At the moment, the country remains calm.

¶2. (C) COMMENT: Grenadians' expectations for the hearing
were very high and were perhaps inevitably dashed. The
prisoners never apologized, asked for forgiveness, or did
anything that indicated that they felt remorse. Their
demeanor was cocky and self assured for the cameras, as if
(as one woman commented) they knew the result before the
hearing started. The fact that the lead lawyer plans to try
to get the trial reopened means that this case will continue
to fester. Disgust, resignation, and anger appear to be the
main reactions among those who lost loved ones to the
revolution. The younger generation does not know what the
fuss is about since this tremultuous period in the 1980's is
not taught in schools or talked about openly outside trusted
associates. Three defense lawyers willing to talk publicly
on June 28 were unanimous in calling for the families to get
over their emotional reaction and accepted that justice was
done. With the re-sentencing final and three of the thirteen
prisoners free and the rest expecting to be out in a few
years, attention will most likely turn once again to locating
the bodies. The defense adamantly maintained that the United
States knows where the bodies of Bishop and his cohort are
located. Pressure may be ratcheted up on the USG to provide
a better and more detailed accounting than it has to date of
what happened and what the U.S. soldiers did with the remains
they examined. Prime Minister is begging for help on this.
END SUMMARY AND COMMENT

THE HEARING

¶3. (C) The "Grenada 13" are the remaining defendants from
the original group of 17 convicted in 1986 of the October 19,
1983 assassination of then Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and
members of his cabinet, as well as other civilians at Fort
Rupert. The assassinations triggered the October 25, 1983
U.S.-Caribbean intervention to restore order. The Privy
Council in London ruled on February 7, 2007, that the life
sentence of the Grenada 17 was invalid, as it was based on an
unconstitutional sentence of death, and returned the case to
the Grenadian Supreme Court. The Privy Council confirmed the
validity of the conviction and directed that the defendants
be re-sentenced. The hearing was set for the earliest
available date on the court's calendar which was the week of
June 18. The proceedings concluded on June 26, with the
sentences handed down on June 27. Twelve defense attorneys
represented the thirteen defendants, with the British QC
Edward Fitzgerald acting as a lead for the group. Several of
the defense attorneys attempted to use the hearing to retry
the case to prove the innocence of their clients and had to
be reminded that the 1986 multiple homicide conviction was
not vacated by the Privy Council. They also repeated several
times the allegation that the United States took the bodies
of Bishop and the cabinet members and therefore, the United
States, not they know where the bodies are now. The lawyers
called for the United States to tell where the bodies are.
(NOTE: One of the defense attorneys told Meaningful
Television (MTV) on January 28 that the prisoners had always
taken responsibility for the killing and initial disposal of
the bodies - not actually a factual statement - but that the
U.S. military had dug them up and therefore knows where they
are now. END NOTE.)

¶4. (SBU) Under Grenadian law, the Crown does not normally

speak at sentencing. However, because the time between
conviction and sentencing was so great, accommodation was
made for Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) Christopher
Nelson to present the facts of the original trial. Nelson
reminded the court that the assassination of then-Prime
Minister Maurice Bishop and others was mass murder on a scale
unknown in all of Grenada's history. Trinidadian lawyer
Lawrence Ramesh Maharaj assisted Nelson in the presentations.
Families of the victims were allowed to make statements on
June 25. In his summation for the Crown, Nelson asked that
life sentences be imposed given the heinous nature of the
crimes committed.

¶5. (SBU) The defense's rebuttal was surprisingly only a few
hours long. The judge announced on June 26 that he would
hand down the sentences on June 27. He promised the written
judgement in two week's time.

JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY IMPUGNED

¶6. (SBU) Justice Kenneth Benjamin, who was next in the
regular rotation to preside over this case was considered by
the court to be too close to the defendants and was asked to
step aside. Benjamin is a good friend of Bernard Coard, the
leader of the faction within the Revolutionary Government
that opposed and then assassinated Bishop and members of his
Cabinet. Benjamin regularly visits Coard in prison. Justice
Francis Belle, a Barbadian currently resident in St. Kitts,
was brought in to preside on the assumption that his
impartiality was unassailable. On June 20, rumors began
flying that there was a problem in the court. By midday,
word leaked out that the court had received a letter from a
Barbados attorney Robert Clarke asserting that Belle, born
and raised in Barbados, as a young man was a member of a
political movement there with very close ties to Grenada's
New Jewel Movement (NJM), Bishop and Coard's party.
According to Clarke, Belle was close to the Coard faction of
NJM. Grenadian businessman Nelson Louison provided an
affidavit attesting to the facts in Clarke's letter. DPP
Nelson announced he had no choice but to request an
adjournment to investigate. On June 21, Nelson requested an
audience with the judge and the lead defense lawyer and the
court was cleared. Afterwards, Nelson held a press
conference to explain that he had discussed the accusations
with Belle and was satisfied that the judge could be
impartial. The hearing resumed the following morning.

¶7. (C) Belle was reportedly furious that his impartiality
had been questioned. Clarke maintained that he had sent his
letter to the court registrar before the hearing began and
accused the court of negligence in letting the hearing begin
without reviewing Belle's background and connections to the
defendants. Opposition National Democratic (NDC) members
accused the Government of Grenada (GOG) of meddling in court
proceedings. They pointed to Attorney General Elvin Nimrod's
June 17 statement at a political rally that the government
would not allow the 13 to walk free. The GOG denied it all.
The damage was done to the judge's reputation and questions
remain about how impartial he actually was. (COMMENT:
Embassy Grenada had USG visitors from Embassy Bridgetown, who
happened to be staying at the same hotel as the defense
lawyers. They overheard the group in the hotel bar in the
early evening of June 26, laughing and joking about how they
had won. Whether it was bravado for the public or reflected
actual knowledge, we do not know. However, several of our
Grenadian interlocutors who attended the trial were stunned
at how little the defense said in rebuttal and at how quickly
Belle made his decision. Already, there is talk that Belle
had not been impartial. Adding fuel to the speculation was
Belle's rapid departure from Grenada and announcement that he
would send his written report back in two week's time. One
local journalist alleged that Belle said he had better get
out of the country fast. END COMMENT.)

THE FALLOUT

¶8. (SBU) Grenada is still absorbing the new status quo and
it is not clear yet how it will react. Public reaction
appears to be mixed, with many disappointed but not surprised
by the leniency shown to the defendants. Some say "get over
it", especially young Grenadians who are impatient with their
elders' apparent obsession with the "guys on the hill". The
revolutionary period is spoken of only in corners, in
whispers, and is not taught in school, so anyone born after
1983 who does not have a family member killed, imprisoned, or
disappeared during the 1979-1983 period, has very little idea

of what actually happened. The other common reaction is that
everyone should move on, forgive and forget, but a lot of
Grenadians have not been able to do that, especially those
for whom having a body to bury or grave site at which to
mourn is very important.

¶9. (SBU) Grenada tried and failed to field a reconciliation
commission for a number of reasons, the first being that the
terms and authority under which it operated hampered its
ablility to compel testimony. Many people who were involved
in the revolution simply refused to talk to the commission,
including a fair number now in government, both in the ruling
NNP and the opposition NDC. In addition, the three
commission members did not give up their normal jobs and so
were often absent from Grenada for extended periods. When
the report finally came out in 2006, two years late, no one
paid much attention. As one family member told a Grenada
Broadcast Network (GBN) talk show host on January 28, "no one
changed their position. It's either all black or all white,
but no one is trying to deal with the large gray area in
between."

¶10. (C) Since the sentences have been announced and the GOG
has called on Grenadians to accept the result of the hearing
(while still saying it was "a sad day for Grenada" that the
men did not get life sentences), attention may turn with
renewed vigor to the whereabouts of the bodies. Prime
Minister Mitchell called Charge on June 28 to say that he was
concerned about the sentences, but reiterated that the GOG
would abide by the ruling. He was planning to address the
nation soon. Mitchell added that he was getting a lot of
pressure from "people, including my own family", who say he
is not pushing the United States hard enough to tell where
"they" put the bodies. He said he had "asked the Under
Secretary (sic) for help in locating them." (NOTE: Charge

SIPDIS
is aware that Mitchell did not actually raise the issue in
his meeting with Assistant Secretary Shannon, but announced
that he had in the subsequent press conference. The PM is
continuing to maintain this fiction. END NOTE.)
OURISMAN

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SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/HARDING, TREASURY FOR
OFAC/CURTIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: FINNISH DIPLOMAT OFFERS VIEWS ON SYRIAN
POLICY TOWARD LEBANON

REF: A. HELSINKI 710
¶B. BEIRUT 1420

Classified By: DCM William Grant for Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

¶1. (C) A visiting Finnish diplomat from Damascus sees Syria
as pursuing a policy of "constructive chaos" in Lebanon, and
views its motives for supporting an EU-proposed border
mission as suspect. He perceives cracks in the Syrian regime
that suggest its lifespan is limited, and advocated targeted
sanctions against key Syrian officials as the best way to
modify the SARG's behavior. Finally, he believes a weak
consensus president (ruling out Free Patriotic Movement
leader General Michel Aoun) is the best way to consolidate
Lebanon's struggling democratic process, in part because such
a candidate would not be perceived by Syria as a threat and
most likely avoid its negative reaction to his candidacy.
End summary.

¶2. (C) Pol/Econ Chief and PolMilOff met, at his request, with
Anssi Kullberg, Second Secretary at the Embassy of Finland in
Damascus, on September 18. Kullberg, a historian by
training, is responsible for Lebanon in the absence of a
Finnish embassy in Beirut and travels here frequently.

SYRIA: PURSUING CONSTRUCTIVE CHAOS IN LEBANON
---------------------------------------------

¶3. (C) In Kullberg's opinion, Syria does not want to ferment
complete political chaos in Lebanon. He felt that Syria
could ill afford to have a political meltdown that would lead
to civil or a Sunni-Shia conflict in Lebanon. Syria needs a
stable, but frightened, Lebanon to maintain its influence in
the country. If Syria truly wanted civil war in Lebanon, he
argued, it would already have begun.

¶4. (C) Rather, Syria wants to keep Lebanon on the "brink" of
chaos. He noted that, while Damascus often accuses the US of
promoting "constructive chaos" in the region, in reality this
is Syria's policy toward Lebanon. In the SARG's eyes, a
pro-Syrian president would obviate the need for Syria's
military to return to Lebanon.

QUESTIONABLE SYRIAN MOTIVES ON EU BORDER INITIATIVE
--------------------------------------------- -----------

¶5. (C) Kullberg said Finland is favorable to the recent EU
proposal (reftels) for an international border mission, but
skeptical about Syria's motives. In his opinion, this latest
EU endeavor to address Lebanon-Syria border security was the
result of FM Moratinos' recent visit to Lebanon and Syria.
In the past, Syria was only willing to meet with EU countries
on a bilateral basis, in an obvious divide and conquer
strategy that had mostly failed (Kullberg cited Italy and
Germany as countries that had rebuffed these attempts), but
now Syria had changed tactics and was targeting the EU as
whole.

¶6. (C) Kullberg stated that within the EU, skepticism is high
about Syria's true intentions in showing interest in any
border security program. He added that expanding the German
Pilot program, currently being implemented on the northern
Lebanon-Syria border, might be best vehicle to improving
border security on the more contested eastern border, though
so far it has been ineffective in stopping arms from crossing
the border.

CRACKS IN THE SYRIAN REGIME
---------------------------

¶7. (C) Kullberg said "cracks" in the Syrian regime already
were apparent, due to what he termed "three springs": 1)
Damascus 2000 following the death of Hafez Asad; 2) the 2004
Kurdish uprising in Damascus; and 3) the 2005 Beirut spring.
There is general popular discontent with the regime;
individual Syrians live under the constant fear of the
"mukharabat" (Syrian intelligence), not necessarily for
political reasons; often it is a case of one individual using

BEIRUT 00001441 002 OF 003


his "wasta" (connections) with the intelligence services to
avenge an alleged personal wrongdoing. Furthermore, Syrians
are not happy with Damascus' alliance with Iran; many believe
it led to the November 2006 crackdown on Sunni's affiliated
with the Hariri family. As a result, Kullberg did not
envision a long lifespan for the SARG.

¶8. (C) The regime, meanwhile, is determined to prevent
different groups from unifying, as the recent arrest of seven
Syria members of the Syrian Youth for Justice demonstrates.
The seven, arrested for establishing an internet forum for
democratic participation, are of mixed religious backgrounds.
Were they all from the same group, Kullberg said, the SARG
would not feel threatened; it is the collaboration of
individuals from different backgrounds that scares them.

HOW TO ISOLATE SYRIA
--------------------

¶9. (C) Kullberg felt that modifying Syria's behavior requires
better western efforts to isolate the regime. EU countries
in particular continue to conduct business with Syria despite
economic sanctions. Furthermore, the Syrian economy is
growing and Asad's regime has become more confident, if not
cocky, and resistant to western pressure. He credited
Syria's "surprisingly good" economic performance with the
government's efforts to liberalize the economy (following the
Chinese model, keeping a tight grip on the political regime),
the high price of oil, increased foreign investment diverted
from Lebanon (especially from the Gulf), little dependence on
imports from the EU (and thus sheltered from the effects of a
high Euro), and the repatriation of money from Syrians
abroad.

¶10. (C) Kullberg thought "targeted sanctions" against elite
individuals inside the regime, especially in the intelligence
services, would be the most effective way to change the
SARG's behavior. Sanctions denying visas to certain
government officials, and especially to their children who
attend US and European universities, would send a strong
message. Also, freezing the foreign assets of these
individuals was another way of securing compliant behavior.
Kullberg admitted that such targeted sanctions would require
compiling detail information that could withstand the legal
scrutiny in the US and Europe, but emphasized that such
sanctions could be the most effective way of dealing with a
recalcitrant Syria regime that seems unwilling to change.


¶11. (C) Asked about recent statements by EU parliamentarians
who visited Damascus advocating the signing of an EU
Association Agreement with Syria, Kullberg said the agreement
was still "frozen." While EU members had an economic
incentive to conclude the agreement, Damascus' motivation was
purely political, since it was not dependent on EU
investment. Kullberg added that credible "carrots," such as
France's offers to engage with Syria should it refrain from
interfering in the Lebanese presidential election, were
useful. Pol/Econ Chief noted that Syria needs to change its
behavior first, to which Kullberg readily agreed.

WEAK CONSENSUS PRESIDENT BEST WAY TO PROMOTE LEBANON'S
FRAGILE DEMOCRACY
--------------------------------------------

¶12. (C) Kullberg, showing his historian background, offered a
unique opinion on the Lebanese presidential race. He
advocated what he called a "weak consensus" president as the
way forward in breaking the current Lebanese political
deadlock, citing Georgia, Ukraine, and Latvia as examples of
emerging democracies where this had been effective. He
explained that while Lebanon has many pressing political
issues, such as disarming Hizballah, proceeding with the
Special Tribunal, and dealing with Syrian intervention,
electing a consensus president was "key to unlocking the
door" to the next phase in the political cycle and bringing
political stability to Lebanon. He felt a consensus
candidate, not directly affiliated with either March 14 or
March 8, was the best option and, in his opinion, would not
be seen as a "political defeat" to either camp. Such a
candidate would be an "acceptable" alternative to both sides.

BEIRUT 00001441 003 OF 003


Kullberg added that such a non-partisan consensus candidate
would not be perceived by Syria as a threat and most likely
avoid its negative reaction to his candidacy.

¶13. (C) Kullberg also thought that such a consensus
presidential candidate would be a plus to the fledging
democratic institutions that have taken root since the Cedar
revolution in 2005. He felt that if a strong-minded
"autocratic" president were to get elected, it would set back
the fragile democratic progress that has been made over the
last two years. What was needed was a low-profile technocrat
that could guide the country along a calm path and be above
the political fray. This would give Lebanon a chance to get
used to democracy, a process he felt would take 10 to 15
years. A candidate from outside Lebanon without a domestic
constituency or unsavory political past, like the example of
Karzai in Afghanistan, would be a good choice, he suggested.

¶14. (C) Kullberg said Free Patriotic Movement leader General
Michel Aoun was an example of a president who would be too
strong. Though the Christians need strong leadership, Aoun's
platform was "hollow" and based too much on personality, and
the FPM was driven by opportunistic motives that would not
provide the country with the leadership it needs.
FELTMAN

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SIPDIS

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SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958 N/A
TAGS: MCAP MOPS PREL PGOV PTER PHUM AF
SUBJECT: PANJSHIR PROVINCE: EXCELLENT SECURITY, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND
IMPROVING INFRASTRUCTURE

¶1. (SBU) Summary: Panjshir has no insurgent threat and generally
good governance, making reconstruction and development projects
possible in the province. With Commander's Emergency Response
Program (CERP) and "Good Performer" money guaranteed to flow for at
least the next fiscal cycle, Panjshir can expect continued
infrastructure development. The province's unique geography,
overwhelmingly rural character, and mono-ethnicity are all factors
in its good performance. End Summary.

Security
-------
¶2. (SBU) In 2007, there were only a handful of security incidents in
Panjshir, including an attack on a girls' school and an attempted
IED attack. In late summer, a small group of Taliban was caught and
arrested inside the province; they were lured to Panjshir from
Baghlan by a successful National Directorate of Security (NDS) sting
operation. Governor Bahlul gives much of the credit for the
province's security to the locals, who notice any outsiders, whether
by appearance or by accent, and question their reason for being in
the valley. The "Lion's Gate" checkpoint at the narrowest point of
the Panjshir river valley remains the only way in and out for all
vehicles, providing additional control. PRT officials are able to
travel within the province with no body armor and in unarmored
vehicles. Panjshir's Afghan National Police (ANP) contingent was
reduced in 2007, against the wishes of the Governor, but regardless
of ANP numbers, the fundamental factor protecting the province is
likely to remain its "community-watch" posture. The provincial
leadership remains on guard against insurgents disguised as outside
contractors, and the PRT and the provincial security forces screen
contractors who come to Panjshir, typically from Kabul.

¶3. (SBU) The first PRT rotations in Panjshir (2005-2006) focused on
the issue of landmine- and munition-stockpiles in Panjshir. This
issue has faded in importance for several reasons. After several
months of quietly carting out the landmines in unmarked trucks to
Kabul, the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) in late 2007 issued a
written certification that Panjshir was landmine-free. In addition,
the GIRoA announced that the Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) program's deadline would be extended for another
four years, removing any sense of urgency. Panjshir maintains
several munition stockpiles inside the valley guarded by the Afghan
National Army (ANA) - the only regular ANA presence in the valley.
Due to the possibility that munitions from these stockpiles could be
bought or stolen and smuggled out of the valley, it would be
preferable that the stockpiles be transferred to MOD central
storage, but the MOD appears to be satisfied with the status quo.
The ANA chief of staff, Bismullah Khan, is a prominent Panjshiri.

¶4. (SBU) Panjshir remains poppy free and stands to benefit from the
"Good Performance Initiative". There are no poppy farmers in
Panjshiri jails, only drug traffickers, and visits from the PRT
suggest these traffickers endure harsher jail conditions than
murderers.

Governance
----------
¶5. (SBU) Governor Haji Bahlul Bahij remains the key politician in
the province. He continues to grow in sophistication and
confidence; he appears to act honestly, and his stature in the
province is unchallenged. He makes oft-repeated appeals to
"democracy," which in his view means having popular support for any
undertaking and showing value-for-money in the execution of projects
and the delivery of services. He stays focused on the Panjshir and
does not involve himself in national issues.

¶6. (SBU) The Provincial Council (PC) in Panjshir has little
authority. The Governor does not turn to the PC for advice, nor
does the PC challenge the Governor. The PC does provide an
interface for the PRT with local communities. The PRT involves
individual PC members in trips throughout the valley; from the
communities' side, the PC members are (unfortunately) seen all too
often as messengers to deliver supplicants' requests to the PRT.

¶7. (SBU) The district managers of Panjshir's six districts are
variable in quality, as are the Panjshir ministry line directors.
The best are the line directors for economy, education, and public

KABUL 00000086 002 OF 002


health, who display organization and commitment. At the bottom are
the line directors for women's affairs, public works, and
information/culture, who have consistently demonstrated their
incompetence and, in some instances, their venality.

¶8. (SBU) The ANP chief, General Waliullah, does not enjoy the trust
of the Governor. At the district level, the PRT has very close and
good relations with the district chiefs, and ANP officers regularly
accompany PRT missions. While the ANP's recent reduction in size is
probably not critical to the handling of routine crimes, it could be
significant in denying the ANP the ability to monitor adequately the
province's borders. (Note: although safeguarded by high mountains on
all sides, Panjshir borders provinces with active insurgencies.)

¶9. (SBU) Official corruption is not a concern in Panjshir, and
Governor Bahlul can appear almost cocky when challenging visitors to
find a single incidence in which Panjshir has been cited for
official corruption. This apparent lack of corruption may have
several reasons. First, there is no poppy crop and no significant
drug trade. Second, Panjshir's close-knit society means that
suspicious financial activity would come to the attention of the
authorities; as long as the Governor is feared as an enforcer,
would-be embezzlers and siphoners have to wonder if the risk is
worth the reward. Finally, Panjshiri officials mostly live in
Panjshir with their families; thus, they do not have the need to
steal money to subsidize family members living elsewhere, especially
family members living abroad.

Development
-----------
¶10. (U) Panjshir's leaders see infrastructure as the priority. In
spring 2007, USAID completed Panjshir's first paved road, covering
47 kilometers and costing 20 million dollars. CJTF-82 and TF
Cincinnatus have provided more than 10 million dollars to fund two
spurs off the paved road to provide road access to most of the
valley's population. Panjshir will soon have new district center
buildings in all six districts. At the provincial government center
in Bazarak, construction is underway on buildings for ministries
(agriculture, public works, finance) and for the governor and other
organizations (Red Crescent, Afghanistan Bank). Privately-funded
cellphone towers and cellphone coverage have made their way further
and further up the valley.

¶11. (U) The NGO presence in Panjshir is less than expected in a
province that is free from insurgency. One notable exception is
"Emergency", an Italian NGO that has run Panjshir's only hospital
and some clinics for several years.

¶12. (U) Power remains a constraint, although the agriculture-based
economy allows the Panjshir to use relatively little electricity,
generated by small hydro-electric generators along the Panjshir
river. Additional power will come from a CERP-funded wind-turbine
project - Afghanistan's first - due to come on-line in the spring of
¶2008.
WOOD

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IZ IR
SUBJECT: UK FOREIGN MINISTER: MOTTAKI IS COCKY

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

¶1. (S) Summary: Following his participation in the Neighbors
Conference in Kuwait, British Foreign Secretary David
Miliband met with Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus on
April 24. The meeting covered a wide range of topics
including Iranian influence in Iraq, the current security
situation in Iraq, the strength of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI),
and development of the Basrah Development Commission. End
summary.

Participants
------------

¶2. (S) The Ambassador and General Petraeus, accompanied by
Pol-Mil Counselor Marcie Ries, met April 24 with U.K. Foreign
Secretary Miliband. Miliband was joined by UK Ambassador to

SIPDIS
Iraq Christopher Prentice, First Secretary David Brett,
Stephen Hickey, Miliband,s Private Secretary, Frank Baker,
Head of Iraq Group, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, and Sarah
Schaefer, Special Advisor to the Secretary.

Iranian Influence
-----------------

¶3. (S) Miliband said he had a 45 minute meeting with Foreign
Minister Mottaki of Iran during the Neighbors Conference in
Kuwait on April 22. During that meeting he told Mottaki that
Iran is "exposed" (Comment: by "exposed" we understood
Miliband meant as a result of the Basrah campaign and
increased public awareness of Iran,s activity in Iraq. End
Comment). Miliband described Mottaki,s reaction as "cocky."
He said Mottaki claimed to have "saved the Charge of Knights
(Basrah) campaign by intervening at the border." Mottaki
further accused the Maliki government of attacking Sadrists
while leaving ISCI alone.

¶4. (S) Ambassador Crocker shared his perspective on Maliki as
being an Arab-Iraqi who does not speak Farsi and is negative
on Iran. The Ambassador outlined a meeting involving Maliki,
President Talibani, and Vice President Mahdi where there had
been agreement that Iran must be told clearly to cease
involvement in Iraq. General Petraeus commented that Maliki
is currently enjoying "unprecedented political support." The
question, Petraeus opined, is whether "Maliki can get enough
support, minus the Sadrists, to go to Tehran and tell Iran to
stop."

Security Situation
------------------

¶5. (S) General Petraeus opened the discussion on the security
situation by thanking Miliband for the extent of UK efforts
in Iraq, and said the USG is working with Her Majesty,s
Government (HMG) on "tweaking" the force cap. Petraeus
expressed his happiness at hearing the British Government
plans to pause the drawdown of troop numbers in Iraq.
Miliband responded that HMG wants to fulfill its commitment
to train Iraqi forces.

¶6. (S) General Petraeus provided an overview of the security
situation around Iraq and in Baghdad, highlighting specific
actions that have improved security since the initiation of
the Basrah campaign on March 24. When queried by Miliband on
the quality of policing in Iraq, Petraeus replied there is a
mixed bag of results, with some units performing well.
Petraeus also predicted a spike in violence should the
Sadrist cease fire be rescinded. He outlined challenges that
exist in controlling violence in Sadr City, at which point
Ambassador Crocker explained that one great challenge is
getting the Government of Iraq (GOI) to determine their
strategy for Sadr City. Miliband agreed with this
assessment. When asked by Miliband if JAM enjoyed the
support of the Iraqi people, Petraeus said they do not, and
that JAM actions including kidnapping and intimidation are
causing discontent.

¶7. (S) Miliband asked about the current strength of AQI.
General Petraeus reported that AQI numbers in Baghdad are
reduced, but they continue to be active throughout the
country.

BASRAH AND CONTINUED HMG ENGAGEMENT IN THE SOUTH
--------------------------------------------- ---

¶8. (S) Miliband said he believes it is important that the USG
and HMG communicate to the GOI how we use contractors in
Iraq. He further explained that HMG is here to provide
training such as at the Basrah Airport and Seaport in
anticipation of Iraqi management of these facilities. "The
more we can be upfront about our function in Iraq, the
better," Miliband stated.


BAGHDAD 00001308 002 OF 002


¶9. (S) Miliband said HMG and the Government of Turkey have a
good relationship and have agreed to "push on Kuwait" in
terms of commercial development in Basrah through the Basrah
Development Commission. Turkey claims to have hundreds of
companies ready to invest in the area, a claim Miliband
thinks is rather exaggerated. Ambassador Crocker pointed out
that Maliki values his relationship with Turkey, but is
suspicious of conspiracies. The Ambassador suggested that
HMG loop in Maliki on the cooperation between the three
countries to allay Maliki,s suspicious nature.
CROCKER

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8235
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 9569
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9888
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 2654
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 1223
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9480
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 2040
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 6621
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000625

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2032
TAGS: PGOV PREL CH TW
SUBJECT: LY SPEAKER WANG JIN-PYNG (KMT) ON MA
ADMINISTRATION, CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS, PRESIDENT CHEN'S
FUTURE

REF: TAIPEI 620

Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).

¶1. (C) Summary: LY Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (KMT) told the
Director during a May 5 meeting that China would not ease
pressure on Taiwan's "international living space" during Ma's
presidency, even if it harmed chances to warm cross-Strait
relations. Facing high commodity prices and a global
economic downturn, Ma will have difficulty attaining a GDP
growth rate of 4.5 percent this year, let alone his target
rate of 6 percent. The legislature will do what it can to
help, said Wang, but serious doubts about the economy linger.
The KMT opposes Ma's push to exclude the party from the
government, and if Ma goes through with it, cautioned Wang,
it could cost him the support of the party leadership and the
KMT legislative caucus. Ma, Premier-designate Liu, and Vice
President-elect Vincent Siew may agree to put Siew in charge
of the economy, but doing so could violate constitutional
principles and cause dissension within the Cabinet. To
Beijing, Ma is still an "unreliable" interlocutor on
cross-Strait relations, said Wang, but PRC President Hu
Jintao trusts Lien, and is keeping him in reserve just in
case ties with Ma don't improve. Wang insisted that Ma and
others must act now to resolve the "special accounts"
controversy before President Chen leaves office; otherwise,
prosecutors will indict Chen, doing significant harm to Ma's
administration and Taiwan's democracy. End Summary.

Beijing Won't Back Off for Ma
-----------------------------

¶2. (C) The Director noted that Wang had just returned to
Taiwan from the Marshall Islands, after attending National
Day ceremonies there. According to Wang, Taiwan's diplomatic
relationship with the Marshall Islands was in jeopardy a few
months ago, following the election of President Litokwa
Tomeing (who had publicly favored switching recognition to
Beijing). President Chen, however, cultivated a personal
relationship with Tomeing through state visits and telephone
calls, and deserved credit for preventing the loss of one of
Taiwan's 23 remaining diplomatic allies. Wang complained
that the relationship continues to be in danger even though
Taiwan is the second largest donor to the Marshall Islands
after the United States.

¶3. (C) Wang's comments on the Marshall Islands prompted the
Director to ask whether Wang expected China to reduce
pressure on Taiwan's "international living space" during Ma
Ying-jeou's presidency. No, said Wang, because diplomatic
relations and participation in international organizations
both touch on sovereignty, and from China's perspective,
Taiwan's sovereignty claims must be diminished, even if doing
so adversely affects the cross-Strait relationship. Beijing
considers the two issues to be unrelated, argued Wang, and
will not allow Taiwan to strengthen its sovereignty claims
simply in order to avoid conflict in the cross-Strait
relationship.

Lin Yu-fang Spoke Out of Turn
-----------------------------

¶4. (C) The Director drew Wang's attention to recent comments
by KMT legislator and LY Defense Committee Chairman Lin
Yu-fang, who openly criticized the Chen administration for
&diminishing8 Taiwan's sovereignty by including the
Director in April's Yushan defense exercise. Wang said Lin
had spoken only for himself, for reasons which Wang did not
understand. Wang also stressed that Lin had focused his
attack on President Chen, and not the Director or the USG.
Wang stated his personal belief that the U.S. is Taiwan's
indispensable military partner, and that U.S. representatives
should be included in Taiwan's defense exercises. While on
the subject of defense, Wang asked why the U.S. had
positioned aircraft carriers near Taiwan during the recent
presidential election. The Director assured Wang that the
carriers were conducting normal operations, and that their
presence was not necessarily linked to events on Taiwan.

GDP Growth No Sure Thing

TAIPEI 00000625 002 OF 003


------------------------

¶5. (C) It will not be possible for Ma to attain his campaign
pledge of 6 percent GDP growth this year, predicted Wang,
especially in light of recent sharp commodity price
increases. A more realistic goal is 4.5 percent growth, he
continued, and even that won't be easy. The LY will
cooperate with the new administration to pass a special
budget to fund the twelve large public works projects listed
in Ma's campaign platform, Wang insisted, but there are
lingering doubts about Ma's ability to improve the economy in
the context of a global downturn.

KMT: Don't Exclude Us, Or Else
------------------------------

¶6. (C) Ma's relationship with the LY is somewhat "difficult,"
said Wang, especially following Ma's proposal to formally
separate the party from the new government. Why split the
KMT from the government, asked Wang, when the party has done
so much for Ma, and still has so much to offer? And why
should the KMT leadership and legislative caucus continue to
support Ma if his plan is to reduce the party's influence in
government? According to Wang, KMT Chairman Wu Po-hsiung met
with Ma yesterday to urge Ma to reconsider. Wang indicated
that if Ma does eliminate "informal" party-to-government
channels, as LY Speaker, Wang would be constitutionally
restricted to interacting with the administration through the
Premier. In that context, said Wang, he would not offer
advice to the administration, but also would refrain from
criticizing it publicly.

Power-Sharing OK, Within Limits
-------------------------------

¶7. (C) Premier-designate Liu Chao-hsuan does not understand
the economy and does not want responsibility for managing it,
opined Wang, and is therefore willing to hand the economic
portfolio over to Vice President-elect Vincent Siew
(Wan-chang). Ma, Siew and Liu enjoy a long history together,
Wang continued, and should be able to find a way to put Siew
in charge of the economy, at least informally (see reftel).
But there is potential for conflict, cautioned Wang. As Vice
President, Siew can only exert powers that are delegated to
him by Ma. Ma's powers are limited by the constitution to
command of Taiwan's armed forces and control of its foreign
policy. The constitution also clearly identifies the Premier
as Taiwan's highest administrative authority, in control of
and responsible for the economy. The Premier does not have
to defer to the Vice President, argued Wang, but if Vice
President Siew and Premier Liu differ on economic policy, a
crisis within the administration could arise. In the long
term, the Cabinet may begin to resent the interference of the
Vice President on economic policy, Wang suggested.

Whither Cross-Strait?
---------------------

¶8. (C) Ma may have erred in naming former TSU legislator Lai
Hsin-yuan as MAC Chairwoman, said Wang. She is
inexperienced, and more importantly, her position on
cross-Strait relations is unclear, making it difficult for
Beijing (and KMT deep-Blues) to trust her. Ma has promised
to resume cross-Strait weekend charter flights by July 4,
noted Wang. Wang predicted that Beijing would express its
displeasure with Lai's appointment by withholding cooperation
on cross-Strait flights, but conceded that only time would
tell.

¶9. (C) PRC President Hu Jintao and KMT Honorary Chairman Lien
Chan are "very close," said Wang, and the two men have
established mutual trust. In contrast, Beijing continues to
view Ma as "unreliable" on cross-Strait relations, a
perception only strengthened by his decision to name the
deep-Green Lai as MAC chief. Wang speculated that Hu may
consider Lien his &insurance policy,8 i.e., a way to
maintain cross-Strait dialogue in the event better relations
with Ma fail to materialize. How Beijing treats Taiwan at the
Olympics will be another important bellwether for the future
of cross-Strait relations, Wang concluded.

TAIPEI 00000625 003 OF 003



Don't Let Chen Be Indicted
--------------------------

¶10. (C) Wang urged the Director to persuade Ma to support
legislative efforts to resolve the "special accounts"
controversy before President Chen leaves office on May 20.
It is virtually certain that prosecutors will indict Chen
shortly after he leaves office, for alleged misuse of
Presidential Office discretionary accounts, said Wang, a
result that would be "bad for Ma and for Taiwan." He claimed
to have already spoken to President Chen with Ma's
Presidential Office Secretary General-designate Chan Chuen-po
present. Both men support the idea of legislation to resolve
the controversy surrounding the proper use of "special
accounts." Wang also claimed to have discussed the idea with
Ma three separate times, but Ma thus far has refused to take
any action. The Director demurred, insisting that the
"special accounts" controversy was a purely internal matter,
to be decided by Taiwan's political leaders.

Comment
-------

¶11. (C) Wang and Ma have a history of prickly relations,
which comes across here. But the tensions between Ma and a
cocky new KMT majority in the LY and a party bureaucracy
slightly giddy over their recent successes were bound to
emerge. How all sides handle this friction will go a long
way toward revealing how effectively the KMT triumvirate of
President, LY and party can manage the challenges of
undiluted power.
YOUNG

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9287
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 001939

SIPDIS
NOFORN
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR UK
SUBJECT: A POLITICAL BODY BLOW TO GORDON BROWN AS LABOUR
LOSES SCOTTISH BY-ELECTION

REF: LONDON 1913

Classified By: Political Counselor Rick Mills for reasons 1.4 (B) and (
D).

¶1. (C) Summary. The Scottish National Party's 365 vote
victory in yesterday's Glasgow East by-election over Labour
is another body blow to Gordon Brown's political fortunes
and, in the immediate aftermath, has fueled speculation that
Brown could face a leadership challenge this fall, when MPs
return to the Westminster Village from the summer break. A
Labour MP and close advisor to Brown told us the morning
after the vote that Brown will be "hunkering down" with his
allies over the summer to fend off Labour party opponents,
which Brown "can successfully do for now," but the Glasgow
result cannot be explained away as anything other than "a
referendum on Labour" and Brown must react. This advisor
said Brown has to use the summer vacation period, with MPs
out of London, to develop a new political strategy. For now,
in part because of the Parliamentary recess, a challenge to
Brown's leadership is not imminent, but the Glasgow defeat -
the third Labour by-election loss since Brown took power --
might embolden his opponents to act in the fall if Brown
cannot turn around Labour's dismal political standing. End
Summary.

A Political Earthquake
----------------------

¶2. (U) In what the winning Scottish National Party
candidate called a "political earthquake," Labour went down
to an unanticipated defeat in yesterday's Glasgow East
by-election, coming in second to the SNP, 11,277 to 10,912.
With a higher than expected voter turn out of 42 percent, SNP
candidate John Mason's victory over Labour's Margaret Curran
represents an astonishing 22 percent swing from the last
general election in 2005, in what had been the Labour party's
25th safest seat. The Conservatives came in third with
1,639, with the Liberal Democrats a distant fourth at 915
votes.

¶3. (C) Forsaking its traditional soapbox issue of Scottish
independence, SNP leader and Scottish First Minister Alex
Salmond personally spearheaded the party's campaign, turning
the by-election into a referendum on Brown and the Labour
Party. Although Labour sent a collection of party
heavyweights and Cabinet ministers to campaign for Curran,
she could not overcome what appears to have been a lethal mix
of Brown's unpopularity, a strong SNP which benefited from
Alex Salmond's frequent appearances in the constituency, and
voter frustration that the impoverished district has not
benefited more from ten years of Labour rule in London.
Labour's attempts to market the by-election as a "local" --
in order to keep the focus off the Prime Minister -- went
unnoticed. Nick Brown MP, a close advisor to Brown and his
Deputy Labour Whip in the Commons, told Poloff the morning
after the vote that "there are no quirks we can use to
explain this defeat away" and the party has to see the vote
as "a referendum on Labour -- that we lost." For now,
Labour party spokesmen sent out to speak publicly on the
defeat, like DFID Secretary Douglas Alexander (a Scotsman
himself), are repeating the now oft-heard Labor refrain that
the party "will have to reflect long and hard on the results
and try to understand the message" voters have sent.

The Winners
-----------

¶4. (C) The winner in yesterday's election is clearly the
SNP. The vote is an enormous boost for the party and its
leader, Alex Salmond, who staked a considerable amount of
personal prestige on the outcome -- visiting the district ten
times during the campaign. The SNP presented the election as
a chance to register a referendum on two governments - the
SNP-led government in Hollyrood or the Labour government in
Westminster, and the SNP can now claim victory. The party
will have to be careful about not becoming too cocky,
however, as the SNP's signature issue, Scottish independence,
was not highlighted during the campaign and most observers
agree that, for most voters, their vote was more anti-Labour
than a strong embrace of the SNP.

¶5. (C) The other winner the morning after are the
Conservatives, despite their third place finish. The
Conservatives are pleased to have done better than expected
in this constituency. Conservative leader David Cameron had
traveled to the district before the election and delivered a
speech on the social causes of poverty and deprivation,
stressing a need for personal responsibility rather than

LONDON 00001939 002 OF 002


government action. Many Conservatives thought making the
speech in the district was a mistake, but it appears not to
have harmed the Conservative vote. Michael Fabricant, a Tory
MP, told Poloff that the third place finish is important to
the Tories because it indicates that Cameron's appeal and
message is making inroads even in traditionally Tory-hostile
Scotland. Cameron himself reacted to the vote by calling for
the Prime Minister to hold an immediate general election, a
call which the Prime Minister's office termed ridiculous.

What's Next for Gordon Brown?
----------------------------

¶6. (C) Nick Brown, Labour's Deputy Chief Whip, told Poloff
that Gordon Brown will use the summer months to "hunker down"
and keep his party allies close and his party opponents "in
line." Nick Brown, who is one of the Prime Minster's closest
political advisors, said that as "terrible" as the election
outcome was, it would not spark an immediate leadership
challenge to the Prime Minister within the Labour Party. The
Prime Minister, however, has to use the summer parliamentary
recess, now underway, to develop a new political message and
consider a cabinet shakeup in order to stop his political
freefall. Nick Brown reported that there are "unconfirmed
rumors" of a small number of Labour party members considering
whether to gather signatures for a letter to the Prime
Minister asking that he step down -- supposedly the plotters
intend to present the letter on September 5 to the Prime
Minister, the date in 2006 on which Labour party rebels
presented a similar letter to then Prime Minister Tony Blair
-- but Nick Brown said the Prime Minister and his allies
would be able "to slap down" the effort, "if it got off the
ground at all."

¶7. (C) Nick Brown acknowledged that many Labour members were
hoping that an election victory in the Glasgow by-election,
no matter how narrow, would "cauterize" Labour's political
wounds, but with Labour's loss, many Labour members will be
panicked that the party's political decline has not yet
bottomed out and willing to consider "drastic action." As
Deputy Whip, Nick Brown will be speaking to many MPs over the
weekend to "keep their heads about them." Ultimately, Nick
Brown claimed, a leadership challenge to the Prime Minister
is "highly unlikely" for the practical reason that, were the
Labour party to change its leader and give the UK a third
Prime Minister in three or four years, it would be
politically impossible for the party not to call a general
election shortly afterwards -- it would be "historically
unheard of to have two unelected Prime Ministers back to
back." Labour MPs understand, Brown continued, that they
would still go down to defeat in such a case so many will be
willing to stick with the Prime Minister in the hope he can
turn the party's fortunes around before spring 2010, when a
general election must be called.

Comment
-------

¶8. (C/NF) With Parliament on recess on until October 6,
Labour will have time for "long and hard" reflection.
Attention now turns to the September party conventions, where
Labour, and possibly more importantly Brown, will have
another (and possibly final) opportunity to convince voters
that Labour has "listened and learned." However, unless
Brown takes dramatic action, whether a leadership shuffle or
new bold policy direction, he may not be able to fend off
grumbles from an increasingly anxious party and, though still
unlikely, a possible challenge to his position as party
leader.


Visit London's Classified Website:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom

TUTTLE

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PODGORICA 000234

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE ALSO FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL MW
SUBJECT: A TOUGH YEAR FOR ONCE-LEADING OPPOSITION PARTY

PODGORICA 00000234 001.2 OF 002


¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Dominated by leader Nebojsa Medojevic's
outsized personality, the Movement for Change (PzP) --
Montenegro's most popular opposition party at the start of the
year -- has plummeted in the polls following Medojevic's
disappointing third-place finish in the April 2008 presidential
election. PzP officials have focused mostly on external factors
to explain this decline, but the party's failure to invest in
its local structures and its attempt to be all things to all
voters contributed to its problems. With few other centrist
opposition alternatives, the PzP has time to turn things around,
but another poor showing in the fall 2009 parliamentary election
could spell trouble for the party. END SUMMARY.



Riding High In January...

-------------------------



¶2. (SBU) The Movement for Change (PzP) and its energetic young
leader, Nebojsa Medojevic, entered 2008 with high hopes.
Established in 2006 as a moderate, pro-European alternative to
the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) and the Serb
nationalist parties, the PzP did surprisingly well in
parliamentary elections that year, garnering 11 mandates. Less
than two years later, the party was Montenegro's leading
opposition force, and the ambitious and charismatic Medojevic
was gearing up for a run at the presidency in the April 2008
election. Medojevic and other PzP leaders confidently predicted
that he would take votes from the ruling Democratic Party of
Socialists (DPS) and opposition parties alike, and was a sure
bet to face President Vujanovic in the election's second round.




...Watching The Poll Numbers Drop In June

-----------------------------------------



¶3. (SBU) What a difference a few months make. Not only did
Medojevic fail to progress to a second round of voting, as
Vujanovic won outright, with more than 50 percent of the vote,
but he came in a disappointing third, behind both Vujanovic and
Serb nationalist Andrija Mandic. To add insult to injury,
Medojevic finished just a few percent points ahead of Srdjan
Milic of the Socialist People's Party (SNP), a candidate who had
been all but given up for dead at the start of the campaign.



¶4. (SBU) The PzP and Medojevic are inseparable in the public
mind, and Medojevic's poor showing precipitated a slide in
support for the party. According to one late June survey, the
PzP is now backed by only 10.8 percent of voters, trailing
Mandic's Serbian People's Party (14.4 percent) and Milic's SNP
(11.1) (Note: The SNP initially had lost many of its voters to
the PzP in the 2006 elections). Even worse, these numbers
marked a sharp decline from June 2007, when (at 22.4 percent)
the PzP had almost twice the support of any other opposition
party.



After The Fall, Finger-Pointing....

-----------------------------------



¶5. (SBU) PzP leaders are still grappling with how things got so
bad, so fast. Asked whether the party was stock-taking, PzP MP
Zarija Pejovic told us, "believe me, we've been doing nothing
else since April." However, most PzP officials point to
external factors. PzP spokesman Koca Pavlovic and party VP
Goran Batricevic told us that Medojevic -- as the strongest
opposition candidate at the start of the campaign -- was the
focus of concerted attacks by Vujanovic and the DPS. In
addition, they asserted that Kosovo independence had benefited
Serb nationalist Mandic, just as the PzP's support for the
Constitution had alienated many Serb voters. (Note: A Bosniak
leader also told the Ambassador before the election that
Vujanovic's overwhelming lead was likely to discourage some
Bosniaks from "wasting" their votes on Medojevic.)



PODGORICA 00000234 002.2 OF 002



...And Plenty Of Criticism

--------------------------



¶6. (SBU) Several PzP officials also conceded that the party's
underdeveloped structure played a part. In a telling sign of
the PzP's structural weakness, Medojevic struggled to gather the
7,500 signatures required to register for the presidential
campaign. And while other parties went door-to-door to mobilize
support, the PzP, lacking cadres, concentrated on expensive (the
party ended up taking significant loans) but ultimately
ineffective advertising. Furthermore, a contact close to the
PzP told us that some local party chapters were given only 1,000
euros for the entire campaign.



¶7. (SBU) Outside observers also fingered the PzP's political
strategy, and, ultimately, the personality of its leader. For
example, leading pollster Milos Besic told us recently that
Medojevic's campaign had been too extreme and too aggressive;
this turned off many voters, particularly the elderly. (We
witnessed an example of Medojevic's hyberbole at a March
campaign rally in an Albanian-majority district in Podgorica.
Medojevic told the crowd that the election represented, "a clear
choice between light and darkness, good and evil...")



¶8. (SBU) Svetozar Jovicevic, a founding member of the PzP who is
now an independent analyst, told us that Medojevic had forgotten
the party's principles in a chase to attract as many voters as
possible. Under Medojevic's guidance, the party had ducked the
independence question -- a fact not forgotten by the
pro-statehood DPS supporters that Medojevic had hoped to
attract. Then, in the hopes of becoming the opposition's sole
candidate, the PzP initially backed pro-Serb radicals in debates
over the Constitution -- leading to accusations of betrayal when
Medojevic backtracked and supported the Constitution's passage.



Comment

-------



¶9. (SBU) Looking ahead, it is unclear whether the party, many of
whose leaders appear dispirited, has a strategy to recover lost
ground before the fall 2009 elections. Their tendancy to blame
external factors (Kosovo, DPS attacks, etc.) for their party's
decline may have deflected attention from necessary organization
building, long neglected in a party dominated by the charismatic
and controlling Medojevic. The repayment of sizeable debts
incurred during Medojevic's presidential run will make
organizational development still more difficult. It also is
unclear whether the cocky Medojevic will heed advice to stop
trying to be all things to all people and stake out consistent
positions. The party's lack of clarity on Kosovo recognition
and weak response to the Karadzic arrest do not bode well in
this regard.



¶10. (SBU) On the positive side, the PzP occupies the centrist
political space between the ruling coalition and Serb
nationalist parties. It is being challenged by a rejuvenated
SNP, but that party still has more appeal to older voters and
so-called Yugo-nostalgiacs than to young Montenegrins the PzP
has targeted. There is some sentiment both from within the
party and among some independents for a PzP-SNP alliance, to
join with several smaller moderate opposition parties. For this
to happen, however, Medojevic would need to swallow his pride
and come to a power-sharing arrangement with Milic and perhaps
others. In the meantime, a poor showing in the next election
could splinter this personality-driven party, leaving a hole in
Montenegro's political center.
MOORE

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 002556

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE/UK
NSC FOR BRADLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV UK
SUBJECT: GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS STEALS THE THUNDER FROM
THE TORY PARTY CONFERENCE

REF: LONDON 2496

¶1. Summary and comment. (C) The Conservative Party's fall
conference, which closed the UK political party conference
season on October 1, ended with a whimper rather than the
expected bang. Turmoil in the world's financial markets
overshadowed Tory leader David Cameron's attempts to portray
his party as the government in waiting. Following the
initial vote in the House of Representatives against the Bush
Administration's financial recovery plan on September 27,
Conservative Party Leader David Cameron adroitly moderated
his tone and the conference's agenda in an attempt to avoid
charges of partisanship. Cameron departed from the
conference organizers' planned program to deliver an
emergency statement on September 30 in which he promised to
cooperate fully with the Government's attempts to shore up
the UK's financial markets, offering his party's full support
to help the Brown Government address the crisis, in a
deliberate contrast to what the UK media described as
political partisanship in the U.S. In the event, the Tory
party high command's initial fears at the start of conference
-- that with a double digit opinion poll lead over a tired
looking Labour Government, the Conservatives might end up
looking hubristic and over-confident - proved unfounded as
Cameron battled to keep his conference in the headlines, and
his party looking relevant as the eyes of the public and
media turned to PM Brown at a time of financial turmoil.

¶2. (C) Comment cont. Conservatives were pleased that their
unified front contrasted starkly with Labour's conference the
preceding week, which had been punctuated by in-fighting and
an obsession with the faltering leadership of Gordon Brown,
but Cameron had to leave Birmingham troubled that PM Brown's
jibe at the Labour party conference -- "now is no time for a
novice" -- has gained traction with the voters and given
Labour a bump in the polls. Cameron attempted to rebut the
charge in his keynote address (ref), but it is clear the
inexperience charge is a winner for Labour and that voters,
though tired of Labour, are not yet sold on Cameron. Although
both parties got what they needed from their annual
conventions, Gordon Brown will be the more relieved of the
two men that media coverage of the financial crisis has taken
the spotlight off his continuing leadership difficulties and
off the Conservative Party's attempts to position themselves
as the next Government. End Summary and comment.

Conservatives Worry About Over Confidence...at First
--------------------------------------------- -------

¶3. (C) The Conservatives gathered for their annual fall
conference in Birmingham with high hopes. Under the banner
slogan, "Plan for Change," this was to be the Party's chance
to lay out its plans to govern, providing the UK media and
public with the "meat of its policies" and an opportunity to
present itself as a credible alternative to Labour. Polls
before the conference found that although voters were
definitely tired of Labour and wanted change, there were
still lingering doubts about Tory policies and ability to
govern. Conservative politicians were under strict
instructions from the Tory high command not to turn off
voters by appearing too cocky or overconfident. But with a
sustained double digit opinion poll lead over Labour, that
was always going to be difficult. Cameron's fears of
appearing "to take victory for granted" soon disappeared,
however, as financial markets continued to implode. The UK
media turned its attention back to Prime Minister Brown, as
the only man in a position to actually influence events, and
the conference slogan was quickly dubbed "Change of Plan" by
wags in the media as Cameron was forced into a radical and
nimble rewrite in order to keep the press interested in
events at Birmingham.

¶4. (C) It all had started off so differently: on the first
day of the conference, speeches to conference delegates as
well as a succession of meetings with MPs revealed that
although Conservative troops might be sticking to their
strict instructions not to appear too cocky in front of a
watchful press, this would not stop them from "sticking the
boot" to the government. Shadow chancellor George Osborne's
tax proposals were the main topic of conversation on the
first day. He hoped to repeat his success of the previous
year when his unexpected and highly popular announcement that
inheritance taxes would be radically increased had shaken the
Labour Government so much that Gordon Brown canceled his
plans to call an early election. This time round, Osborne
pleased the party faithful with his announcement that any
future Conservative Government would freeze council tax
levels (a local taxation) for its first two years. Both the

LONDON 00002556 002 OF 003


party's vice-chairman, Oliver Letwin MP, and the editor of
the popular website "Conservative Home," Tim Montgomerie,
told us that Osborne's tax announcement was very popular with
party members and would be a good plank for the next campaign.

¶5. (C) By the second day of the conference, the mood had
changed dramatically following events in Washington. David
Cameron clearly needed to change the narrative to keep the
media focus on his conference and to nimbly avoid charges of
partisanship. In one swipe, Osborne's tax announcement was
wiped off the front pages (although on closer inspection of
the small print, much of the media dismissed Osborne's plans
as unworkable anyway) and even at the conference itself, the
main topic of conversation became events in the U.S. Julie
Kirkbride, Conservative MP and spouse of former Shadow
Northern Ireland secretary, Andrew Mackay, summed up the
conference's real focus by the second day when she told
poloffs, "we're all looking at what you'll do."

Changing the Narrative and the Narrator
---------------------------------------

¶6. (C) In an adroit reaction to world events, Cameron
succeeded in keeping the spotlight trained on his conference
by giving an unplanned emergency statement on the economy on
September 30, in which he pledged full support to the
Government, "in stark contrast," he added, to the
partisanship of politicians in D.C. Later, in a private
meeting, a Cameron insider told poloffs that the decision had
been taken that it should be Cameron who delivered the speech
rather than shadow chancellor George Osborne as private party
polling indicated that the public feel Osborne lacks the
necessary "gravitas." Somewhat unfairly, party officials
thought, polling indicated that Osborne was seen as
lightweight and inexperienced, in part due to his
high-pitched vocal delivery. This party insider also
revealed that Brown's charge that Cameron was a "novice" at a
time of crisis had gained significant traction with voters.
Internal Tory spot polling had found, worryingly for the
Conservatives, that contrary to the general consensus, if an
election were held the next day, Gordon Brown would be
re-elected, albeit with a vastly reduced Labour majority.

Tories Still Oppose 42 Day Detention Bill
-----------------------------------------

¶7. (C) Outside the conference hall, Shadow Home Secretary
Dominic Grieve was outspoken in his criticisms of the
Government, and scornful of Government plans to continue to
push through legislation increasing the time suspects can be
held, without charge, to 42 days. The legislation has
already passed through the Commons after a very close vote
and will be voted upon in the Lords this month, where it is
certain to be amended, requiring another vote in the Commons.
Grieve expressed doubt that the legislation would pass a
second time in the Commons.
Tories on Foreign Policy
------------------------

¶8. (C) In further meetings on the margins of the conference
hall, David Lidington, Shadow Foreign Affairs Minister for
the Middle East, briefed poloffs on his recent visit to Iran
which he summed up as "great people, terrible government."
Keith Simpson, another member of Hague's foreign affairs team
who referred to his shadow portfolio as covering "the rest of
the world," and a strong supporter of the Atlantic
relationship, said that Cameron's reaction to world events,
and his attempts to moderate the partisan tone of conference,
were "spot on," as did Shailesh Vara, the Conservative
Party's Deputy leader. Vara was equally frank about the
party hierarchy's instructions not to appear cocky, and the
"ban on champagne" at receptions in order to avoid charges of
hubris - instructions which had proved unnecessary as the
financial news darkened throughout the week.

Cameron's Closing Speech
------------------------

¶9. (C) The conference wound up with a keynote speech by
Cameron that, in subsequent press reporting, was viewed as
well-judged and providing sufficient, if undetailed, policy
discussion to allow the Tories to challenge the Labour claim
Cameron is a flash in the pan. He addressed early, and head
on, Gordon Brown's central criticism that with the world in
economic chaos, "now is no time for a novice" by arguing that
what matters more than experience is "character and judgment"
(ref). If Cameron's aim was to convince the public that he
has serious policies and will bring changes, then he

LONDON 00002556 003 OF 003


succeeded in the eyes of much of the press. Cameron may have
faced criticism that his speech failed to lay out, in
specifics, the party's plans for government but no doubt he
is trying to avoid the fate of previous leaders who, having
set out a detailed platform far in advance of any general
election, later had their best ideas taken by the Labour
Government.

Visit London's Classified Website:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom

LeBaron

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SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W, INR/AA
DOE FOR GEORGE PERSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2018
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINR NI
SUBJECT: 35 NIGERIANS YOU SHOULD KNOW: OUR TOP FIVE IN
SEVEN CATEGORIES

Classified By: Political Counselor Walter Pflaumer for reasons 1.4. (b
& d).

¶1. (C) Introduction: Understanding who matters, not what
matters, is often the half the battle in Nigeria. Perhaps
more than any other country on the subcontinent, Nigeria has
hundreds upon hundreds of politicians, businessmen, retired
military generals, and traditional leaders who wield
tremendous influence and can shape the outcome of whatever
current crisis is threatening to unsettle the country.
Nigeria is now is at a crossroads, and a rocky one at that.
Leadership is lacking; elites, especially the northerners,
are anxious about President Yar'Adua's health: and people are
worried about the "what next?" scenario -- if Yar'Adua's
election is overturned or he becomes incapacitated or dies in
office. For a country with a tradition of strongmen with
strong personalities as its leaders, there is some disquiet
over the state of affairs at the moment However, we find
that Nigerian governors and other state officials are
concerned primarily with issues directly affecting their
states. We see an indifference about what goes on in Abuja
from a number of state leaders and governors, who have taken
state autonomy to new levels. These governors, plus other
members of the elite such as businessmen, military and
traditional leaders, and politicians all are pieces of the
puzzle. These individuals, whether they are competing against
each other or uniting in pursuit of some common political or
economic goal, will determine how Nigeria will weather this
stormy period. As the Supreme Court nears a decision on the
2007 presidential election and predictions about the
President's health become more dire, the Mission has put
together a list of leaders who would play a major role in
keeping Nigeria either on track, off track, or trying to put
it back on track, since it has certainly lost its way over
the past 12 months. Therefore, below is the Mission's
back-of-the-envelope list of some three dozen Nigerians,
separated into seven overarching categories, who are going to
be critical in the next couple of months. (Note: the names
in each of the sections are NOT/NOT listed in order of
importance.) End Introduction.

-----------------------
Yar'Adua's Inner Circle
-----------------------

¶2. (C) Turai Yar'Adua: President Yar'Adua's wife; widely
believed to have a strong say over many of the decisions made
in the Villa; allegations persist that she is lining her
pockets; she has a reputation for having a vicious
personality; causes great fear among ministers; known as Mrs.
President; has recently begged Yar'Adua to stay the course as
President when we heard he wanted to step aside about two
weeks ago.

¶3. (C) Taminu Yakubu: President's Chief Economic Advisor; one
of his closest associates from Katsina State; a bit unsavory;
reportedly involved in illicit enrichment schemes, but
someone whom we need to watch, to whom we need to maintain
our access and contacts.

¶4. (C) Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF)
Yayale Ahmed: A former classmate of the President; in charge
of most of the day-to-day operations of the government;
affable but should not be underestimated; reasonably
positively disposed towards the U.S.; recommend we take him
up on his desire to visit Washington DC. If Yar'Adua weathers
the medical issues longer than anticipated, then Yayale Ahmed
most likely will be the one running the show behind the
scenes unless he is forced out in some political play, which
could happen.

¶5. (C) Attorney General Michael Aondoakaa: Tends to be
present when the President makes important decisions; one of
leading advocates for removing EFCC Chairman Ribadu; not to
be trusted; close to ex-Delta State Governor James Ibori; was
recently in London helping out Ibori's lawyer, who was
recently arrested by the Metropolitan police. Aondoakaa
claims that whatever information Met Police has previously

ABUJA 00002095 002 OF 005


from the EFCC was not obtained through proper channels. If
you think of Darth Vadar, you think of the AG.

¶6. (C) Dahiru Mangal: Wealthy businessman; said to have
benefited from government contracts when Yar'Adua was Katsina
State Governor; keeps a low profile; also rumored to have
close connections to fundamentalists in the north.


------------------
Northern Governors
------------------

¶7. (C) Kwara State Governor Bukola Saraki: One of the
President's key advisors; critical in anointing PDP
leadership; Chair of Northern Governor's Forum; family's
influence well-established in Kwara and western Kogi State;
his ailing father heads the Northern Union; Saraki family is
also involved in some questionably illicit deals, and
reportedly also had a hand in choosing current EFCC
Chairwoman Waziri as a way to protect his father from EFCC
inquiry.

¶8. (C) Katsina State Governor Ibrahim Shema: One of the
President's key confidantes from Katsina; not a big
personality on his own; his claim to fame is his relationship
with the President, and maintaining the good work that
Yar'Adua did in Katsina. Ambassador has visited the state
and it is one of the most well run, and clean states in the
Federation.

¶9. (C) Benue State Governor Gabriel Suswam: Appears to be
close to President; helped select PDP leadership,
particularly PDP Chairman Vincent Ogbulafor; former member of
the House of Representatives.

¶10. (C) Adamawa State Governor Murtala Nyako: A former Naval
Chief of Staff; former military governor who was unafraid of
unpopular decisions; close to President Yar'Adua as they were
governors at the same time, might be someone we can work
with; considered to be one of the more effective Governors in
the north on implementing state programs to help his
constituents. Ambassador just had a long and frank meeting
with him on Yar'Adua's health, but he was clear that he would
push for Nigeria to follow constitutional succession
processes in the event that the President does not survive.

¶11. (C) Kano State Governor Ibrahim Shekerau: ANPP Governor;
leads most populous state in the north; helped stop PDP from
stealing state election in 2003 and 2007; of late, Shekerau
has been a disappointment as he has done little for his
state; his popularity also has tanked since he fell out with
former presidential candidate Buhari.

------------------
Southern Governors
------------------

¶12. (C) Bayelsa State Governor Timipre Sylva: Only Ijaw
Governor in Nigeria; leads one of the wealthiest states; of
late has been one of the GON's go-to-guys on Niger Delta
issues as he has been able to pull some of the militants into
vocational training and demobilization efforts, and has been
willing to help the GON military's JTF stamp out the rest; he
told the Ambassador that he receives $700 million a year in
oil receipts, and that he has helped militant leader Joshua
McGyver come in from the cold.

¶13. (C) Rivers State Governor Rotimi Amaechi: His state
receives about $1 billion annually from oil receipts; Port
Harcourt serves as oil industry's capital; political contacts
from his stint as Speaker of the Rivers State House of
Assembly; pushing for a harder military line in the Delta by
the JTF, and as a result has more access now to the Villa
given his support for the JTF.

¶14. (C) Lagos State Governor Babatunde Fashola: He leads the
most populous state in the country (despite what the 2006

ABUJA 00002095 003 OF 005


census claimed); very popular in Lagos and noted for his
energy and initiative; only Action Congress governor, and has
access to Yar'Adua when he wants it, given the importance of
Lagos State.

¶15. (C) Ogun State Governor Gbenga Daniel: One of the few
second-term Governors in the southwest; has decent reputation
for governance; does not have the mandate problems of
Oyinlola of Osun state or Agagu of Ondo state; his
relationship to Obasanjo has turned sour as of late, but he
can still be an important bellwether of the former
President,s positions.

¶16. (C) Anambra State Governor Peter Obi: One of the few
governors in southeast with some popular appeal; managed to
stay in power despite best efforts of the Uba brothers who
first thwarted his legitimate election win in 2003 and then
pushed the State Assembly to impeached him in 2006; has
support of the Church; links to business community from days
as a banker; very close to the most senior traditional elder
in the south, the Obi of Onitsha, and made sure the
Ambassador met him on a recent trip to Anambra. During
Ambassador's visit there, it is clear that Obi has done a lot
in his state, particularly on infrastructure development.

-----------
Businessmen
-----------

¶17. (C) Aliko Dangote: One of the richest men in Nigeria;
helped finance PDP's campaigns in 1999, 2003, and 2007; still
widely influential despite losing some contracts under the
current administration; he also sits on an unofficial kitchen
cabinet for economic matters that Yar'Adua listens to;
Ambassador has access to him.

¶18. (C) Jim Ovia: CEO of Zenith Bank, which is one of the
most successful banks in the country now. Mission enjoys a
good PPP relationship with him on a numbers of public
diplomacy and AID projects. Ambassador knows him well.

¶19. (C) Ibru Family: One of the wealthiest families in
Nigeria; Michael is an "industrialist" with his finger in a
lot of different businesses and industries; Alex publishes
the Guardian newspaper; Felix was Governor of Delta State and
then a two-term senator; Cecilia is the MD of Oceanic Bank.

¶20. (C) Femi Otedola: Owner of Zenon Oil; Close to Obasanjo;
His father was Governor of Lagos State from 1991-1993; recent
press reports suggest he is expanding his business portfolio
into sugar and cement sectors.

¶21. (C) Ndi-Okereke Onyiuke: Director-General of the
Nigerian Stock Exchange; President of Transcorp; considered
to be close to former President Obasanjo; she is considered
very close to Nigeria's top bankers, but also has a
questionable relationship with stockbrokers and reportedly
manipulates shares for the benefits of her close associates.

--------------------------------------------- -------
Southern Godfathers, Elders, and Traditional Leaders
--------------------------------------------- -------

¶22. (C) Edwin Clark: Former Commissioner of Information; from
Delta State; appears to have access to VP Goodluck Jonathan
as well as some sway over many of the militants; seen by the
GON as someone they can talk to, but unclear whether he can
really influence militants behavior in his area.

¶23. (C) Former President Obasanjo: Although his star has
dimmed over the past 18 months, OBJ helped put in place many
of the politicians in office now; exceptionally wealthy;
member of Transcorp; Head of PDP's Board of Trustees (for
now).

¶24. (C) Ooni of Ife: One of the two most powerful
traditional leaders in the southwest.


ABUJA 00002095 004 OF 005


¶25. (C) Obi of Onitsha: Key traditional leader in southeast;
is a Stanford graduate and a former Shell Managing-Director


¶26. (C) Former VP Alex Ekwueme: Prominent leader in
southeast; part of the G-34; helping to reform PDP.

--------------------------------------------- -------
Northern Godfathers, Elders, and Traditional Leaders
--------------------------------------------- -------

¶27. (C) Former Head of State Ibrahim Babangida: Always a
factor in Nigerian politics; often works in tandem with his
neighbor, former head of State General Abdulsalami Abubakar.

¶28. (C) Former President Shehu Shagari/Former Head of State
Yakubu Gowon: Both command respect from the street and elite.

¶29. (C) Former Head of State Muhammadu Buhari: The new and
improved Buhari showed principled positions on
anti-corruption and electoral issues which earned him
reasonable grassroots support in north during the last
election.

¶30. (C) Emir of Kano: In office since the 1960s, the Emir is
probably second only to the Sultan in terms of influence; he
is one of the more senior traditional leaders alive today
(the Lamindo of Yola is the oldest sitting traditional
leader); has helped in the past to broker elite compromises.

¶31. (C) Emir of Zazzau: From prominent city of Zaria, one of
the more important traditional leaders in the north; same can
be said of the Emir of Katsina.

------------------
Younger Generation
------------------

¶32. (C) Speaker of the House of Representatives Dimeji
Bankole: Occupies the number four position in the country;
his father is a longtime rival of former President Obasanjo
in Ogun State.

¶33. (C) Representative Farouk Lawan: Leader of the Integrity
Group, which spearheaded the removal of corrupt Speaker of
the House Patricia Etteh.

¶34. (C) Ledum Mittee: Leads the Movement for the Survival of
the Ogoni People (MOSOP); respected in Delta for his position
as Saro-Wiwa's number two; heads Niger Delta Technical
Committee (NDTC), and is thought to be doing his best to
ensure stakeholder participation in the NDTC.

¶35. (C) Peter Esele: Leader of Trade Union Congress and
former head of PENGASSEN, which represents Nigerians with
more white-collar occupations in the oil sector.

¶36. (C) Olisa Agbakoba: Former President of the Nigeria Bar
Association.

--------------------------------------------- ----------------
In Two Categories by Themselves -- Senate President David
Mark & The ADC
--------------------------------------------- ----------------

¶37. (C) Defying classification, Senate President David Mark
is the number three officeholder in the government and would
assume immediate power if the Supreme Court overturned the
Presidential election; he is a former military general who
served as Minister of Communication in past military regimes;
once known as a Babangida boy, Mark was content to support
former President Obasanjo's third term bid and now is trying
to cozy up to Yar'Adua; according to rumors, he spend
millions of dollars to keep his Senate seat; there are
reports that Chief Justice Kutigi is looking into whether
Mark bought off judges over the summer in order to assure a
favorable ruling in the August 2008 ruling on the appeal of
his Electoral Tribunal case (the Tribunal largely ruled

ABUJA 00002095 005 OF 005


against Mark). Mark is cocky and brash, and would certainly
use any interim opportunity -- if the Supreme Court annuls
the 2007 election -- to advance his political goals.

¶38. (C) The Aide de Camp -- Colonel Mustapha Onoyiveta:
Ambassador has met with him on many occasions; we believe he
is not to be trusted. We also have heard (including from
Governor Saraki) that he is not loyal to Yar'Adua. We believe
he is a wild card being the man standing behind Yar'Adua,
primarily responsible for his personal security. We all know
the role that young colonels have had in Nigeria as well as
other countries around Africa. He is someone we are watching
closely.
Sanders

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC KMDR IS

SUBJECT: ISRAEL MEDIA REACTION

--------------------------------
SUBJECTS COVERED IN THIS REPORT:
--------------------------------

¶1. Mideast

¶2. Iran

-------------------------
Key stories in the media:
-------------------------

Major media quoted PM Ehud Olmert as saying that he would remain
caretaker until the formation of a new government early next year.
HaQaretz quoted police sources as saying on Monday that enough
evidence has been amassed against PM Olmert for an indictment to be
filed against him within days, In theory, that could lead to his
ouster from office even before new elections are held in early
February. Leading media reported that DM and Labor Party leader
Ehud Barak has challenged Kadima Chairperson Tzipi Livni and Likud
leader Benjamin Netanyahu to an American-style debate. Leading
media quoted Netanyahu as sayng that he will not give up Jerusalem
or the Golan. Media reported that chief Palestinian negotiator
Ahmed Qurei praised Livni for not removing Jerusalem from the
negotiations. Media reported that Shas Chairman Eli Yishai has
accused Kadima of arrogance and racism. He was quoted as saying in
an interview with Israel Radio this morning that he would tone down
his remarks. Maariv reported that Netanyahu met with Pensioners
Party Chairman and cabinet minister Rafi Eitam, who has since broken
his contacts with Kadima. The newspaper reported that the sides
deny having concluded an agreement between them.

HaQaretz cited reports that have reached the GOI that French
President Nicolas Sarkozy is very critical of U.S. presidential
candidate Barack Obama's positions on Iran. Sarkozy has made his
criticisms only in closed forums in France, but according to a
senior Israeli government source, the reports reaching Israel
indicate that Sarkozy views the Democratic candidate's stance on
Iran as "utterly immature" and comprised of "formulations empty of
all content." According to those reports, Sarkozy told Obama at
their July meeting that that for the new American president to
change his country's policy toward Iran would be "very problematic."
An Israeli source was quoted as saying that following their July
meeting, Sarkozy repeatedly expressed disappointment with Obama's
positions on Iran, concluding that they were "not crystallized, and
therefore many issues remain open.Q According to the Israeli
source, Sarkozy plans to begin intensive negotiations with the new
U.S. administration, regardless of whether it is headed by Obama or
Sen. John McCain, even before the new president takes office in
January, with the goal of persuading him to continue the current
policy on Iran. However, HaQaretz reported that Sarkozy's pessimism
does not stem only from Obama's stance; it also stems from the
overall behavior of the international community toward Iran's
nuclear program, and particularly its inability to agree on a fourth
round of Security Council sanctions against the Islamic Republic.
HaQaretz cited SarkozyQs belief that this foot-dragging will make it
impossible to effect a change in Iran's nuclear policy.

Yediot quoted two American sources conversant with the American
commando operation in Syria as saying that it was actually carried
out in prior coordination with Syrian military intelligence. The
Jerusalem Post reported that representatives of 14 Arab states held
a three-day conference in Damascus last week aimed at reinvigorating
the decades-old economic and trade boycott of Israel.

Maariv reported that Israel protested to Egypt about military
maneuvers that Israel says are directed against it.

HaQaretz reported that DM Barak favors barring right-wing extremists
who attack soldiers or policemen from entering the West Bank and, in
extreme cases, even putting them in administrative detention. The
newspaper quoted Attorney General Menachem Mazuz as saying that
Barak plans to discuss the issue with senior army, police, and legal
officials.

HaQaretz, The Jerusalem Post, and Makor Rishon-Hatzofe reported that
at a meeting with IsraelQs Ambassador to the U.S. Sallai Meridor,
Republican vice-presidential hopeful Gov. Sarah Palin told him they
would be working together. HaQaretz and Makor Rishon-Hatzofe
reported that Meridor is also scheduled to meet with Democratic
vice-presidential candidate Sen. Joe Biden. Makor Rishon-Hatzofe
reported that the McCain campaign allegedly warned U.S. Jews that an
Obama victory might produce a new Holocaust.

HaQaretz reported that about two weeks ago, 250 Russian speakers
from around the country attended a symposium sponsored by backers of
the Geneva Initiative.

The Jerusalem Post quoted visiting legendary boxing promoter Don
King as saying yesterday that the African American community should
learn from how the Jews appreciate their historical struggles.

Maariv featured the case of Pvt. Michael Handman, an American-Jewish
soldier who was beaten unconscious after he complained about
religious discrimination at Ft. Benning in Savannah, GA. Maariv
said that the phenomenon is widespread on U.S. Army bases.

Leading media reported on, and Yediot bannered, the thwarting of an
assassination attempt on Sen. Barack Obama.

Major media reported that yesterday Bank of Israel Governor Stanley
Fischer cut the bankQs discount rate by 0.25 percent.

Leading media reported that telecommunications software company
Amdocs is laying 500 staff members worldwide, including 200 in
Israel.

------------
¶1. Mideast:
------------

Summary:
--------

Senior columnist and longtime dove Yoel Marcus wrote in the
independent, left-leaning Ha'aretz: QWhat remains to be seen is
whether in the coming election, voters will grant [Livni] the
victory she expects -- and which she certainly deserves.

Former Labor Party Knesset member Uzi Baram wrote on page one of the
independent Israel Hayom: QIt appears that the struggle will focus
on Livni and Netanyahu.

Deputy Managing Editor and right-wing columnist Caroline B. Glick
wrote in the conservative, independent Jerusalem Post: QDue to the
centrality of Jerusalem in Livni's failed negotiations with Shas, it
is apparent that maintaining or ending sovereignty over united
Jerusalem will be the central issue of the coming elections.

Block Quotes:
-------------

¶I. "She Deserves to Win"

Senior columnist and longtime dove Yoel Marcus wrote in the
independent, left-leaning Ha'aretz (10/28): QNow, in hindsight, it
is clear that the matter was not in Livni's hands at all: Shas never
intended to join her government.... Livni tried to forge a new kind
of politics. Was she too rigid? Yes. Her decision to go to the
President before she had to, for instance, was hasty. But in any
case, there is no doubt that she is at peace with herself. She
proved that she acts according to her own conscience, and that she
speaks from her heart -- something that can definitely be termed a
different kind of politics. What remains to be seen is whether in
the coming election, voters will grant her the victory she expects
-- and which she certainly deserves.

II. QLivni or Netanyahu

Former Labor Party Knesset member Uzi Baram wrote on page one of the
independent Israel Hayom (10/28): QEhud Barak was led to the
elections despite himself.... Benjamin Netanyahu is going to the
elections as a possible winner.... Netanyahu will try to be moderate
and fuzzy on diplomatic issues because he will want to retain the
support of parts of the political center and conciliate new members
who do not partake of the right-wingQs experience. It appears that
the struggle will focus on Livni and Netanyahu. BarakQs situation
looks difficult, but his chances of winning a larger slate of
Knesset seats than currently predicted cannot be dismissed. He has
the ability to fight and convince and the defense issue has not been
entirely lifted from the agenda as a key one.

III. "All Roads Lead to Jerusalem"

Deputy Managing Editor and right-wing columnist Caroline B. Glick
wrote in the conservative, independent Jerusalem Post (10/28): QDue
to the centrality of Jerusalem in Livni's failed negotiations with
Shas, it is apparent that maintaining or ending sovereignty over
united Jerusalem will be the central issue of the coming elections.
If the Left can convince a sufficient number of voters that a united
Jerusalem is a drain on the country's resources or that it is
impossible to enforce Israeli law among an increasingly lawless and
irredentist Arab population, then it will have a fighting chance of
winning the elections. If the Right is able to demonstrate that the
problems that afflict Jerusalem are little different from those
suffered by mixed Jewish-Arab cities throughout the country and are
a consequence of government and municipal mismanagement, and are
therefore manageable, then it will win the elections. Today the
problems that Jerusalem faces stem from its unique demographic
character, municipal mismanagement and the clear if previously
unstated intention of successive leftist governments to eventually
withdraw from the Temple Mount and from the city's Arab
neighborhoods.

---------
¶2. Iran:
---------

Summary:
--------

Amnon Rubinstein, Law Professor at the Interdisciplinary Center and
a former education minister from Meretz, wrote in the conservative,
independent Jerusalem Post: QA rejuvenated, cocky Russia does not
pose an existential threat to the West.... [But] Iran, unlike
Russia, poses a real threat to the peace, stability, and welfare of
many countries and to the very existence of the State of Israel.


Block Quotes:
-------------

"Choose Your Enemy: Moscow or Tehran"

Amnon Rubinstein, Law Professor at the Interdisciplinary Center and
a former education minister from Meretz, wrote in the conservative,
independent Jerusalem Post (10/28): QWhoever is elected U.S.
president next month will have to take a vital decision on how to
deal with two clear and present crises: an imminent-nuclear Iran and
an ebullient, post-Georgia Russia. The two issues are clearly
interconnected: Russia under Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev will
not allow -- and will even thwart -- effective UN sanctions against
Iran until differences with a U.S.-led alliance are remedied and the
past East-West understanding is restored. That this interdependence
affects the future of Israel and the entire Middle-East is also
manifestly clear. Simply put, the next president of the United
States will have to decide whether to jeopardize the isolation of
the Iranian regime or somehow placate the Russians by, among other
things, mothballing the idea of expanding NATO to include Ukraine
and Georgia.... A rejuvenated, cocky Russia does not pose an
existential threat to the West.... Iran, unlike Russia, poses a real
threat to the peace, stability, and welfare of many countries and to
the very existence of the State of Israel.

CUNNINGHAM

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MICHAEL WILLIAMS SAYS SYRIANS "COCKY"
ABOUT LEBANON

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

¶1. (C) UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams,
UNSCOL Chief of Staff Jack Christofides, and UNSCOL Poloff
Rami Shehadeh February 17 provided the Ambassador and Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Staff Member Perry Cammack with a
readout of Williams' February 12 trip to Damascus. Williams
described the Syrians as "cocky" and extremely confident
regarding their authority in Lebanon and their bargaining
position in any future talks with the U.S. The Syrians
argued UNSCOL had no role in resolving the situation of
Palestinian military camps in Lebanon. For his part,
Williams expressed concern about these military bases and
also about Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. He worried
that Syria, Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas would re-assert
themselves in the camps following the Israeli punishment of
Hamas in Gaza.

¶2. (C) Discussing UNIFIL and the LAF in southern Lebanon,
Williams noted that it would be helpful to increase awareness
that UNIFIL's role is solely to assist the LAF, not to
conduct independent patrols. Williams also commented that
some had agreed that the $350 million spent annually on
supporting the UNIFIL maritime fleet could be better spent
securing Lebanon's land border with Syria. End summary.

SYRIANS "COCKY" ON LEBANON
--------------------------

¶3. (C) UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams
February 17 briefed the Ambassador and Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Staff Member Perry Cammack, accompanied
by PolEconOff and PolMilOff, on Williams' recent trip to
Damascus. UNSCOL Chief of Staff Jack Christofides and UNSCOL
Poloff Rami Shehadeh also attended the February 17 meeting.
During Williams' February 12 visit to Syria, he met with
Foreign Minister Walid Muallem, Deputy Foreign Minister
Faisel Mikdad, and Vice President Farouk al-Shara. (Note:
Williams' February 12 trip was his third to Damascus. He
last traveled in January to accompany UN SYG Ban Ki-Moon.
End note.)

¶4. (C) Williams got the impression the Syrians would take
additional steps on Lebanon-Syria diplomatic relations,
including assigning an ambassador in Beirut in the next two
months, (i.e., not waiting until after the Lebanese
parliamentary elections). Williams assessed the Syrians were
waiting to use the absence of a Syrian ambassador in Beirut
as a bargaining chip in their dialogue with Saudi Arabia.
Explaining to Williams the delay in appointing an Ambassador,
Muallem said that "some people in Lebanon criticize us," a
reference to Druze leader Walid Jumblatt.

¶5. (C) On the joint Syria-Lebanon border committee, Muallem
was dismissive, said Williams. He noted that the 1945
agreement stipulates that the Deputy Foreign Minister chairs
the committee; he saw no need for Syria to appoint additional
representatives. Muallem claimed the PFLP-GC camps inside
Lebanon on the Lebanon-Syria border have "nothing to do with
the UN." Muallem cited the 1969 Cairo Agreement -- which the
Lebanese Parliament has since annulled -- to argue the border
camps were an internal Lebanese matter. Additionally,
Williams noted the GOL agreed in 2006 to disarm all
Palestinians outside the twelve officially recognized
Palestinian camps. (Note: The Palestinian military bases
are not included in the twelve officially recognized refugee
camps. End note.) When Williams raised the issue of weapons
transiting Syria to Hizballah in Lebanon, Muallem flatly
asserted that no smuggling occurred across the border.

¶6. (C) Describing the atmospherics of his meetings in Syria,
Williams assessed the overall tone was more negative than
during his visits to Damascus in November and January.
Williams noted the Syrians were "quite cocky" on Lebanese
issues. He assessed the Syrians were confident that they had

BEIRUT 00000196 002 OF 002


the upper hand in potential future discussions with the
United States. The Syrians have "read the writing on the
wall" and expect talks with the U.S. to occur, Williams said.
The Syrians judge the "U.S. needs us more than we need them."

DEFMIN MURR WORRIED ABOUT CAMPS
-------------------------------

¶7. (C) Williams also reported that Defense Minister Elias
Murr had expressed concern about security in the Palestinian
camps, in a meeting the day before. Williams said he shared
Murr's concern and was more worried about Lebanon's camps now
than he had been during the fighting in Gaza. Williams
suggested that Syria, Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas -- realizing
that Hamas had suffered a huge blow in Gaza -- may feel the
need to score a victory for their side by fomenting something
in the camps. An uprising in the camps would be a way for
Syria to exert its authority in Lebanon. Murr, during his
meeting with Williams, also noted the weapons that through
the Palestinian border base (Qoussaya) could end up in the
refugee camps.

"NO EYE" INTO BORDER BASES
--------------------------

¶8. (C) Williams asserted that the UN had "no eye" into
Palestinian military bases in Lebanon. The Nameeh base near
Beirut's airport is under Syrian control, Williams said.
Residents in the bases number in the hundreds, UNSCOL
assessed, but further details are a "black hole" for the UN.

UNIFIL AND LAF DOING WELL
-------------------------

¶9. (C) Williams provided Ambassador and Cammack with a
general assessment of UNIFIL and LAF performance in southern
Lebanon. Williams said both the Israeli and Lebanese sides
had expressed satisfaction, along with their complaints, to
UNIFIL. The Israelis want more patrols and less UNIFIL
reliance on the LAF, Williams said. However, UN requests for
more information from Israel, to help direct UNIFIL patrols
to suspicious areas, has been refused. Israel argued that
providing UNIFIL with data would be akin to handing the
information directly to Hizballah, which in Israel's opinion
has infiltrated the LAF.

¶10. (C) For his part, Williams said an increased awareness of
UNIFIL's role would be useful; UNIFIL's mandate is only to
assist the LAF. The LAF has done "better and better,"
Williams noted. The LAF now is "more seasoned" and
accustomed to their job duties. UNIFIL was pleased that the
LAF bolstered its troop numbers in southern Lebanon during
the Gaza fighting. Williams commented, though, that the LAF
had Hizballah's blessing for its operations.

¶11. (C) Discussion turned to the UNIFIL maritime force on
Lebanon's coast. Williams noted that some argued that the
naval force's yearly budget -- $350 million -- could be
better spent on Lebanon's porous eastern land border with
Syria. He assessed that the GOL needed a new border control
policy to encourage foreign donors to support the mission,
but opined that donors would, in fact, be interested in
helping the Lebanese secure the border with Syria.

COMMENT
-------

¶12. (C) We were struck by Williams' description of Syrian FM
Muallem's dismissiveness about discussing the Palestinian
military bases in Lebanon. We recommend that the continued
presence of these bases in Lebanese territory be added to the
agenda for any contacts with the SARG regarding Lebanon,
including Congressional visits. We find Williams idea on the
UNIFIL maritime patrol interesting and perhaps something
worth pursuing in discussions prior to the next UNIFIL
mandate renewal in the UNSC.

SISON

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, AND INR/AA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2019
TAGS: PU XY PGOV PREL SNAR KDEM KCRM
SUBJECT: GUINEA-BISSAU DEFENSE CHIEF DEFENDS ACTIONS AND
ASKS FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE

REF: DAKAR 470

Classified By: Ambassador Marcia S. Bernicat for reasons 1.5 B/D.

¶1. (C) Summary: On April 2, PolCouns met with Naval Captain
Jose Zamora Induta, the de facto head of the armed forces of
Guinea-Bissau. PolCouns expressed U.S. concern regarding the
apparently unconstitutional designation of Induta as chief of
the armed forces, the recent political violence carried out
by military members against critics of the armed forces and
the government, as well as the military's failure to
cooperate with the inter-ministerial commission established
to investigate the assassinations of former President
Bernardo Vieira and former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
General Batista Tagme Na Wai. Like the Prime Minister,
Induta insisted that the country's constitution and laws
regarding the nomination of the armed forces chief of staff
were being respected and he defended the military's actions
in the recent arrest of the defense attorney of the former
chief of staff of the Navy (reftel). He denied that the
members of the armed forces had beaten the audit court chief
justice and argued that someone is conducting a campaign to
denigrate the military.

¶2. (C) Induta told PolCouns that he needs the assistance of
the United States to fight drug traffickers. He claimed that
traffickers had contacted him to ask for authorization to
continue transiting through Guinea-Bissau and offered him
1,000 euros per ton transshipped. He said he would be unable
to fight the traffickers without assistance from the United
States because the traffickers are better armed and prepared.
Polcouns assured him the U.S. could only provide assistance
to credible, reliable partners. End summary.

Induta: The Constitution Is Being Respected
-------------------------------------------

¶3. (C) PolCouns conveyed USG concern regarding the apparent
constitutional and legal violations with regard to Induta's
creation of a military commission to manage the crisis
following the death of Na Wai and his subsequent nomination
to be chief of the armed forces. Induta denied that there
was anything unconstitutional or improper in the process that
resulted in his nomination. He reiterated what he told
PolCouns and DATT in the week following the assassinations:
he and the other members of the military's crisis management
commission stepped in to fill a void that the service chiefs
had failed to fill. He criticized the service chiefs for not
taking the necessary initiative and said that he and his
fellow commission members had done what was necessary.

¶4. (C) As for his nomination as chief of the armed forces,
Induta argued that the military had behaved appropriately
with regard to the law. In fact, he said the armed forces
had gone beyond what was required in the law to ensure that
there was a consensus of support within the officer corps.
According to Induta, the law calls for the armed forces to
convene a panel to select and provide a name for the chief of
the armed forces nomination to the Minister of Defense. This
is exactly what the armed forces did on March 6; a meeting
was convened with all the senior officers in attendance
including the battalion commanders of the various zones.
(Comment: It is Post,s understanding that the meeting was
attended by only senior Balanta officers not seen as close to
Vieira. For example, the colonel serving as director of
national defense policy in the office of the Minister of
Defense was not invited to participate because, according to
him, because he is only half-Balanta. Moreover, in all
likelihood, he is viewed as having been too close Vieira. End
comment.)

¶5. (C) Following the meeting of senior officers, the armed
forces proposed Induta as the chief of staff of the armed
forces and the battalion commander of the Northern Zone based
in Mansoa, Colonel Antonio Indjai, to be the vice chief.
Induta said, as far as he is concerned, the military has done
its part and the matter of military command had been settled.
PolCouns pointed out that the constitution bars the interim
president from acting on the nomination. Induta replied that
the question of confirmation of the nominations was a
civilian matter. When asked if he should be referred to as
"chief of staff," "ad interim chief of staff," or "chair of
the military crisis management commission," Induta hesitated
and then said, "I suppose chair of the military commission,
because the president hasn't confirmed my nomination yet."
(Note: Nevertheless, Induta provided PolCouns with several

DAKAR 00000477 002 OF 004


documents he had signed as chief of staff and in which he is
addressed as chief of staff by the offices of the prime
minister, minister of defense, attorney general, and director
of the Judicial Police. End note.) Induta grudgingly
acknowledged that the next president would have the authority
to dismiss him, but he said he assumed that the elected
president would do so only if he had a good reason and that
the president would not want to "fight with the armed forces."

Defends and Denies Military Actions
-----------------------------------

¶6. (C) PolCouns told Induta that the USG is troubled by the
extrajudicial arrests and violence being carried out by the
military. Induta said the military is a victim of an active
campaign to denigrate it and its members. In the case of the
arrest of Pedro Infanda, the defense attorney of former naval
chief of staff ex-Admiral Bubo Na Tchuta, Induta insisted
that the armed forces had taken the necessary actions to
ensure stability. He accused Infanda of incitement and
disturbance of the peace. He said the military acted because
the attorney general's office had failed to do so. On April
1 he met with Attorney General Louis Manuel Cabral to urge
him to take action in the future, so the military would not
have to do so in the future. When asked on what legal basis
the military had arrested Infanda and why Infanda had been
beaten, Induta said it was the armed forces, responsibility
to maintain stability and guarantee the peace. He did not
address the beating of Infanda.

¶7. (C) With regard to the assault of Francisco Fadul, the
chief justice of the audit court and head of a political
party, Induta denied that the armed forces were involved. He
said had the armed forces been involved, it would have
happened during the day, as had been the case of Infanda,
because the military has nothing to hide. He noted that all
of the security forces use the same uniforms and suggested
that someone was impersonating the military. Induta claimed
there was a campaign to make the armed forces look bad.

Induta: We Are Cooperating with Inquiry; Ours Almost Done
--------------------------------------------- -----------

¶8. (C) Induta denied that the armed forces had failed to
cooperate with the inter-ministerial commission of inquiry.
He noted that the armed forces were represented in the
inter-ministerial commission of inquiry and argued that no
other group was more interested than the military in
establishing who is responsible for the assassinations. He
called the people who are accusing the armed forces of
failing to cooperate "liars, who do not want to work." He
said the military's internal commission of inquiry had
already determined who was responsible, the suspects were in
custody and that the report would be finalized soon. Asked
if the report would be shared with the inter-ministerial
commission of inquiry, Induta said, "Yes, if they ask for
it." He also said that the suspects would be handed over to
civilian authorities. PolCouns asked why the armed forces
were investigating the death of Na Wai, but not that of
Vieira. Induta replied that the death of the chief of staff
of the armed forces in a military installation, ostensibly at
the hands of or in cooperation with members of the armed
forces, was a military matter, but the same was not
(entirely) true in the case of the death of the president.
However, the military would be happy to conduct an
investigation into the death of Vieira, if asked to do so by
the government, he said.

Induta: We Need Resources to Fight Narcotics Traffickers
--------------------------------------------- -----------

¶9. (C) Induta told PolCouns that the Bissau-Guinean armed
forces needed U.S. assistance to fight narcotics traffickers.
The de facto chief of defense said he was reforming the
armed forces to be able to take on the traffickers and to
ensure stability. To that end, he said he would be
recruiting 1,000 new troops. According to him, this is
necessary because 80 percent of the current armed forces
personnel are officers. He emphasized that he would be
recruiting people who had at a minimum completed high school,
"so they can resist influence and manipulation from
politicians." This would only be the first phase in the
reforms. He claimed he needed at least 1,500 additional new
troops, beyond the initial 1,000, to maintain stability and
fight the traffickers. Ideally, he needed a total of 3,000
new troops, he said. Asked how he would reconcile adding

DAKAR 00000477 003 OF 004


3,000 troops to the current 4,500 troops given the 3,500
total force limit called for in the country's National
Assembly-approved national defense strategy, Induta said
there was some confusion regarding the total number of troops
the country is supposed to have and that the total number is
still under discussion. According to him, Na Wai wanted
6,000, but Induta believes that a total force of 4,500 would
be sufficient in the long term. In the interim, he added, it
would be necessary to simply add forces without
decommissioning and demobilizing current troops.

¶10. (C) Induta said the armed forces had identified 15
different networks of narcotics traffickers operating in
Guinea-Bissau. According to him, representatives of the
traffickers met with him at their request to seek
authorization to continue using the country as a transit
point. Induta said that these representatives offered to pay
him 1,000 euros per ton of product transshipped through
Guinea-Bissau. He claimed that the armed forces had seized a
suspect ship off the coast of the country because it was
neither a fishing vessel nor a passenger vessel, but it was
making regular visits to different islands for some undefined
purpose, which he assumed was related to trafficking. Asked
if the armed forces had recovered any narcotics on the ship,
he replied no. Induta also claimed to have information about
airfields being prepared in different parts of the country
for use by traffickers.

¶11. (C) Unfortunately, he said "I am not in a position to
tell the traffickers I will fight them because the
traffickers are better armed and prepared." Induta asserted
that he is ready and willing to fight the traffickers,
provided the United States and other donors provide him with
the resources to do so. Until that time there is nothing he
can do. He acknowledged that the armed forces had been
involved in trafficking in the past, but claimed that was no
longer the case. While he said he had no desire to
investigate people for their past activities,)
narcotics-related corruption would no longer be tolerated.
However, he emphasized, that without outside assistance he
would not be in a position to combat the traffickers,
"because they are better armed and better prepared."
Therefore, "We will only start the fight when you give us
resources." Induta stressed that the matter is urgent and
said that he had discussed the problem of narcotics
trafficking with President Yahya Jammeh during his recent
trip to The Gambia. PolCouns assured the de facto chief of
defense that he would transmit the message, but explained
that the United States would not be able to provide any
assistance unless it had credible and reliable partners with
which to work.

Comment
-------

¶12. (C) Induta comes across as cocky, completely sure of
himself and utterly unconcerned about any questions regarding
his legitimacy. Having trained in the United States on three
occasions, he behaved as though he thinks he knows and
understands Americans. Induta said repeatedly during the
meeting with PolCouns that his goal is to make Guinea-Bissau
"just like the United States," yet during a previous meeting
with PolCouns and DATT, when challenged about his apparent
usurping of command, Induta explained, "This is Africa.
Things are done differently here." While he has stated
publicly on numerous occasions that he and his fellow
officers are not interested in taking over the government,
his actions belie any claim that he seeks to head a military
that is subject to civilian authority. Induta also displays
a disdain for the political/intellectual classes of
Guinea-Bissau, repeatedly referring to the "lawyers and other
people with degrees and the politicians who are not willing
to work" or do what is necessary to develop Guinea-Bissau.
This attitude may reflect inter-ethnic prejudices rather than
political differences. Non-Balanta elites speak of the
Balanta in patronizing terms saying they make good fighters
but are not good for other things, a sentiment that no doubt
grates on Induta and his fellow Balanta officers, who regard
themselves as the guardians of Bissau-Guinean freedom.
Finally, Induta's clumsy claim that he is ready to combat the
narcotics traffickers only if the United States provides
assistance managed to include "official" confirmation that
members of the military have been involved in trafficking.

¶13. (C) Post believes Induta regards security sector reform
(SSR) as a means to consolidate his hold on power within the

DAKAR 00000477 004 OF 004


armed forces. Lacking combat experience, he is regarded by
informed local observers as having limited support within the
military. This probably explains why he has teamed with
Indjai, an independence fighter and reported nephew of Na
Wai, as his vice chief, although no such position existed
during Na Wai's time as chief of defense. Induta's desire to
recruit additional forces -- before he is willing to risk
antagonizing any of the current military with demobilization
-- underlines his precarious situation.

¶14. (C) Induta's somewhat precarious grip on power ironically
offers the international community an opportunity to
counterbalance his ambition to continue the cycle of wielding
political power from the defense chief's office.
Demobilization and SSR are the essential prerequisites to
political stability in Guinea-Bissau and an effective
counter-narcotics strategy for the country (and are key to
any successful regional counter-narcotics strategy as well as
efforts to prevent Guinea-Bissau from becoming a source of
political instability for the region). While there is risk
involved, donor countries can make use of Induta's argument
for additional resources both to persuade the government to
request some formal ECOWAS/CPLP force presence and to compel
certain security sector reforms. End comment.
BERNICAT

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STATE FOR NEA, NEA/IPA, NEA/PPD

WHITE HOUSE FOR PRESS OFFICE, SIT ROOM
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PARIS ALSO FOR POL
ROME FOR MFO

SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC KMDR IS

SUBJECT: ISRAEL MEDIA REACTION

--------------------------------
SUBJECTS COVERED IN THIS REPORT:
--------------------------------

¶1. PM Netanyahu's Speech

¶2. Iran

¶3. Mideast
Block Quotes Only:
-------------
¶1. PM Netanyahu's Speech


¶I. "Netanyahu's revolution"

Ari Shavit, senior commentator, wrote in the independent,
left-leaning Ha'aretz (6/18): "A week ago my piece about the
seven-word formula - a demilitarized Palestinian state alongside a
Jewish Israeli state - appeared on this page. Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu adopted this formula, making it the cornerstone
of Israeli policy.... However, he added two fundamental elements to
the formula: a solid international guarantee that the Palestinian
state is indeed demilitarized, and a clear Palestinian recognition
of Israel's being a Jewish state....He decided to break out of the
corner and take the initiative. Netanyahu accepted the principle of
dividing the land in a controlled manner to avoid an imposed
partition. In order to prevent a swift, dangerous retreat to the
1967 borders he proposed a painful compromise. Thus he found himself
uttering the two taboo words he had sworn he would never say:
Palestinian state.... He realized that neither the world nor the
Israeli public understand what Israel is fighting over....
Netanyahu grasped that when the battle line is the occupation and
the settlements, Israel is in an inferior position.... Unlike them
he is not trying to engineer a practical arrangement, but rather to
establish peace on a clear, solid ideological foundation. ... He may
or may not succeed.... He might lead the country to peace, or bring
it to war. But he made a move of revolutionary significance.
Netanyahu not only took a courageous personal step, he generated an
intellectual, ideological turnabout. With the seven-word formula he
changed the discourse on the conflict from its very foundations. He
set an unprecedented challenge before the Palestinian nation and the
international community. After the Bar-Ilan speech the question on
the world agenda is not only when and where the Israelis will
withdraw, but what the Palestinians, Arabs, Europeans and Americans
will do to ensure that the great Israeli withdrawal does not end in
disaster."

II. "He Also Considers Them a Nuisance"

Veteran columnist Uzi Benziman wrote in popular, independent Maariv
(6/18): "The legitimacy of the settlement enterprise is already
being eroded, not only in the eyes of Israeli society as a whole,
but also in the eyes of the right wing camp itself.... When the
prime minister-who is, as we recall, the Likud leader-declares his
recognition of a Palestinian state on part of Judea and Samaria, he
necessarily recognizes the possibility that part of the existing
Israeli settlements will be compelled to hand over their land to
this state... He admits before the whole world that the settlements
are a nuisance, an illegitimate enterprise, and ways must be found
now to minimize their damage.... The practical attitude of the
Israeli governments towards the settlements pushes the state into an
absurd situation: Even though an absolute majority of Israelis and
their elected leaders recognize the burden that the settlements
impose on the state and its welfare, they continue to maintain and
cultivate them. This paradoxical conduct is made possible for known
reasons...(the fear of governments over the generations to clash
with the settler public, repressing the probability that a
Palestinian state will be established one day, the cocky belief that
it is possible to fool the entire world all the time), but the time
has come to break free of it.... Netanyahu's speech this week
determined what the settlements were for Israeli society; it now
remains to determine the price of their evacuation."





¶2. Iran

I: "West Failed to Anticipate Magnitude of Iranian Protest"

Alex Fishman, Military Commentator, wrote in the mass-circulation,
independent Yediot Aharonot (6/18): "Why do we have the feeling that
all those Western experts and intelligence officials... simply
missed a number of processes that were afoot within Iranian society
and fell asleep on the job? We can only hope that the information in
the West, and mainly in Israel, about the Iranian nuclear program is
a bit more up to date and accurate.... The current unrest is being
directed by conservative elites that are fighting against one
another.... If it forcibly suppresses the demonstrations, Iran will
enter a state of perpetual unrest.... The village fool in this story
is President Barack Obama. That man thinks that he is playing the
role of president of the United States in some Hollywood disaster
movie. He showed weakness in dealing with the Iranians when he
passed up on Dennis Ross's services as his representative in talks
with Iran. The Iranians demanded that Ross be ousted, and Obama
capitulated, despite his commitment not to allow any preconditions
to be set before the talks were held. In addition to Dennis Ross's
ouster, the Iranians set another eight preconditions that they are
demanding be met before the talks are begun. Then he threatened to
impose harsher sanctions against Iran without first coordinating
that course of action with the Russians. Russia laughed behind his
back and has been sabotaging the process. Then he announced in Cairo
that he was prepared, actually, to allow the Iranians to develop
their nuclear capabilities on their own for peaceful purposes.
Behind the scenes, the Americans are trying to sell the Iranians the
old and idiotic idea that Iran will develop its nuclear program on
Russian soil under Russian supervision. In tandem, the Americans are
trying to sell the Iranians an idea by the World Bank about a
peaceful nuclear program that will supply Iran with the fissionable
materials it needs. And today, in light of the events underway in
Iran, we see the leader of the free world stammering a few
non-committal and irrelevant statements. That too is something that
Israel needs to take into account."

II: "Iran Youth Bring Promise of Change to Islamic Regime"

Zvi Bar'el, senior Arab affairs commentator, wrote in the
independent, left-leaning Ha'aretz (6/18): "Iran's young generation
- which makes up 60 percent of the population and never experienced
the Islamic Revolution nor identifies with the ideology behind it -
is channeling all of its bottled-up economic, social and democratic
frustrations into the current demonstrations. At this point, U.S.
President Barack Obama's rationale that Iran's policy won't
radically change whether its president is Mousavi or Ahmadinejad is
of secondary importance. Protests are without a doubt in favor of
one symbol over another; in favor of a Green Revolution and a new
dream, rather than for an Islamic Revolution.... At this crucial
point, Khamenei has to decide how to react. He has three options: To
sacrifice Ahmadinejad; to clash with protesters and shed blood; or
to find a worthy compromise acceptable to Mousavi. It is highly
doubtful that Khamenei will call for new elections, but he might ask
Ahmadinejad to make a compromise "for the sake of national unity and
the revolution's honor."... Such protests can get out of hand, be
taken over by local leaders or simply dissipate - an outcome that
would be a long-term defeat for reformists.... The expectation is
that the regime will unbridle the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and
order a forcible clampdown on the protests. The chances he will call
for a compromise are also still considerable."

¶3. Midest

I."In the Aftermath of his Cairo Speech

Dov Contorer, contributor, wrote in the Russian-language
conservative daily Vesty (June 18):"In the aftermath of his Cairo
speech, the US President came back home and posed for a picture
during his telephone conversation with the Israeli Prime Minister,
with his shoe soles facing the camera (and the interlocutor [PM
Netanyahu]). Israelis can't say anything, because 'this is American
style', however the Arabs will understand immediately how President
Obama is treating PM Netanyahu.... This was a thought-through
gesture that President Obama would have never let himself do to the
Saudi King or President Mubarak. ... The Israeli side should find a
way to convey its dissatisfaction to the Americans. If we don't
want to have to deal with not only pressure, but also with growing
political disrespect from the White House, we have to define what
Israel believes to be unacceptable [behavior] towards it and its
Prime Minister."

CUNNINGHAM

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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SIPDIS

STATE FOR D(S), P, T, S/SANAC, S/SEMEP, IO, ISN, NEA
DOE FOR S1, OIP, NA-20
NSC FOR SAMORE, SCHEINMAN, RYU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2019
TAGS: PREL AORC PARM KNNP XF IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/GC: MIDDLE EAST MORASS

REF: A) UNVIE 413 B) UNVIE 402 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)

Summary and Comment
---------------------

¶1. (C) The state of play on Middle East GC issues leading
into the week of the September Board just before the IAEA
General Conference is grim. GC President Macmillan's effort
toward a consensus approach based on elements of a single
resolution is on temporary life support, though she is not
prepared to give up. None of the parties is seriously
engaging with the Presidency; the Arabs are uncompromising,
the Egyptians pay lip service, and Israel is taking a
familiar hardline. Israeli Ambassador Michaeli is asserting
that the point of departure for negotiations should be the
last, 2005, consensus resolution. He has signaled lack of
confidence in the GC President after becoming discomfited by
some of the negotiating language Macmillan floated (and has
since withdrawn in deference to Israel) that would have
implied a MENWFZ could come before peace. Michaeli has since
re-engaged and submitted Israeli suggestions to Macmillan and
Swedish Ambassador Lundborg September 4. We will encourage
Michaeli to stay engaged and reassure him we have his back
covered throughout this process. A Janus-faced Egypt puts on
its best face with the Presidency while taking a hard-line
with U.S. interlocutors and telling Michaeli he betrayed
Egypt's trust last year.

¶2. (C) The Arab Group is uncompromising in continuing to
insist on the separate Israeli Nuclear Capabilities (INC)
resolution, in accordance with AL Ministerial decisions.
They were "categorical" about this political mandate for a
separate resolution in a September 4 meeting with Macmillan
and characterized it as an issue of regional pride. In a
September 2 meeting with Ambassador Davies, Arab Group
Ambassadors joined by Arab League Multilateral Director
Al-Asad, who will report to the AL Council next week,
appealed for "dialogue" with the Obama Administration and set
the IAEA General Conference issue as a "testing ground" for
the 2010 NPT Revcon. In a September 3 meeting with S/SANAC
Einhorn, Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi took a similar line. He
noted he has no negotiating mandate on the Egyptian Middle
East Safeguards resolution, complained of Israeli
intransigence, and refused any linkage between the MES and
INC resolutions, other than to say consensus this year on the
MES might help lead to flexibility on the INC next year. The
Arabs are fairly cocky about defeating any "no action motion"
(though the like-minded continue to levy this threat) and do
not seem to have any compunction about once again derailing
the General Conference. Macmillan cautioned the Arabs about
the consequences of tabling the INC, the worst not
necessarily being a "no action" motion but killer amendments
to their sacrosanct text on the floor. She reported to
like-minded Ambassadors September 4 that this had not
occurred to the Arabs.

¶3. (C) There is some relative good news. The EU is too
internally divided to pursue (for the moment) separate track
negotiations with Cairo on the Middle East Safeguards (MES)
resolution delinked from the INC. We have strongly advised
against this course, which would undercut the Presidency's
efforts by allowing Egypt a fall-back option. The EU
Presidency is working closely with Macmillan on conceptual
elements that they are discussing with Egypt and Israel.
Although Macmillan prefers to insert such elements into a
single resolution, if the Arab Group remains obstructionist,
this effort could easily morph into an EU negotiation with
Egypt and Israel on the MES text. Director General ElBaradei
may also be prepared to play a constructive role in reigning
in the Arab Group. In his introductory call on the Director
General September 3, Ambassador Davies enlisted his help with
the Arab Group, which ElBaradei agrees is setting itself up
for another humiliation. The Director General has a vested
interest in ensuring that his last General Conference is not
marred by another Middle East debacle. End Summary and
Comment.

And Then There is the Iranian Agenda Item
-----------------------------------------

¶4. (C) Against this backdrop still looms the Iranian
supplemental agenda item on prohibition of armed attacks
against nuclear facilities, and no one has a clear plan of
how to dispose of it. The option of a General Committee
challenge remains the most expedient but it seems
increasingly unlikely that we will have the votes to defeat
it as Russia, Belarus and Cuba have recently been added to
the Committee roster. Canada argues that we should pursue a
challenge, win or lose, in the General Committee for
"demonstration effect." However, the like-minded have cold
feet about calling a Plenary vote should we lose in General
Committee. Macmillan is convinced that even if we win in
General Committee, Iran will call a vote on the agenda in
Plenary, a view also shared by Israeli Ambassador Michaeli.
With NAM support for the agenda item, we could lose such a
vote in Plenary. Iran further intimated to the GC President
that a resolution or text could be introduced under the
nuclear safety agenda item (as was the case inthe 1980s and
1990s) should its supplemental item be blocked.

¶5. (C) Meanwhile, the P5 1 are divided on the Iranian item.
Russia and China do not yet have instructions but, in a
bilateral conversation with Ambassador, Russian Ambassador
Zmeyevskiy was supportive in principle of the proposed agenda
item and disputed the argument that this is an issue for the
Security Council. In a September 3 P5 1 meeting, Zmeyevskiy
said he thought it would be very difficult to object to a
resolution under this item. Chinese Charge Huang said he has
requested instructions on a preliminary draft of an Iranian
resolution, but noted China was supportive of a resolution on
this topic in 1990. France and Germany signaled support for
blocking the item.

¶6. (C) Earlier in the week, Macmillan queried DCM about
attempting to talk the Iranians down to a Presidential
Statement, but would not pursue this without prior U.S.
agreement. Having met with Iranian Ambassador Soltinieh
September 3, Macmillan reported that he is still working on
the text of its resolution and seems to be having some
conceptual problems in getting NAM support for the substance.
Some of the NAM are also apparently leaning toward a
Presidential Statement. Like-minded Ambassadors discussed
September 4 the option of a no action motion on the Iranian
agenda item, with mixed feelings. Macmillan cautioned that
"no action" may turn the Iranian item into a cause clbre
for the NAM against the West, even among NAM who are not
favorably disposed toward the substance or Iran. Among the
JUSCANZ, Canada, Australia and the ROK would support a "no
action" motion on the Iranian item but Japan believes it
would be counterproductive to try to block the agenda item.
Canada is also proposing killer amendments to any Iranian
resolution adding references to safeguards, compliance and
calling on states to be parties to legally binding
instruments of which Iran is not a party. (Note: Some of
these suggestions could be subject to points of order as to
relevance. End note).

¶7. (C) A further option we have not disclosed to the
like-minded (so as to preserve the element of surprise) would
be to launch a pre-emptive strike by tabling a U.S.-sponsored
draft resolution under the armed attacks agenda item before
Iran submits its text. A U.S. draft could be loosely based
on the language of the consensus 1985 GC resolution on armed
attacks, focusing on peaceful development of nuclear energy,
safety and application of safeguards, in addition to some of
the Canadian elements. This would have the effect of
deflating the Iranian gambit, which has at best lukewarm
support among Member States, while aligning ourselves with
the principle as it applies to safeguarded facilities. As
resolutions under the same agenda item are considered in the
order in which they are submitted, it would be imperative to
submit a U.S. draft first. Mission welcomes tactical
guidance on options for dealing with the Iranian agenda item,
recognizing that the fate of this item will influence our
effort to keep a spotlight on Iran's own nuclear activities.
To increase our leverage, we continue to speak of the Iranian
item in tandem with the other Middle East issues, which the
Arabs are anxious to keep separate.

GC Presidency and EU Efforts Falter, For Now
--------------------------------------------

¶8. (C) While struggling to keep the idea of a single
consensus resolution alive, GC President Macmillan's efforts
have hit a number of roadblocks, both on the part of Israel
and the Arab League which has been dismissive of her
consensus approach. Rather than draft a single resolution
text, she has sought to distill the three main issues, NPT
universality, compliance and peace process/NWFZ precedence,
which have prevented consensus in the past. Once there is
agreement on these "concepts," consensus formulations could
be slated into a single resolution, or alternatively into the
Egyptian text. Macmillan has met both separately and now
together with Egypt and Israel and with the Arab Group
(Comment: This is likely a tactical retreat on the part of
the Arab Group so as not to be seen as rejecting her good
offices, ref b). Earlier in the week she floated possible
formulations of the three concepts for negotiation, including
the 2008 Algerian amendment on NPT universality, adherence to
"disarmament and non proliferation conventions" vice
compliance, and a re-formulation of the peace process
language. The latter, which recognized efforts toward peace
"including a NWFZ," caused particular Israeli umbrage as to
the issue of precedence. Israeli Ambassador Michaeli
conveyed his unease with Macmillan's efforts to Ambassador
Davies September 2 and insisted that negotiations should
include all that has been added to the Egyptian text since
the last consensus MES resolution in 2005. Having seen this
particular language, Michaeli subsequently complained
bitterly to Nuclear Counselor and publicly to like-minded
counterparts on the margins of a September 3 IAEA meeting.
By her account, Macmillan was distressed by Michaeli's
unhelpful attitude and took pains to explain to him that this
was text for negotiation. Given the Israeli reaction, she
now considered these proposals "dead." Since then, Macmillan
reported September 4 that Israel has come forward with
alternative proposals.

¶9. (C) In a joint meeting with Israel and Macmillan the same
day, Egypt was forward leaning and willing to work on text,
likely because the language met Egyptian redlines on
compliance and NWFZ vice peace process precedence.
Meanwhile, Michaeli continues to note that Egyptian
Ambassador Fawzi has no mandate to negotiate. Michaeli had a
different take on the meeting relayed to Nuclear Counselor,
though he acknowledged it ended in a boxing match. He and
the Egyptians, joined later by Macmillan, exchanged text
ideas on the compliance language, including a reference to
"commitments, obligations and conventions." Israel seeks to
retain "compliance" and is not supportive of the Algerian
amendment on NPT universality. Michaeli also suggested using
the 2007 MES language on peace process, but Fawzi seemed
disinclined. Lastly, Michaeli sought to delete operative
paras in the MES text that had been imported since 2005 from
UNGA resolutions. For his part, Fawzi aired familiar (and
disingenuous) complaints about not being consulted on the
Israeli amendments last year. Subsequent to this meeting,

Israel submitted its proposals to Macmillan and Swedish
Ambassador Lundborg to broker with Egypt.

¶10. (C) Even as Egypt has been playing "good cop" with
Macmillan, Fawzi took a harder line in a private meeting with
S/SANAC Einhorn September 3. S/SANAC Einhorn reviewed the
priority President Obama is attaching to improved relations
with Egypt and to NPT issues, and observed that Egypt and the
Arabs seemed headed toward prompting another "psycho drama"
in the GC that would not help them in real efforts to make
progress toward arms control lin the region. Fawzi responded
by claiming again that the GC is an opportunity for President
Obama to make good, and complained about Israeli
intransigence. Fawzi characterized Macmillan's efforts as
"dead" and continued to absolve himself of responsibility for
the INC resolution, other than to hold out hope that
consensus on the MES resolution this year might lead to
flexibility on INC next year. The Egyptians adopted a
similar tone with Ambassador Davies in a separate meeting
with the Arab Group September 3 (para 14 below). Meanwhile,
Macmillan vociferously denied to Msnoff that she was giving
up, and will keep trying as she sees no other way out of this
Middle East morass. She welcomed any suggestions on text and
in the meantime, she and Swedish Ambassador Lundorg had
decided to take a one-day break to let temperatures cool.

¶11. (C) Although the EU Presidency has been working closely
with Macmillan on formulations of the three main issues,
Lundborg has been inclined toward separate track negotiations
with Cairo on the MES text, in the hopes of generating
Egyptian good will and possible help on the INC. Asked about
"linkage" to the INC in a September 1 meeting with Ambassador
Davies, Lundborg inferred that this would not be explicit,
and acknowledged the risk that Egypt could pocket an agreed
MES text while doing nothing about the INC. In the worst
case scenario, he postulated a no-action motion followed by a
vote on the INC. Despite internal EU divisions, Lundborg
continues to take the lead in brokering text with Egypt and
Israel, working closely with Macmillan. His efforts could
easily morph into a separate EU negotiation with Egypt, if
the Arab Group continues to reject a single resolution.

¶12. (C) The EU is in disarray with no common position on this
approach. Swedish Msnoff reported an inconclusive CONOPS
meeting in Brussels that morning to like-minded (U.S, Canada,
Australia, Sweden, UK, France and New Zealand) experts
meeting September 2 with NSC Non-Proliferation Director Rexon
Ryu. The UK specified, however, that the EU had a common
position in so far as the INC not being a basis for
consensus, as was relayed in the EU letter to Arab League.
Beyond this, there is disagreement within the EU as to the
advisability of a separate track negotiation with Cairo. The
UK, France and the Netherlands seek linkage to the INC while
many other Europeans see the merit in cooperating with Egypt
as an end in itself, UK Ambassador Smith reported to
Ambassador Davies in a separate meeting September 3. Smith
added that the UK preference to insert a reference to the
Additional Protocol in Egyptian text has elicited European
hand-wringing. In the like-minded session, Australian DCM
also toyed with the idea of a separate track negotiation with
Egypt whereas Canada objected to anything short of a "package
approach," stating that it would not support an EU-agreed MES
text without a package. NSC Director Ryu advised the
like-mined of the whole-scale U.S. diplomatic effort vested
in the 2010 NPT Revcon and the attention this issue has
received at the highest level with Egypt. He supported the
effort toward new consensus in IAEA GC and encouraged the
like-minded to stay united so as to not give Egypt a tactical
advantage. Ryu observed that Egypt should not be given the
impression that there is more than one negotiating track or
an easy fall back, i.e., via a separate deal with the EU.

¶13. (C) GC President Macmillan also reported on her efforts
to the like-minded, saying that she was still hopeful and
would keep the single resolution idea alive. She had
received no positive feedback as the Arab Group continued to
defer to Ministerial decisions on tabling the INC. They also
reject any PRST. To have any chance, she needed support in
clearing this blockage. Egypt was more willing to engage on
the issues, she reported, but was equivocal in so far as
Fawzi's main concern is to protect an Egyptian text.
Macmillan added that Arab Group confidence in NAM support for
defeating a "no action motion" underlined their desire to
bring the INC to a vote, win or lose. Even countries like
Africa Group Chair Angola, which has close ties to Israel,
predicted solid Africa Group support against no action, she
noted. Still, the UK and others supported keeping the threat
of no action on the table. (Note: Privately, UK Ambassador
Smith was pessimistic about Macmillan's chances for success
but saw her efforts as tactically constructive. End Note.)
Canada observed that "no action" may not be the worst
outcome, worse still would be the collapse of the General
Conference (Note: Canada still predicates tabling a no action
motion on the basis of a reasonable chance of success. End
note). France was likewise pessimistic about the Arab
Group's being unconcerned in its insistence on tabling the
INC. French DCM surmised that creating a big fuss in Vienna
might serve the Arab Group's "real objective" by positioning
themselves for the NPT Revcon.

Arab League Not Ready for Compromise
------------------------------------

¶14. (C) In a first meeting with the Ambassador September 3,
the Vienna Arab Group (Chair Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Oman,
Jordan, Palestine, Arab League rep) joined by Arab League
Multilateral Director Al-Asad, appealed for a serious
dialogue on the substance of the Israeli Nuclear Capabilities
(INC) draft GC resolution and set this as first test of the
Obama Administration's non-proliferation agenda in advance of
the NPT Revcon. Arab League rep Wehbe opened by highlighting
AL SYG Moussa's personal effort toward moderating the INC
resolution last year (by changing "Threat" to "Capabilities")
and the addition in the current draft of a reference to
President Obama's call for a nuclear weapons-free world.
Al-Asad advised that he would be reporting his Vienna
consultations on this issue to the AL Council of Ministers
meeting in a few days. He hoped that President Obama's
commitment to disarmament and arms control would translate
into real action on NPT universality and rejected the premise
that Israel was being unfairly singled out. Syria stressed
not giving "immunity" to Israel while Oman, by contrast,
framed the issue as a regional one involving not just Israel
but Iran and other non-NPT parties. Jordan also injected
that there were other players in the region, not just Israel.
Arab Ambassadors voiced their disappointment with previous
GC outcomes, and the "psychological trauma" of no-action
motions, which they hoped to avoid.

¶15. (C) Ambassador Davies sought to portray Vienna issues in
a larger context and underline the President's sincere
commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament as the
centerpiece of his foreign policy. Recognizing the stakes of
a nuclear explosion, he hoped to return to the IAEA's
founding vision of Atoms for Peace. The Ambassador stressed
that Vienna could play a positive role in the process leading
up to the NPT Revcon, including by positive momentum toward
solving these Middle East issues. This would help make
Vienna "relevant." Ambassador Davies encouraged the Arab
Group to give the GC Presidency's efforts a chance so as to
avoid another debacle in the General Conference. He
questioned Arab Group openness to this effort toward a single
resolution and relayed Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi's earlier
comment to him that this was the Presidency's "right."

¶16. (C) Jordan advised that Vienna reps did not have
decision-making authority on a single resolution given the AL
Ministerial decision to table a separate INC resolution.
Egyptian DCM Sirry was more categorical in stipulating that
there was no room for merging the MES and INC resolutions as
they treated distinct issues. Msnoff noted the convergence
in the substance of the two resolutions, in particular, given
the Algerian amendment to the MES resolution on NPT
universality. (Comment: From the tenor of this discussion,
the Arab Group continues to give the GC President's effort
short shrift, despite having agreed to meet with her again on
September 4. End Comment).

¶17. (C) Sirry further highlighted the GC Middle East debate
as a first opportunity for the new Administration to
demonstrate its position on nonproliferation issues in the
months leading up to the Revcon. Joining the meeting late,
Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi took a similar hard-line accusing
the U.S. of double-standards in focusing on Iran while
blocking any effort to deal with Israel. Ambassador Davies
argued for a holistic approach to the Middle East via a
single resolution. Syria again injected that holistic meant
stop shielding Israel. Rejecting the argument that Israel
should be named only in tandem with other NPT non-parties,
Al-Asad noted that the 2000 NPT Revcon singled out Israel on
regional issues. He recounted how the Arab League had
modified its INC text four times over the years and appealed
for support but saw no movement from the U.S. Al-Asad
concluded the meeting by again presenting the IAEA GC Middle
East debate as a "testing ground" for the September UNSC
special session on disarmament, the Nuclear Security Summit
and other high-level events leading up to the Revcon.

DAVIES

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SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/P, EAP/PD - THOMAS HAMM
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S. BEEF IMPORTS TO TAIWAN

¶1. Summary: On November 4, Taiwan's major Chinese-language and
English-language dailies continued to give extensive coverage to the
controversy caused by the Taiwan government decision to allow the
import of U.S. beef and beef products. The pro-independence
"Liberty Times" ran a front-page banner headline reading "The United
States Warns That Setting Limitations on U.S. Beef [Imports] Is
Inconsistent with the Agreement [It Signed with Taiwan]." The
KMT-leaning "China Times," on the other hand, ran a front-page
banner headline reading "Legislative Yuan Rushes to Amend the Law to
Block U.S. Beef Imports."

¶2. Editorials and op-ed pieces in Taiwan's papers continued to
direct their criticism against the import of U.S. beef and offal at
the poor accountability and credibility of the Ma administration. A
column and an op-ed in the pro-independence "Liberty Times," a
"China Times" editorial, and an editorial in the pro-independence,
English-language "Taiwan News" all lambasted the Ma administration
for its opaque decision-making process. Several op-ed pieces have
linked the beef issue with the year-end city mayors' and county
magistrates' elections around the island and urged the public to
vote against the ruling KMT in the upcoming elections. A "China
Times" commentary criticized the pro-DPP Green camp for trying to
use the beef storm to beat up on the KMT and to fool the voters
during the election campaigning. An op-ed in the China-focused
"Want Daily" criticized Taiwan National Security Council Secretary
General Su Chi for seeking to link the decision to import U.S. beef
with the talks over the U.S.-Taiwan free trade agreement and U.S.
arms sales to Taiwan, saying that these are all separate issues. A
separate "China Times" op-ed, written by an associate professor in
food science, however, urged the public to look at the beef issue
rationally and said Taiwan does not have to renegotiate the beef
deal at the expense of its national credibility. An editorial in
the conservative, pro-unification, English-language "China Post"
cited the previous cases of referenda in Taiwan and said a
referendum on U.S. beef imports will not succeed in the end. End
summary.

A) "Ma Ying-jeou Is Still Fooling [the Taiwan People]!"

The "Free Talk" column in the pro-independence "Liberty Times"
[circulation: 680,000] wrote (11/4):

"The fact that the Ma Ying-jeou administration, given its black-box
[decision-making] process, has signed an 'unequal treaty' [with the
United States] on the imports of U.S. beef and thus sold out the
health of the Taiwan people has triggered [many] repercussions. In
order to 'put out the fire,' the Ma administration has worked out a
series of administration measures on the one hand, and some Blue
camp people, on the other hand, have stepped forward to demand that
[the Ma administration] renegotiate the deal. But a close look
[into all these actions] can tell [you] that Ma is just playing a
double-faced strategy; all these are nothing but feigning political
movements to fool the [Taiwan] people! ...

"The Ma administration claimed earlier that the agreement signed
between Taiwan and the United States has precedence over domestic
law, but now it is arguing that a series of administrative measures
will be able to block the imports of [U.S.] beef offal. [The move]
is akin to slapping one's own face; will the [Taiwan] people allow
Ma to continue fooling them at his will?"

B) "Looking at Taiwan's Security from [the Perspective of] Beef and
Ma"

Columnist Paul Lin wrote in the pro-independence "Liberty Times"
[circulation: 680,000] (11/4):

"... Evidently, the import of some risky parts of U.S. beef into
Taiwan has triggered people's alarm over their health and safety.
If the Ma administration does not want to renegotiate the deal [with
the United States], it will be difficult to resolve this safety and
health problem. ... China's opposition against the United States
normally stems from its ideology and need to vie for supremacy,
while Ma is inducing the [Taiwan] public to oppose the United States
in an attempt to cater to China and in the hope that the U.S.
government will not expose his green card and tax matters.

"The United States is Taiwan's best friend and the interests between
the two cannot be separated. This is the history and the truth.
Taiwan purchasing products from the United States serves the United
States' interests, but it must not endanger Taiwan's major
interests. Ma is hypocritical in the way that he tries to curry
favor with the United States by taking care of U.S. interests while
sacrificing the health of the Taiwan people. What really benefits
both countries is Taiwan's military procurements from the United
States, because that is also what Taiwan needs for its own security.
Ma is evil-minded in the way that he has been sabotaging Taiwan's
arms procurement from the United States for a long time while now he
is trying to curry favor with the United States by sacrificing the

health of his people. To resolve such a predicament, the Ma
administration should first admit its mistake to the U.S. government
that it has failed to take Taiwan's public opinion into
consideration. Only by apologizing sincerely [to the United States]
can there be a chance for the United States to consider reopening
the talks [on U.S. beef] ..."

C) "[The Ma Administration] Should Have Stuck to Its Original
Scenario Had It Known Earlier"

The KMT-leaning "China Times" [circulation: 120,000] editorialized
(11/4):

"With the [Taiwan people] remaining indignant over the U.S. beef
issue, the question that the public wants to know badly is: Could
it be possible that no one [in the Taiwan government] has ever
anticipated what would happen? Be it over-confident or cocky, one
thing is for sure: namely, the high-ranking [Taiwan] officials have
totally overlooked the impact [of the decision to import U.S. beef].
... Prior to the [decision to] open Taiwan's market to U.S. beef,
had the [Taiwan] authorities actually gone over step by step the
possible reactions of the public? Have they really thought it over
that as a responsible government, they should provide sufficient,
detailed and accurate information on U.S. beef to the people?
Information such as which country allows import of which part [of
U.S. beef], and which parts of the beef the Taiwan government plans
to allow to import and which does not are what the Ma administration
was obliged to tell its people before it made the decision to open
the Taiwan market to U.S. beef. ...

D) "An International Deal Is Closely Related to the Credibility of a
Nation"

Associate Professor Lee Hsiu-chin from Tajen University's Department
of Food Science and Technology opined in the KMT-leaning "China
Times" [circulation: 120,000] (11/4):

"...Given the [parts of] U.S. beef that the Department of Health
decided to import, the chances for getting ill by eating the most
risky part (i.e. ground beef) are 5.77 in ten billion. Some people
argued that 'we must not import it as long as the chance of getting
ill is not zero.' Such logic resulted from unlimited exaggeration
actually will not help to clarify the issue. No food can be said to
be 'one hundred percent' safe. The Taiwan people have consumed
boneless U.S. beef for three years now, which also carries a risk of
7.18 out of a trillion. Does that mean we have to ban the boneless
beef as well? The goal that public health is after should be to
work out an acceptable risk standard. ... In terms of U.S. beef, the
international standard is the one set by the World Organization for
Animal Health (OIE), which excludes all the specified risk materials
--the distal ileum of the small intestine and the tonsils, and the
remaining parts of the cattle are safe to eat. The protocol that
Taiwan signed with the United States has actually adopted a stricter
and more limited standard that that of the OIE. ...

"The next question then comes to: Can Taiwan unilaterally repudiate
the protocol it signed with the United States? The answer is yes.
It's not that [we] cannot do it, but the question is how much are
[we] willing to pay to do so? ... The key lies in the fact that
given Taiwan's difficult situation in the international community,
its credibility is the island's biggest asset. If Taiwan can rashly
repudiate a written international agreement, what else does it have
to win the trust of its allies or the international community?

"Finally, if the public has overwhelming doubts about U.S. beef,
what we should do is prevent the import of those controversial parts
[of the cattle] via powerful administrative measures under the
pre-condition that we do not violate the obligations stipulated in
our agreement. ..."

E) "Playing the U.S. Beef Card to Fool the Voters for Their Votes"

The "Short Commentary" column in the KMT-leaning "China Times"
[circulation: 120,000] (11/4):

"In the face of the mounting rage against U.S. beef in [Taiwan]
society, the Green camp decided recently not to beat up on the
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement [that Taiwan is planning to
sign with China] but to play the card of U.S. beef. Frank Hsieh,
the DPP's former presidential candidate, even said that as long as
the DPP can win seven seats in the year-end city mayors' and county
magistrates' elections, the Central Government will have to
renegotiate the [beef] deal with the United States and thus ban the
beef products that carry the risk of mad cow disease from coming
into Taiwan. But we dare guarantee that even if the Green camp wins
all the seats in the year-end elections, the Central Government will
not re-start the talks with the United States. ..."

F) "Beef, Free Trade Agreement, and Security in the Taiwan Strait"


Chen Yu-chun, a Taiwan academic now working as a senior research
fellow at China's Tsinghua University, opined in the China-focused
"Want Daily " [circulation: 10,000] (11/4):

"... [Taiwan's] National Security Council official used [the signing
of] a free trade agreement to emphasize why Taiwan had to yield to
the United States [over the import of U.S. beef]. But [the signing
of] a U.S.-Taiwan free trade agreement is an issue that has existed
for a long time. It is very nave to say that once Taiwan opens its
market to U.S. beef, Washington will sign the agreement with Taipei.
...

"The democratic government of Japan recently adjusted Japan's
security relations with the United States, a move that has drawn
grave concerns from the United States, which has already openly
urged Tokyo not to endanger the foundation of the Japan-U.S.
alliance. If Japan is altering [its policy], Washington will only
attach more importance to Taiwan's strategic position rather than
weakening it. At the current stage, China and the United States are
in a situation 'where they fight with each other without breaking
[the relationship], vie against each other without going to war.'
How is it possible that Washington will cast Taiwan's security
interests aside just in exchange for the beef trade that is of a
non-strategic level and thereby impact the United States' grand
strategic plan for China?"

G) "A Referendum on Beef Imports from the United States?"

The conservative, pro-unification, English-language "China Post"
[circulation: 30,000] editorialized (11/4):

"Taiwan's Consumers' Foundation and a few other private non-profit
organizations, including the Housewives' Association, are planning
to propose a referendum on the importation of American beef and beef
products that may by a one-in-a-billion chance cause bovine
spongiform encephalopathy or mad cow disease. ... We wish we could
wish them success. But we are afraid they won't get the endorsement
of enough voters to make the commission call the nation's fifth
referendum, even if the initial requirement of one tenth of the
signatures may be fulfilled. They must be reminded that none of the
four previous referendums were validated for lack of achieving the
necessary quorum of half of the electorate.

"One thing we can't understand is why organizers of the American
beef boycott campaign should try to beat a dead horse. As was
pointed out yesterday in a commentary article in Monday's edition of
this newspaper, the beef war between Taiwan and the United States is
over. The agreement won't be renegotiated, while people are free to
boycott risky ground and bone-in beef as well as offal. The
Department of Health has promised to ban them if there arises a
legitimate fear that the imports may spread any disease. As a
matter of fact, even without any boycott, the people of Taiwan, save
a few steak lovers, will venture to try American beef and beef
products they may consider unsafe for consumption. ..."

H) "Accountability Is Issue in Taiwan-U.S. Beef Flap"

The pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" [circulation:
20,000] editorialized (11/4):

"Yesterday's consensus among all parties in the Legislative Yuan to
rapidly approve a legal ban on the importation of beef products with
especially high risk of contamination of "mad cow disease" sent an
important message to President Ma Ying-jeou's Chinese Nationalist
Party (Kuomintang) government and decision-makers in Washington and
Beijing that voices of the Taiwan people cannot be ignored. ... The
promulgation of the market opening Monday evening together with the
announcement of Cabinet plans to adopt various technical measures,
such as demanding the defrosting of ground beef for inspection or
denying import permits, to technically obstruct the full opening of
the Taiwan market to U.S. beef was greeted with considerable
scepticism. Such scepticism is fully justified since it would be
difficult for the KMT government to explain to Washington why it was
obstructing a newly signed market - opening agreement. ...

"Besides announcing the consensus to approve the proposed revisions
by Nov. 17, Legislative Yuan President Wang Jin-pyng called on the
Cabinet to keep the door closed to such imports until the new
revisions were approved. The spotlight will now be shifted back to
the KMT to see whether the ruling party will use its nearly
three-fourths legislative majority to approve the revisions in the
face of anticipated pressure from the U.S. on the Taiwan government
to fully implement the protocol it just signed with Washington.

"Besides welcoming the KMT government's announcement of the protocol
to 'fully open its market to American beef and beef products'
Monday, the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Trade
Representative Office issued a veiled warning to the Taiwan

government not to subvert the protocol by stating that Washington is
'currently reviewing' the Cabinet's 'additional domestic measures'
in order 'to ensure they allow Taiwan consumers the opportunity to
enjoy the same safe American beef and beef products that American
families eat.' The problem is that many Taiwan consumers do not
dare to 'enjoy' such products because they lack confidence that they
are indeed 'safe,' concerns which received a timely boost by news
reports of two deaths in the U.S. linked to the consumption of fresh
ground beef believed to be contaminated by E. coli bacteria. The
exposure of the vulnerability of the KMT government to popular anger
could not have come at a better time since the Ma government is now
preparing to begin talks with the People's Republic of China on an
'economic cooperation framework agreement' which poses a far greater
threat to the livelihood and security of the Taiwan people."

STANTON

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DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/CM, EAP/PA, EAP/PD, C
HQ PACOM FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR (J007)
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL ECON KMDR OPRC CH

SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: PRESIDENT OBAMA'S VISIT TO CHINA

--------------------
Editorial Quotes
--------------------

PRESIDENT OBAMA'S VISIT TO CHINA

a. "China should have the ability to shape the U.S." (pg 14)

The official Communist Party international news publication Global
Times (Huanqiu Shibao)(11/19)(pg 14): "During his visit to Asia,
President Obama has shown frankness, wisdom and a desire to move
forward as a young American leader. Suddenly confronted with a
United States that has adopted a milder attitude, China should note
several things. First, China should not become cocky over the fact
that after the financial crisis the world is praising China's
economic model and criticizing the U.S. model. Second, China should
use this moment to look for diplomatic opportunities. China always
responded to American political signals rather than take the
initiative to provide advice in dealing with the United States. In
the future, China should shift its diplomatic focus to the American
people in the U.S., leading them to give up hostility and vigilance
against China and understand China better. And third, China should
be sober enough to see the limits of the changes in U.S. diplomacy.
That U.S. diplomacy is a mixture of ideology and dealing from
strength will not change. President Obama said in Shanghai that
American students coming to study in China will greatly increase, to
100,000. However, currently there are still no relevant official
regulations, or official fund, to guarantee that in the United
States. It would be a historical progress if the U.S. federal or
state government could take effective measures to support the issue.
In this way, 'mutual study and common progress,' proposed by the
U.S. Ambassador to China, looks likes it may be about to be
realized."

b. "Wen Jiabao: China opposes a 'G2'"

The Shanghai-based Shanghai Media Group (SMG) publication, China
Business News (Diyi Caijing)(11/19)(pg A3): "Although Obama is
trying to promote Sino-American cooperation, China clearly does not
support the concept of a 'G2.' Premier Wen Jiabao talked about the
reasons: first, China is a developing country with a large
population and still has a long way to become modernized; second,
China advocates independent diplomacy and will not ally itself with
any country; and third, China insists that all countries should
together make decisions on world's affairs, instead of one or two
countries. Shi Yinhong, the Director of Renmin University's
Institute of International Relations, said that a lot of Americans
are talking about a 'G2,' which is part of the United States'
strategy to get China to do things in accordance with the
recommendations of the United States on financial, economic and
international security issues. However, the U.S. emphasis on China,
reflected by the concept of a G2, is welcomed. China will not
sacrifice relations with other countries for its relations with the
United States. China will for sure promote diplomacy of its own, a
process in which the United States is very important."

c. "The invisible concerns of building a China-U.S. partnership"

The China Radio International sponsored newspaper World News Journal
(Shijie Xinwenbao)(11/19)(pg 2): "The U.S.-China joint statement has
shown an obvious characteristic of seeking common ground while
accepting existing differences. Experts believe that the statement
is a chance for the U.S. to adapt to the era and shows the U.S.'s
temporarily positive attitude about China's rise. Both countries
have honestly stated their stances on how to deal with each other's
core interests. On issues of China's core interests, like the
Taiwan issue and trade protectionism, since China has clearly made
its stance, the bilateral frictions on these issues will decrease in
the future. However, concerning core interests of the United
States, the frictions will increase. In contrast to China, the
United States is unwilling to talk clearly about its core interests
because they are difficult to talk about. They are also vague and
mutable. Given the recent global changes, it is good for the world
that China and the United States have affirmed their partnership to
jointly address global challenges. We hope, though, that this
partnership can become more practical."

d. "The common language of partners"

The official Xinhua News Agency international news publication
International Herald Leader (Guoji Xianqu Daobao)(11/19)(pg 10):
"Cooperation in more than 20 fields and about 45 times citing 'both
sides agree' in the U.S.-China joint statement has shown that
U.S.-China relations, after 37 years of development, are at a
critical time of deep cooperation. A partnership to deal with
common challenges - a new phrase to describe new U.S.-China
relations - reflects the common hope of both countries. Sino-U.S.
relations are definitely not characteristic of the 'beautiful and
moderate' relations between big powers. Although Obama's visit to

BEIJING 00003137 002 OF 002

China ended in a cheer, the difficult task of addressing U.S.
domestic concerns and convincing the U.S. public of the importance
of Sino-U.S. relations is still ahead. It is not easy for a
President with limited diplomatic experience. Obama's visit to
China is just a beginning."

HUNTSMAN